As Bangladesh reaches the six-month mark under its interim government, I write from Washington, D.C., as a Bangladeshi deeply invested in my homeland’s political trajectory. Our generation has grown up with resentment and disappointment, watching Bangladesh struggle to meet even the most basic expectations of its people. Meanwhile, nations such as China, Malaysia, Turkiye, Indonesia, and Vietnam – once comparable to Bangladesh in socio-economic and political realities – have surged ahead.
For years, we were told that Bangladesh’s large population was its greatest obstacle. Yet China, with 1.4 billion people, transformed itself from an impoverished country into a global superpower within just three decades. Instead of progress, Bangladeshis witnessed dynastic family rule, systemic corruption, and political patronage – factors that have stifled progress and left its national identity in question. Even today, outsiders still ask, “Is Bangladesh just another part of India?”– a telling sign of its diminished global stature. For a country of 180 million people, the world’s eighth largest country by population, this is far from the status Bangladesh should command.
The August 5 uprising offered a renewed sense of hope, raising the possibility of generational change finally breaking this cycle. That optimism intensified when Muhammad Yunus, the only Nobel Prize winner among 180 million Bangladeshis and arguably the country’s most internationally recognized figure, stepped forward to lead. For years, when people asked, “Who is the alternative?” personally, I pointed to Yunus. My trust was rooted in his merit – his rise to prominence was based on his own achievements and excellence, not on family or establishment connections, unlike many successful Bangladeshis.
However, the realities of the past six months have led me to question that optimism to such an extent that I felt compelled to write this article. I do so in good faith, hoping that the Yunus government will engage in self-reflection. With that in mind, I pose 10 hard questions covering issues rarely discussed in public discourse, but which I believe are critical to Bangladesh’s future.
1. What Is Bangladesh’s National Identity?
Nation-building requires historical foundations, as history shapes a country’s identity and aspirations. Over the past 16 years, a singular narrative of history has dominated. This narrative suggests that Bangladesh was born solely in 1971, created by one leader, with no significant past. Yet history tells us otherwise: the conquests of Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammad Bakhtiar Khilji, the Bengal Sultanate, and resistance of the brave people of this land against British colonial rule are all part of Bangladesh’s legacy.
Since August 5, the discourse has remained narrowly fixated on the past 16 years of political repression and misrule, overlooking the governance failures of preceding regimes and, more importantly, Bangladesh’s broader historical and civilizational foundations. This selective framing raises fundamental questions: Where should our national identity begin? Which historical events and figures should serve as the cornerstone of our state’s identity?
2. What Should Define Bangladesh’s Cultural and Religious Identity?
For the past 16 years, a country with over 90 percent Muslim majority has found its cultural and religious identity relegated to a minority position. The long-standing debate between secularism and Muslim Bengali identity has often served external actors, enabling a divide-and-rule strategy. Today, this division has reached a point where it poses an existential threat to national identity and unity.
Should Bangladesh adopt a secular identity shaped by external influences, or should it define itself based on its historical and cultural realities? Should religious identity override all other aspects of national identity, despite its proven ineffectiveness in the post-colonial era, which ultimately led to the Liberation War of 1971? What identity can truly unite our people?
3. Is Bangladesh’s Crisis One of Governance or Structural Limitations?
As a product of post-colonial world order, with 180 million people and limited land and resources, is Bangladesh’s problem simply poor governance, or is the issue deeply rooted in a constrained economic structure – a “small pie”? History suggests that successful nations first focus on enlarging the pie, working on economic development before fine-tuning governance, as seen in South Korea and Singapore.
Is Bangladesh’s constant oscillation between democracy and autocracy every 5–10 years truly fostering development, or is it merely a cycle of elite power struggles? If our diagnosis is wrong, can any proposed solution succeed?
4. Is Incremental Change Enough, or Is a Revolution Necessary?
The August 5 movement was initially called a revolution but is now described as an uprising. This distinction is not just academic – it has serious political and strategic implications. Revolutions bring systemic change, while uprisings often lead to a reshuffling of elites.
What makes August 5 different from past political shifts in the 1975s, 1990s, and 2006? Will this movement bring real transformation, or is it another chapter in the same cycle? Can Bangladesh achieve fundamental change through an uprising alone, or is a full-fledged revolution necessary?
5. Who Are the Real Stakeholders in This Government?
Beyond students, who played a crucial role in this movement that overthrow the past regime? What are the political credentials and affiliations of the advisers now leading the government? The interim cabinet is dominated by advisers past retirement age, despite the movement’s call for generational change. Yunus is a unifying figure with unique credentials people trust, but what about his advisory body?
Why is there no strong representation from middle-aged professionals and experts who have developed expertise in their fields? Do students – despite their passion and rightful aspirations – possess the necessary knowledge and experience to govern? Would they not serve the country’s best interests by remaining outside the government, acting as a pressure group, rather than becoming stakeholders in an administration that may fail, thereby undermining their own aspirations?
6. Why Is There No Merit-Based Reshuffling in the Government?
Cabinet reshuffles are standard practice in functional governments, yet this interim administration resists change despite evident inefficiencies and controversies.
What are the concrete academic and professional qualifications of the advisers? Beyond finance and economics, do they have expertise in security, diplomacy, and governance? If the argument is that the post-August 5 transition was rushed, shouldn’t six months have been enough to reassess and restructure?
7. Why Is There No National Security Reform Commission?
One of Bangladesh’s greatest failures over the past 16 years has been its lack of military and intelligence capabilities, allowing India to systematically weaken the country’s state structure. The Bangladesh military remains non-combat ready, focused instead on internal security and U.N. peacekeeping missions, while intelligence agencies lack professionalism and an externally focused mandate.
Why hasn’t the interim government prioritized national security reforms, such as establishing a National Security Council? Numerous reform commissions exist, yet not a single one is dedicated to national security and defense. If Bangladesh had a stronger military and resilient intelligence apparatus, would we have witnessed the Bangladesh Rifles carnage of 2009, regular border killings by India’s Border Security Forces, or the influx of millions of Rohingya refugees?
8. How Will Bangladesh Navigate the Coming Geopolitical Storm?
Much like in 1971, the world is moving toward a new Cold War, and Bangladesh risks being caught in the crossfire. Yet, the interim government’s foreign policy sounds no different from the previous regime’s outdated dictum of “friendship to all, malice toward none” – a sentiment recently echoed by the foreign adviser. His recent remark that Bangladesh will maintain good relations with India, China, and the U.S. is identical to past regime’s foreign minister’s statement.
Who in the cabinet has the geopolitical expertise to navigate the geopolitical headwind that the country is about to encounter? The past regime actually had no foreign policy, as I explained here. How does this administration’s approach differ from its predecessor’s failures?
9. Will This Government Leave Bangladesh in a Better Position?
At Davos, Yunus claimed that the previous regime fabricated economic data. Even if that were true, living standards did improve compared to pre-2008. The past government justified its rule by arguing that economic progress required a trade-off with security, leading to minimal economic gains at the expense of sovereignty.
Can this government confidently say that, when it leaves, Bangladesh will be better off both in security and economic prosperity? If so, why is there no visible progress in six months?
10. What Are the Tangible Metrics for Success?
Upon his return from Paris, on August 7 at Dhaka airport, Yunus called this movement “Bangladesh’s second independence” and “Bangladesh 2.0” – implying a fundamental departure from the past. Yet, in six months, no structural changes have been seen. In a recent interview, Yunus admitted lacking political talent, akin to a pilot mid-flight confessing he doesn’t know how to fly.
How should Bangladeshis find assurance that country is in the right hands, and how should we measure this government’s success? What tangible benchmarks will determine whether August 5 was a real turning point or just another repeat of 2006-08?
A Plea for Real Change
These are not just abstract political debates; they are pressing concerns that will shape Bangladesh’s future in the years to come. One generation may pass, but a nation must always strive to be a better place for the next. The real question is: Are we leaving behind a stronger, more prosperous Bangladesh for future generations? Bangladesh cannot afford another failed transition, nor can we afford to repeat the cycle of 2006-08 and its aftermath – a period that claimed the lives of thousands of young people.
This nation stands at a historic crossroads. We must not fail.