For Thailand, the road to 2025 has been frustratingly bumpy. In addition to the gloomy economic outlook, the accumulation of border tensions on land and at sea has prompted a growing chorus of public criticism against the Paetongtarn Shinawatra government and the military alike. While it may be accurate to say that average Thais couldn’t care less about security affairs, prolonged security tensions with supposedly “weaker” neighbors could deal a mighty blow to public morale and confidence in the country’s leadership. This is especially true against the backdrop of ongoing debates about military modernization.
The current most pressing security challenge is the encroachment by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), or the Red Wa, into Thailand’s mountainous northern borders, which have yet to be properly demarcated. The UWSA has been active since around the end of the Cold War and controls two autonomous and non-contiguous areas in Myanmar’s Shan State, one bordering China and the other adjacent to Thailand. It’s deemed one of the most formidable ethnic armies in Myanmar, with up to 30,000 combat-ready soldiers.
The fortification of the UWSA’s bases along the Thailand-Myanmar border dates back to 2002, and the group has since been periodically encroaching on Thai territory. Reports of its latest and boldest advance first emerged in late November, and December 18 was said to be the “withdrawal deadline” given by the Thai army. This has apparently gone unmet, and there’s no clarity – at least to the public – on Thailand’s next course of action.
The sense that the moment has come for Thailand to battle back, and that failure to do so would be costly, is therefore only natural. Failure to exert credible pressure wouldn’t just harm public perception; it would also embolden the UWSA and other borderland armed groups to use Thailand as their operational grounds. These groups include the Shan State Army-South and Karenni National Progressive Party, which, relative to the UWSA, have had more contentious relationships with the central government in Naypyidaw. So as Myanmar’s civil war rages on and the Tatmadaw continues to lose ground to resistance groups, Thailand’s tacit tolerance of these groups’ activities could increasingly strain the Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relationship.
It should be noted that the UWSA generates significant revenue from narcotics production and trafficking. Needless to say, much of the contraband flows through Thailand, and profits are reaped by certain Thai business operatives. Given this context, Thailand’s lack of decisive action against the UWSA perpetuates the impression among the public that some authorities are either complicit or benefiting from the illicit drug trade.
The geopolitical dimension also matters. Firm backing from China is what helps sustain the UWSA. Its undeterred growth as more or less a Chinese proxy, then, threatens to anchor Beijing’s presence within Thailand’s borders. This is uncomfortable, even as Thailand enjoys strong and cordial relations with China. The undesirability of such a scenario increases when Thailand considers its role as the only formal U.S. ally in continental Southeast Asia.
Yet the UWSA’s association with Beijing is precisely why a direct confrontation should be avoided. One doesn’t even need to think about the tension this would put on Thailand-China relations. From a purely tactical perspective, fighting a well-trained non-state army with reliable access to supplies from a major power, in highly challenging terrain no less, guarantees a resource-draining war of attrition.
An armed confrontation today would just catalyze an influx of refugees fleeing into Thailand, which would arguably be more resource-draining than the fighting itself. Thailand has humanitarian obligations to assist these refugees, and there’s no question that the aging nation needs foreign workers to thrive economically. The real question is how long Thailand can adequately care for both its aging population and foreign workforce without fanning the flames of nationalism. Thailand’s public health system, recognized as one of the best in the world, is beginning to buckle under the pressure.
Beyond the refugee issue, an armed clash would likely have spillover effects in several Thai border provinces, including Chiang Mai, Thailand’s second-largest city and a major tourist destination. Any damage to the tourism industry is bad news. As I recently told Deutsche Welle’s Tommy Walker, tourism is “the fastest and simplest way to generate GDP,” as other sectors “are lagging and need to undergo substantial structural reforms.”
Because the dangers of confrontation are more acute, chances are that Thailand will strengthen its military posture but won’t stray away from the traditional approach of combining pragmatism with vigilance, and favoring negotiations over combat, in its dealings with the UWSA. Public sentiment will grow sourer as a result, making improved strategic communication from authorities a necessity. The message should emphasize that Thailand’s “inaction” is not an incapacity to fight but rather, a calculated choice to avoid a counterproductive conflict.
At the bilateral level between Thailand and Myanmar, the border demarcation should be pursued more vigorously, even if it proves challenging under the current climate. As Thailand’s security expert Panitan Wattanayagorn highlights, the legally dubious status of the border has been a major enabler of the UWSA’s advances.
Ultimately, the unfolding situation leaves two reminders. First, it reflects Southeast Asia’s many silent border disputes – latent but prone to sudden escalation. Second, it repels the thinking that post-Cold War Thailand has no credible external enemy and that its armed forces are merely instruments of domestic political meddling.