Cambodia and Thailand have a maritime border dispute that dates back to 1973. Under the leadership of prime ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and Hun Sen, the Cambodian and Thai governments were able to begin the process of settling the overlapping claims by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2001. Due to domestic political instability in Bangkok, however, the two sides have more or less been frozen in their positions and have met no more than seven times over the past decade.
With the formation of the current Pheu Thai-led government in August 2023, there were hopes that negotiations would resume and both kingdoms would be able to “unlock” the sizable oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand. Settling at least part of the overlapping claims area (OCA) between the two nations would not only strengthen the energy security of both, but also provide impetus for working on their remaining land border disputes.
Under former Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, however, the direction of policy was unclear. Politicians were eager to move forward with energy talks in the lower portion of the OCA, the location of most of the known hydrocarbon resources, while the Foreign Ministry argued that Thailand should adhere to the 2001 MOU, which stated that the two nations should negotiate over the lower and upper portions of the OCA simultaneously. This lack of policy clarity from the highest parts of the Thai government have led to more than a year’s worth of deadlock and inaction.
When Srettha was removed from office by the Constitutional Court on August 14 and replaced by Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra, there was a renewed focus of Cambodian-Thai maritime border talks. Shortly after her appointment as prime minister, Thaksin, in a grandiose televised event, outlined his “Vision for Thailand.” Part of this included a pledge to restart negotiations with Cambodia aimed at resolving the OCA.
Loss of Narrative Control
Even before Paetongtarn took office, Pheu Thai’s conservative opponents have opposed the restart of negotiations with Cambodia, claiming that the MOU risks undermining Thai sovereignty. In June, the serial litigator Paiboon Nititawan, the deputy leader of the military-aligned Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), filed complaints to the Constitutional Court seeking to have the 2001 MOU annulled on the grounds that the MOU was a treaty and therefore needed parliamentary ratification. In early September, the court rejected the petition on the grounds that Paiboon had no standing as an injured party. But the opposition to maritime talks has continued to build, with the PPRP continuing to push for the scrapping of the MOU and sowing confusion as to what the agreement states. The PPRP has also whipped up nationalist fears that Thailand risks being forced to cede Koh Kut Island to Cambodia if the negotiations proceed.
The reason for this confusion can be laid directly at the government’s (i.e. Pheu Thai’s) doorstep. As well as the aforementioned lack of policy clarity, the party has failed to communicate its policies. This now threatens to derail its planned negotiations with Phnom Penh.
It was only on November 4 that the government finally allowed Suphanvasa Chotikajan Tang, the director-general of the Treaties and Legal Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to make a public announcement in which she explained to the public the legal issues surrounding the MOU and the position of the Thai government. Suphanvasa explained that the Cambodian claim on Koh Kut was unreasonable and not based on legal principles, that the island was indeed Thai territory, that the MOU is only an agreed framework for negotiation, and that any negotiations on the lower portion of the OCA, which includes the hydrocarbon resources, or the upper portion, which includes Koh Kut, had to be negotiated in parallel. She added that neither Thailand nor Cambodia could legally withdraw from the 2001 MOU and that any withdrawal had to be consensual.
However, this explanation was not enough. The reality is that the Thai government is currently reacting rather than proactively setting the narrative surrounding the OCA. The director-general’s statement has so far been the only official statement that directly addresses the OCA and 2001 MOU. The Thai government’s lack of a strategic public communication strategy is allowing false and politically damaging information to enter into the public narrative and is beginning to affect bilateral relations. Former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen recently addressed his country’s Senate regarding the issue and stating that negotiations need to be undertaken “with mutual respect” and musing whether the Thai government should enact a law categorizing nationalist protesters as “terrorists.”
Indeed, it is true that nationalist sentiment over territorial claims has led to violence between the two neighbors in the recent past. The first instance was the burning down of the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh in 2003 over allegations that a Thai actress claimed Angkor Wat belonged to Thailand. Second, was the short border war and military clashes from 2009-2011, when Thai nationalism flared over the disputed Preah Vihear temple.
Myanmar-Thailand Border Tensions
The Thai government’s uncoordinated communication strategy was again on display during a recent incident on the country’s maritime border with Myanmar. On the evening of November 30, a group of Thai fishing boats were approached by Myanmar Navy vessels in the Andaman Sea. During the encounter, one fishing vessel was shot at by the Myanmar Navy, and the Thai fishing vessel being taken to port in Myanmar.
Once again, Thai government communications were chaotic. Vice Adm. Suwat Donsakul of the 3rd Naval Region issued a press statement on November 30 stating that the Thai vessels “might have encroached on Myanmar territorial waters,” to a depth of 3 nautical miles. Confusingly, he said that he made this determination on the basis of data from the Sea Vision tracking system, a system that Thailand does not use to track fishing vessels. The same evening, the X account of the Thai armed forces further added to speculation by stating the ship had encroached 4-5.7 nautical miles into Myanmar waters.
Finally, on December 2, three days after the incident, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made an official statement in which she denounced the use of violence, informed the public that an official protest had been lodged with the Thai-Myanmar Joint Border Committee, summoned the Myanmar ambassador for talks, and promised regular public updates.
While Paetongtarn’s statement was largely in line with protocol, it only underscored the confusion in Thailand’s crisis communications, coming only after two other official sources released varying, and unverified, information to the public. Moreover, even if the Thai boat did cross into Myanmar waters, it was unprofessional and irresponsible for any Thai government sources to admit this. The reality is that the maritime border between Thailand and Myanmar lies in a zone of non-delimited territory and is unclear. By openly stating that the Thai vessel was in Myanmar waters, an official precedent was set for later negotiations between the two claimant states. If an area has not been legally delimited by two states, officials must never officially admit that a certain territory belongs to another state, which can undermine a state’s territorial claims.
A Strategy Needed
The lack of attention from the Pheu Thai government toward public communication is allowing governments’ opponents to muddy the narrative and create confusion among the public. The government needs immediately to prepare the ground with a preemptive media-based narrative. Months in advance of any negotiation regarding the OCA, the Foreign Ministry needs to inform the public about the 2001 MOU framework and the basic Thai position on territorial disputes with Cambodia. The ministry’s spokespeople must make continuous media appearances on TV, radio, and alternative media such as YouTube, where popular Thai creators like Sorayuth, Sonthi Limthongkul, Sirote Talk, Sunai, and Jomquan have tens of millions of subscribers.
The message needs to be consistent and easy to understand. A single speech is not enough. The Foreign Ministry and government spokespeople have to continuously inform and update the public to correct false narratives on a weekly and monthly basis. Lastly, the government needs to amplify its wins, such as when the aforementioned serial litigator Paiboon Nititawan failed in his attempt to annul the MOU, in order to dampen the effects of its opponents’ efforts.
The history and basics of the OCA are not difficult to understand, nor are the guidelines of the 2001 MOU. However, the government’s lack of a public communications strategy is allowing inconsequential voices to have outsized influence. The Myanmar case demonstrates not only a need for a unified narrative but also the need for a hierarchical and central node of strategic communications. Government officials and civil servants should never issue public statements before a single clear and consistent statement is provided from the top down. This preferably should be come through only two channels: the prime minister’s office, or an official government spokesperson. Only then should other government officials make public remarks. Crisis communications and diplomacy demand a strict hierarchy of information flows, which can inform discipline and create a unity of narrative, action, and response so that government is measured and prudent in its signals to domestic and international audiences.
If not dealt with, sparks of nationalist sentiment can easily catch fire. Nationalism is a powerful force and there is no more sensitive issue than that of national sovereignty. This was evidenced by the damage to relations with Cambodia during the Preah Vihear controversy in the 2000s, which led to border skirmishes between the two nations. Prudent, deliberate and disciplined strategic communications are essential to keeping these forces at bay if the Thai government wishes to maintain stable relations with its neighbors and make headway on the resolution of outstanding maritime and territorial disputes.