Pakistan’s parliament recently passed the Societies Registration (Amendment) Act 2024, which introduces new regulations for registration of madrassas (religious seminaries).
However, President Asif Zardari refused to grant his assent to the bill, a constitutional requirement for it to become law. According to Article 75 of Pakistan’s Constitution, a bill cannot become law unless both Houses of Parliament pass it and it receives the president’s approval.
At the heart of the controversy surrounding the bill is a proposal to reverse key reforms introduced in 2019. These reforms placed seminaries under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, recognized the ministry as the only authority to collect data on madrassas, standardized their curricula, mandated submission of annual reports detailing educational activities and finances, and banned teaching or promoting militancy, sectarianism or religious hatred. Additionally, each madrassa campus was required to register as a separate entity.
The proposed amendment, however, seeks a reversal of all these reforms. The most contentious aspect is the transfer of oversight and registration authority back to district-level commissioners. This reversal would also treat multi-campus madrassas as single entities. Thus, the new proposed amendment aims to curb central government influence by reducing the Ministry of Education’s role in shaping madrassa curricula and relaxing financial reporting requirements.
Historically, madrassas were registered under the colonial-era Societies Registration Act of 1860 at the district level, a decentralized system that gave the government limited control over madrassas’ curriculums, activities or funding.
The proponents of the bill, particularly religious parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) argue that by decentralizing control over madrassas, religious institutions would gain autonomy. For these groups, the centralization of madrassas under the Ministry of Education in 2019 represented an undue infringement on religious freedoms.
However, opponents, including Zardari, have raised concerns about the potential negative consequences of the reversal of the reforms, arguing that it could roll back years of progress, albeit limited, in establishing a unified regulatory framework for madrassas. The president has cautioned that the amendment could undermine Pakistan’s international credibility at a time when the country is striving to align with global standards on counter-extremism and financial accountability.
The reforms introduced in 2019 were, in fact, driven by international pressures, particularly from organizations like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog.
Pakistan remained on FATF’s “grey list,” between 2008-2010, 2012-2015 and 2018-2022, a designation for countries failing to meet international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. This status posed significant risks to Pakistan’s economy, including the potential loss of critical foreign aid, investment as well as a country’s access to international borrowing.
A key requirement for Pakistan’s removal from the grey list was establishing oversight of religious seminaries to ensure transparency in their activities and financial operations. In response, the reforms were enacted in 2019, classifying madrassas as educational institutions and placing them under the Ministry of Education’s jurisdiction and increasing control over their activities. These measures were then widely hailed as a step forward in aligning religious education with broader national goals.
But, even after the 2019 reforms, the government lacks an exact count of madrassas in the country and comprehensive data on their activities. However, the reforms then allowed the government and provincial Ministries of Education to intervene when necessary.
Amid the ongoing debate over the rollback of reforms, especially the president’s refusal to give the final assent, JUI chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman has warned of nationwide protests if the bill is not passed.
The rapid growth of madrassas in Pakistan over the last 40 years, suggests they have attracted substantial resources through donations, charity and other forms of funding. However, the lack of reliable data or transparency regarding these financial flows raises concerns about their accountability and further reinforces the influence of Pakistan’s religious parties.
In the 1980s, during Zia’s military regime, Pakistan’s madrassa system went through a transformation. Under the Islamization project, not only did Pakistan’s legal system undergo major changes but also, to strengthen alliances with religious groups, the Zia government implemented a formalized zakat (Islamic donation) system, which automatically deducted funds from bank accounts and directed them to institutions approved by religious leaders.
These changes along with international funding Pakistan received to support the mujahideen fighting to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan, spurred the rapid establishment of new religious schools across the country. Meanwhile, by the end of 1970s, the Afghan war brought millions of refugees into Pakistan, thousands of whom were orphaned children. Many of these madrassas served as orphanages.
But what initially seemed like a government-supported and international initiative gradually turned into a challenge. Without much state oversight, each madrassa gained the autonomy to shape their curriculum. Many focused exclusively on religious teachings and rote memorization, while neglecting essential subjects like science and mathematics. As a result, students often graduated with little to no practical skills, critical thinking ability or the capacity to integrate into broader society.
Many of these madrassas were subsequently criticized for becoming breeding grounds for religiously motivated extremism.
In January 2002, when Pervez Musharraf allied with the U.S. in its “war on terror,” he vowed to take action against radical religious groups and to reform the madrassa system, which had become globally infamous for its role in incubating extremism. But, despite these promises, Musharraf’s efforts were called into question.
Pakistan remained under intense international pressure particularly from the FATF regarding growing radicalism. Thus the 2019 reforms were an effort to address these concerns.
The proposed roll-back of the 2019 reforms risks undoing the little progress made so far.
The ongoing debate over the Societies Registration (Amendment) Act reflects the broader tensions in Pakistan’s efforts to balance religious autonomy with national and international accountability. As Pakistan grapples with the challenges of reforming its madrassa system, the outcome of this debate will have lasting implications for the country’s efforts to address extremism and to implement the reforms made earlier.