The U.S.-Philippine relationship is strong enough to survive the upcoming changeover in administration, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said yesterday, as he again affirmed Washington’s support for its “ironclad” security ally.
At a press conference during a visit to the Philippine military’s Western Command on the island of Palawan, Austin said that the Philippine alliance was a subject of strong bipartisan support in Washington.
“The strength of our alliance, I think, will transcend change in the administration going forward,” Austin said alongside his Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro, the Philippine Inquirer reported.
The defense chief also reiterated the U.S. support for the Philippines in the South China Sea, where it has faced increasing pressure from the China Coast Guard. Austin reiterated that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the bedrock of the U.S.-Philippine alliance, covers any armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea.
“Americans are profoundly committed to the defense of the Philippines,” Austin said. “Our commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty is ironclad.”
The two-year overlap between President Joe Biden and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has seen substantial advances in the relationship between Washington and Manila, including enhanced U.S. access to Philippine military bases, more frequent military exercises, and a $500 million injection of U.S. military aid. But as former President Donald Trump prepares to take office for the second time on January 20, a sense of uncertainty has settled over the relationship.
In an article last week, The Economist identified the Philippines as “one of many American allies around the world” that are uncertain about how Trump is likely to approach foreign policy. The transactional president-elect “tends to see alliances as protection rackets,” the article argued, suggesting that the administration is likely to put more of a burden on the Philippines to provide for its own defense. It is also likely to be skeptical of the case “for risking American blood and treasure to defend a collection of uninhabited atolls” in the South China Sea.
Outwardly, Philippines officials are confident that the relationship will continue on its current upward trajectory. Marcos spoke with President-elect Trump in a phone call yesterday, telling reporters that it was “very friendly” and “very productive” and that he would plan to see Trump as soon as he could. In a recent interview with the South China Morning Post, the Philippine ambassador to the U.S., Jose Manuel Romualdez, has also expressed confidence that the relationship will remain stable under the second Trump administration, but that Manila had other options if U.S. engagement weakened.
“While we are hoping that the United States will continue to remain engaged, because they play an important role, if they decide to scale down … it only emphasizes how important it is to have a multilateral approach,” Romualdez said.
Given his erratic character and apparent lack of attention, predicting the likely policy direction of an administration headed by Donald Trump is hard to do with even vague certainty. The first Trump administration was a tricky period for the U.S.-Philippine alliance, but this had more to do with the fact that it coincided with the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, who distanced himself from the U.S. and took a more accommodating position toward China.
Even then, the administration’s hawkish stance toward China created pressure in the direction of deeper engagement with the Philippines. In March 2019, Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. official to clarify that the U.S. security guarantee extended to Philippine vessels in the South China Sea, a question that had hitherto been uncertain. The position has since been repeated on numerous occasions by the Biden administration.
The Economist argued that the uncertainties of the Trump administration could require Manila to scale back its “assertive transparency” campaign, by which it has defied Chinese incursions into its exclusive economic zone and publicized the increasingly forceful methods that the China Coast Guard has used against Philippine vessels and personnel.
Beyond that, however, the likelihood is that the incoming Trump administration will keep its attention laser-focused on China. To the extent that the growing security cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines has grown from a shared concern about China’s growing power and ambition, this is likely to continue.
With allowances for some Trumpian lurches and prevarications, the underlying structure of great power competition between China and the U.S. is likely to prevent any serious weakening of U.S. engagement with the Philippines.