Iran is currently undergoing a period of strategic reorientation. It faces energy and economic crises and its regional ascent has been reversed by events in Syria and Israel’s weakening of Hezbollah. Tensions with the United States could also soon intensify, with the Trump administration signaling a return to the “maximum pressure” policies of its first term. These circumstances have pushed Iran to implement its long-awaited “strategic partnership” with Russia, seek partnerships with fellow BRICS states like Ethiopia, and redouble its long-shot campaign to persuade the United States to resume nuclear talks.
Amid this reorientation, Iran has quietly begun to court Afghanistan. This week, Abbas Araghchi conducted the first official visit to Kabul by an Iranian foreign minister in eight years, and the first since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. With this visit, Tehran appears eager to overcome key points of contention with Kabul, with the clear aim of bolstering economic relations. However, closer cooperation between these regimes comes with significant risks for the wider region.
Difficult Neighbors
For decades, the Islamic Republic’s stance toward Afghanistan centered on support for the Hazaras, the country’s Shia minority. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Iranian regime provided them with arms and accepted displaced members of the community as refugees. This put Iran at odds with the Taliban as they consolidated their rule in the 1990s following Soviet withdrawal, especially as Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) personnel were deployed to assist the Hazaras directly.
After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies, the country’s new government sought to establish cordial relations with Iran. However, this was undermined by Iranian efforts to covertly supply weapons and funding to the Taliban and provide refuge to fleeing al-Qaida leadership. Disputes over water rights and border crossings also became increasingly significant in bilateral relations, despite the implementation of tenuous agreements seeking to resolve these issues in 2016 and 2018, respectively.
The Syrian Civil War also emerged as a key issue. In 2012, Iran began to recruit Afghan Shias (primarily Hazaras) under the auspices of the Fatemiyoun, an IRGC-manufactured militia, for deployment to Syria. Over the course of the conflict, the militia participated in key battles and ballooned to an estimated 10,000 soldiers. Afghan politicians decried these activities, particularly over concerns that they could stoke sectarian conflict in Afghanistan.
Though Iranian officials decried aspects of the Taliban takeover in 2021 and paid lip service to concerns over international law, then-President Ebrahim Raisi also celebrated the U.S. “military failure” that had been inflicted. Reports also emerged that the Islamic Republic offered bounties for U.S. personnel killed by the Taliban, egging more direct military confrontation. Despite initial efforts to court the resurgent Taliban, the Islamic Republic ultimately decided not to recognize the Taliban’s government, citing a lack of “inclusivity” – a nod to concerns over the rights of Shias. Nevertheless, regime officials and aligned media largely cheered the Taliban’s victory, even claiming that they became part of the “Axis of Resistance.”
This honeymoon did not last, as old scars quickly reopened. Clashes on the border in 2022 and 2023 brought resumed tensions, which intensified as Tehran accused Kabul of restricting the flow of the Helmand River, a key water source for northeastern Iran. Some have speculated that the issue of water in particular could spark eventual war between the Islamic Republic and the Taliban.
In some ways, these diplomatic issues still served to the benefit of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s porous northeastern border enabled the influx of millions of Shia Afghans since 2021, many of whom have been offered the rights to work, vote, and possess an Iranian passport under “special permanent residence.” This offered the Islamic Republic a new constituency of voters, a recruiting pool for the IRGC, and a means of alleviating the country’s declining birthrate. Lack of access to water and Taliban repression have been driving forces behind these trends, making them acceptable problems for the Islamic Republic.
These challenges aside, Iran re-established diplomatic ties with Afghanistan in 2023, stopping short of formally recognizing the Taliban’s rule.
Becoming “Brotherly Countries”
Despite Tehran’s tendency to tolerate tensions with Kabul, relations began shifting in a new direction. In 2024, shared issues with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and enmity toward Israel created the impetus for enhanced dialogue, though the Taliban’s apparent promises to send fighters to support Hezbollah never materialized.
This intensifying political alignment laid the groundwork for increased economic cooperation. In the face of financial pressure, the Raisi administration secured a $35 million agreement with Afghanistan in February 2024, allowing the Taliban use of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port, enabling Afghan exports to avoid transit through Pakistan. Eyeing eventual transit links with China, Iran also negotiated an agreement in subsequent months to bolster railway connectivity with Afghanistan. Over the course of 2024, Iran and Afghanistan saw rapid growth in bilateral trade as a result of these actions.
Negotiations through 2024 laid the groundwork for Araghchi to visit Kabul this year. During his visit, Araghchi of course urged his Taliban counterparts to protect the rights of Shia Afghans, respect previous agreements on water access, and to facilitate legal immigration of Afghans into Iran. Acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund welcomed these requests, calling for positive relations between Iran and Afghanistan as “brotherly countries.” Araghchi later dismissed these issues as a “normal dispute.” Ultimately, both parties effectively agreed to resolve these issues fully at a later date. Contrary to expectations, the Iranian delegation did not appear to challenge recent Afghan efforts to dam the Helmand River.
Iran’s strategic reorientation was apparent during Araghchi’s visit. Rather than focusing solely on issues that have defined Afghanistan-Iran relations in recent years, Tehran’s pursuit of new trading partners was front and center during Araghchi’s visit. The foreign minister was accompanied by a large commercial delegation, and he dedicated much of his visit to meeting with business leaders. He urged further joint investment, eventual tariff elimination, and increased Afghan exports to Iran – and promised to pursue a preferential trade relationship. Should these measures succeed, Afghanistan could become a significant export market for the Islamic Republic.
Araghchi’s visit ultimately ended on a positive note, prompting speculation that the Islamic Republic could soon recognize the Taliban’s rule, and begin negotiations on a more formal agreement.
Wider Risks
Iran’s overtures to the Taliban come with several risks, and expanded commercial relations may be exploited for re-establishing the regime’s regional posture. First, Iran may eventually use commercial relations with Afghanistan to facilitate the repatriation of Fatemiyoun fighters, something that the Taliban have resisted. Iran has previously used commercial activities as cover, particularly in the movement of arms and personnel to Syria and Lebanon. Once in Afghanistan, these fighters could be used as a political cudgel by the IRGC, possibly to foment sectarian violence.
Second, Iran could use an expanded presence to recruit further personnel for its militias from within the Hazara community – especially given that the Islamic Republic has already used warming relations with Afghanistan expand ties to the country’s Shia ulema. If it is not mobilized in Afghanistan, an expanded Fatemiyoun could be deployed in other theaters alongside the IRGC, including Yemen, Iraq, or inside Iran.
Finally, the Islamic Republic is likely to use Afghanistan as a means of evading international sanctions, especially through the creation of an overland trade route to China. Access to new capital in this manner will almost certainly be used by the Iranian government to rebuild its proxies and support its military capability.
As Tehran continues to pivot, its growing engagement with Kabul underscores a calculated effort to navigate its own economic and geopolitical challenges. Though Araghchi’s visit may have marked a turning point in Afghanistan-Iran relations, it also signals the creation of new risks for an already volatile region.