The Arakan Army (AA) has gradually become the dominant military force in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It has captured more than 80 percent of the western state, leaving only a few key urban areas such as Sittwe, Manaung, and Kyaukphyu in the hands of the Myanmar military. As the AA gained significant territorial holdings, it has established parallel governance structures and is now in position to achieve greater autonomy and self-determination in the region.
What are the prospects for an AA-led Rakhine State, particularly in terms of international recognition? Past secessionist movements in other parts of the world – such as in Kosovo, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Timor-Leste – provide potential pathways for the AA. One key factor will be the response of stakeholders such as China, India, ASEAN, and Western governments – and the economic and security concerns of Bangladesh and other neighboring states.
The Arakan Army’s Governance and State-Building Efforts
The AA’s significant control of major territory has dramatically altered the political landscape of Rakhine State. The AA was founded in 2009 and has grown into one of Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), boasting sophisticated military and governance structures. Rebel groups that are seeking legitimacy often set up governance structures that mimic state-like institutions. The AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has tried to follow this model as well, implementing its own systems for judicial and legal matters, taxation and revenue collection, security and administration, and social services.
The ULA has been establishing its own courts and legal code in parallel to Myanmar’s existing legal framework. Customary Rakhine law, Buddhist legal traditions, and adapted elements from Myanmar’s existing legal system form the basis for its legal code. Its courts are functioning independently in AA-controlled areas to handle civil disputes, property conflicts, and minor criminal offenses. The courts operate at the village, township, and district levels with a hierarchical appeals process.
Community views on the ULA judicial system are mixed. Many Rakhine people consider it as an attractive alternative to the ineffective and corrupt Myanmar legal system, while some fear the lack of standardized legal protections and due process. Nevertheless, the ULA has tried to enhance its credibility through the appointment of trained paralegal personnel and the timely resolution of cases.
The ULA claims that it is funding its administration and governance through a structured taxation system, collecting levies from businesses, agricultural production, and cross-border trade. Fees on goods moving through AA-controlled territory are also imposed, and the taxes key industries, including fisheries, rice production, and timber, with varying rates that are based on economic output. Furthermore, businesses in urban centers must pay licensing fees while international trade with Bangladesh and India provides another revenue stream.
Given the dire humanitarian situation in Rakhine State due to the ongoing conflict, some local businesses view taxation as an economic burden. Others appreciate the relative stability the AA provides compared to extortion by Myanmar’s military and local militias.
The AA controls key transportation hubs and ensures public order through its armed forces. It has set up a decentralized security structure, with district-level military commanders overseeing law enforcement. The AA has established village security units to handle local security concerns, with directives coming from the AA’s central leadership. These units enforce curfews and conduct patrols in areas of ongoing military threats.
The ULA has initiated basic education and healthcare programs, recruiting volunteer teachers and medical personnel. Schools in AA-controlled areas follow a modified curriculum that includes Rakhine history and culture, in contrast to the centralized Myanmar education system. Healthcare clinics provide basic medical services, with limited access to advanced treatment. Although these efforts are underfunded, they have gained civilian support by addressing longstanding service gaps.
This pattern resembles the governance model of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar’s east and other secessionist movements worldwide. The AA/ULA’s growing administrative capabilities position its territory as a potential de facto state, even if formal recognition remains elusive.
The effectiveness of these governance structures will determine the AA’s ability to sustain long-term autonomy. Political and economic stability along with strategic diplomatic capability are essential for gaining international recognition and political legitimacy.
Considering the current political climate, the AA has three potential trajectories.
First, it could achieve considerable autonomy within a federal Myanmar. The AA’s leadership has consistently indicated its ambition for Rakhine State to achieve a status of no “less than a confederate.” The AA may therefore seek to negotiate an autonomous region within a federal Myanmar similar to the Wa Self-Administered Region.
The second option for the AA is to declare independence unilaterally; however, the AA might face political and economic isolation without achieving international recognition.
The third option is essentially the status quo: the AA may function as an unrecognized state and engage in trade and diplomacy without full recognition from neighboring countries and international community.
Comparative Case Studies of Independence and Secessionist Movements
Other self-determination movements from around the world hold lessons for the AA in its quest for a more formal autonomy or even independence.
Eritrea (1993): Eritrea is an interesting case study as it achieved independence through a combination of armed struggle, international diplomacy, and strategic negotiation. Although there was initial reluctance from global powers to recognize its statehood, Eritrea secured sovereignty through a U.N.-supervised referendum. The AA could study Eritrea’s success in sustaining insurgency and territorial control for a longer period while working to secure international legitimacy. This can be made possible by engaging with global institutions and neighboring states to solidify its territorial claims.
Timor-Leste (1999–2002): In Timor-Leste, independence resulted from a decisive referendum and U.N. peacekeeping intervention. Beyond armed resistance, the strategies of Timorese rebel groups included diaspora advocacy, diplomatic lobbying, and leveraging international humanitarian concerns to gain global support. The AA could draw from this model by mobilizing the Rakhine diaspora outside Myanmar, seeking international involvement and support.
Kosovo (2008): Following NATO intervention and a period of U.N. administration, Kosovo achieved independence through backing from the United States and major European powers. Its cause was helped by a ruling in its favor by the International Court for Justice, which found that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Kosovo secured international recognition from over 100 U.N. member states although its U.N. membership remains blocked due to opposition from Serbia, Russia, and China. The AA could follow Kosovo’s successful diplomatic strategy in gaining international support and humanitarian assistance.
South Sudan (2011): As part of a broader peace process, South Sudan secured independence through a U.N.-backed referendum in which 99 percent of the population voted for independence. This was made possible through sustained diplomatic engagement supported by regional and international actors. The AA currently lacks an equivalent mediation process; nevertheless, it could seek regional or international mediation through China, ASEAN, or neighboring countries with the end goal of a recognized governance arrangement.
Somaliland (1991–present): Somaliland presents a compelling case study that might follow a similar pattern as the AA in Rakhine State. Without international recognition, Somaliland has been able to establish itself as a functional government with elections and stable foreign trade. Somaliland operates as a de facto state with diplomatic ties to regional and international actors. The AA could employ a similar state-building approach, strengthening governance, security, and economic institutions to enhance legitimacy while pushing for gradual international recognition.
Global Geopolitical Interests
International recognition of breakaway states is largely based on and driven by geopolitical interests instead of strict international legal norms. Major global powers accept or object to recognition of new states in accordance with their strategic priorities, alliances, and rivals. Take Kosovo as an example: the Western nations recognized Kosovo’s independence in order to counter Russian and Serbian influence. The same case is true for Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which served as a challenge to Western-backed Georgia. With that in mind, the interests of major players like China, India, Bangladesh, and Western powers could determine prospects of a potential AA-led Rakhine state.
For China, stability within Myanmar – and especially Rakhine State – is a key strategic interest. Rakhine State is home to many Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, including the Kyaukphyu deep sea port and oil and gas pipelines. For China, Rakhine State serves as a critical land and maritime corridor, facilitating access to the Indian Ocean and reducing reliance on the vulnerable Strait of Malacca.
Additionally, Myanmar is also a buffer state in China’s efforts to counter Western and Indian influence in Southeast Asia. Despite criticism and condemnation from the international community, China has maintained pragmatic engagement with the Myanmar military to in addition its considerable influence over major EAOs.
Given China’s vested interests in Myanmar, the AA will need to carefully navigate diplomatic engagement with China. Any governance arrangement that the AA/ULA aspires to achieve must offer China economic and security guarantees that align with Beijing’s regional ambitions. This means the AA must protect Chinese investments, maintain political stability in Rakhine State, and mutually collaborate on infrastructure development projects that benefit both Rakhine people and Chinese economic interests.
India is another key regional player under its Act East policy, aiming to strengthen India’s connectivity and influence in the Southeast region. New Delhi’s main concerns are stability in its northeastern states and countering Chinese influence in Myanmar and ASEAN. India’s strategic investments in Myanmar include the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. Like China, India is maintaining its diplomatic flexibility, engaging with both the Myanmar junta and EAOs operating near its borders, including the AA.
The AA must explore bilateral engagements with New Delhi, emphasizing shared security interests and economic cooperation. The AA could highlight its role in ensuring regional stability and countering insurgency threats along India’s northeastern border. It must also show a willingness to protect India’s strategic investment in Rakhine State and propose trade partnerships or infrastructure projects that align with India’s Act East Policy and economic ambitions in the Indian Ocean. India would like to see the AA position itself as an alternative force to counter China’s influence in Myanmar’s coastal regions.
The U.S. and major European powers are likely to support the AA’s self-determination movement if the group aligns with their broader human rights and democracy agenda. If the AA’s governance model in Rakhine state can showcase democratic values and a commitment to human rights, it is likely to gain Western diplomatic engagement and support. Nevertheless, the changes in the United States’ political leadership and the broader trend of democratic backsliding globally might introduce uncertainty, making sustained diplomatic engagement less predictable.
Bangladesh is the only country that shares a border with Rakhine State. Dhaka has expressed concerns about potential instability and refugee movements, particularly given the history of Rohingya displacement. What Bangladesh wants most is to see the safe repatriation of the 1 million Rohingya refugees currently living on its soil. The AA must answer questions about how it plans to address Rohingya issues in order to prevent Bangladesh from opposing its international recognition. The AA should also show its openness to potential trade ties with Bangladesh.
Regardless of how the AA/ULA handles its diplomatic affairs, the Myanmar junta will oppose any move toward recognition or autonomy of the state, intensifying military offensives with aerial bombing and strikes. The AA must prepare for long-term resistance while building governance structures and seeking regional mediation for a peace agreement.
How the AA/ULA Can Make the Case for Its Political Legitimacy
While individual countries have individual geopolitical interests to consider, the Westphalian norm of territorial integrity poses an additional challenge when it comes to recognizing new states. The principle of non-intervention held by the United Nations and regional organizations such as ASEAN makes formal recognition unfeasible. The AA could overcome this challenge by pushing for “special autonomy” as an interim arrangement. Similar to the Aceh model in Indonesia, AA could initially seek greater autonomy within Myanmar before pursuing formal international recognition.
If the AA/ULA has proven its ability to establish an effective governance system in the areas under its control, it could seek de facto recognition through trade agreements and political engagement, similar to Somaliland’s approach. Furthermore, the AA could leverage international humanitarian concerns to gain international support, as seen in Timor-Leste’s case. The Rohingya issue remains a key international concern especially for Bangladesh, and this presents an opportunity for the AA to position itself as a responsible governing authority by demonstrating its commitments to minority rights, inclusive governance, and conflict resolution.
Not only Bangladesh but the entire international community will scrutinize the AA’s treatment of ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya. Many secessionist movements struggle with legitimacy due to shortcomings in their governance, especially regarding the rule of law, human rights protections, and democratic governance. The AA could improve its credibility by implementing inclusive policies and ensuring minority rights protections, as well as transitioning from a military organization to a civilian-led government structure. In AA-administered regions, the group could establish independent institutions and mechanisms for anti-corruption, transparency, and the rule of law. This would strengthen the AA’s appeal as a viable state government.
Finally, economic sustainability is crucial when it comes to international recognition. The AA must demonstrate that an independent Rakhine State would be financially self-sufficient and not overly reliant on external aid.
Rakhine has offshore gas reserves, fisheries, and tourism potential. The AA could negotiate economic partnerships particularly with China and India to use these resources and enhance the financial stability of the state. The AA could make Rakhine State an important commercial hub by establishing ports and trade routes, similar to how Somaliland engages in trade with the Gulf states despite lacking formal recognition.
In the end, sustained peace and political stability are key for attracting investments. The AA can attract foreign investments by ensuring political stability, legal protections for investors, and infrastructure development plans.
Conclusion
The Arakan Army’s territorial gains and its governance ability have positioned the AA/ULA well to be a key driving force in Rakhine’s political future. Although an independent Rakhine is unlikely to gain widespread international recognition, a de facto autonomous region under AA control appears increasingly plausible.
The international response will depend on economic interests, security considerations, and broader geopolitical calculations. Lessons learned from case studies such as Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Somaliland demonstrate that sustained diplomatic engagement, effective governance, and economic viability will be crucial for any recognition efforts. Further research should examine the evolving nature of rebel governance in Myanmar and how regional actors adjust their policies in response to the AA’s growing influence and its territorial control in Myanmar.