The ongoing power struggle between the Kandahari and Kabuli factions of the Taliban has garnered significant attention in post-Soviet media spaces. This internal conflict, which could potentially lead to a shift in Afghanistan’s leadership, reveals the complex dynamics at play within the organization.
Central to this struggle are the disagreements between the leader of the Taliban movement, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, and Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Haqqani, concerning governance approaches and Afghanistan’s international role. These internal divisions highlight the lack of a cohesive vision among the Taliban’s top leadership. Such fragmentation at the highest levels of leadership has several significant implications, and serves to exacerbate the international community’s distrust toward Afghanistan’s current authorities.
However, the lack of international recognition for the Taliban government extends beyond this internal discord. Several factors contribute to this continued non-recognition, ranging from the Taliban’s problematic history and widespread global condemnation of its lack of inclusivity, to the shifting geopolitical landscape and the persistent presence of radical and terrorist elements in Afghanistan.
These, and other factors, combined with the internal power struggles, create substantial obstacles to international recognition. Despite controlling Afghanistan for over three years, the Taliban regime remains largely unrecognized globally, with only limited engagement from neighboring states and powers like China and Russia.
A Matter of Distrust
The international community’s distrust of the Taliban government is a primary obstacle to recognition, stemming from historical precedent, a lack of inclusive governance, and internal political fragmentation.
The limited recognition afforded to the Taliban during its first period of rule (1996-2001), followed by its swift ouster after the September 11 attacks, inspires a climate of skepticism. Political elites in countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and India view this history as a cautionary tale, leading them to avoid rushing into recognition.
In addition, a critical demand from the international community is the establishment of an inclusive government representing all political forces and ethnic minorities in Afghanistan. Despite claims of diversity, Pashtun dominance persists within the Taliban, and the regime’s non-democratic seizure of power in August 2021 raises questions about its domestic political legitimacy. Concerns over the representation and satisfaction of ethnic minorities, social groups, and women remain prominent, particularly among the United States and European Union countries.
Frequent clashes between the Kandahar-based Taliban faction and the Haqqani Network, meanwhile, signal internal instability. The contrasting leadership styles of the reclusive Mullah Akhundzada and the more visible Sirajuddin Haqqani have fueled perceptions of a divided Afghanistan, potentially splitting into rival political centers – Kandahar and Kabul. This uncertainty regarding the Taliban’s long-term unity and viability, among other effects, makes global financial institutions hesitant to unfreeze Afghan assets, thereby exacerbating the country’s economic crisis and weakening the Taliban’s overall position.
Reputation and Regional Dynamics
The international community’s approach to recognizing (or not) the Taliban government in Afghanistan remains complex and nuanced. While some nations are cautiously moving toward recognition, others maintain a more reserved stance due to potential diplomatic and economic repercussions.
Some Arab and Central Asian countries exhibit reluctance to formally recognize the Taliban’s regime, fearing reputational risks and potential backlash from the wider international community. The United States and the European Union’s potential imposition of sanctions serves as a significant deterrent, leading countries like the UAE, Qatar, and Turkmenistan to adopt a wait-and-see approach.
However, a gradual shift toward recognition is emerging among other states. Russia and Kazakhstan, for instance, have taken steps that signal a more favorable stance toward the current Afghan government. In 2024, they both removed the Taliban from their lists of terrorist organizations, laying the groundwork for future diplomatic recognition. This measured approach not only indicates a changing perspective on the Taliban’s governance but also reduces the likelihood of unexpected international backlash against formal recognition.
Disrespect and Undesirability
The relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a close alliance to strained ties characterized by mutual distrust and strategic divergence.
For years, Pakistan remained the Taliban’s closest ally. However, the Taliban’s ascension to power in 2021 has not yielded the anticipated benefits for Pakistan. Instead, the Taliban’s push for autonomy and refusal to play the role of a “younger brother” led to heightened tensions, particularly along the Durand Line. The Taliban’s stance on the Durand Line, which they refuse to recognize as an international border, has become a major point of contention. This position aligns with longstanding Afghan nationalist sentiments but directly challenges Pakistan’s territorial integrity and strategic interests.
The Taliban’s unrecognized status provides Pakistan with additional leverage over Afghanistan. However, Pakistan may consider unilateral recognition if the Taliban make the desired concessions. Alternatively, if Afghanistan-India cooperation strengthens, Pakistan may be compelled to make certain concessions and recognize the Taliban government in order to avoid being encircled by India and its partners.
Iran and Tajikistan maintain limited dialogues with Afghanistan. Given its involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts, Iran seeks to avoid new challenges on its eastern borders. Tajikistan, following other Central Asian states, has begun to soften its stance toward the Taliban. However, both countries would prefer a government in Afghanistan that represents the interests of ethnic Tajiks or the Shia community, and thus view the present Taliban as an undesirable force.
New International Standards
China and Uzbekistan have developed new approaches to the diplomatic problem of recognizing Afghanistan’s leadership. In February 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s acceptance of the Taliban envoy’s credentials signaled de facto recognition and a shift in diplomatic engagement. Today, China maintains high-level diplomatic contacts with Afghanistan’s leadership and has become a major economic partner, fostering pragmatic relationship built on a solid economic cooperation at the intergovernmental level.
Uzbekistan has emerged one of the most active countries regionally regarding Afghanistan, advocating for a unified international strategy and a tailored approach to Afghan stabilization. The Uzbek leadership has acknowledged the Taliban as a leading power in Afghanistan, with Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov visiting Kabul in 2024. Bilateral trade turnover reached $1.1 billion by the end of 2024. These developments indicate that Uzbekistan is engaging in substantive dialogue with the Taliban, potentially setting new precedents for recognition in international practice.
The Global Agenda
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 led to a decline in global media attention toward Afghan affairs. The media appears to be gradually “forgetting” this issue, while the international community’s focus shifts toward the situations in Gaza, Syria, Ukraine, and the United States, with Donald Trump’s new administration. This decreasing attention to Afghanistan delays decisions related to the formal establishment of diplomatic relations, with each country engaging with the Taliban based on its own interests and strategic considerations.
Uzbekistan’s calls for a specialized international approach to Afghanistan have not received much of a response from the global community.
Terrorism and Radicalism
The Taliban have shifted their policy on terrorism, claiming to be actively combating al-Qaida and the Islamic State Khorasan branch. However, reports occasionally emerge regarding its cooperation with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban and viewed by Islamabad, among others, as a terrorist organization. The ideological proximity between the Taliban and the TTP leads to the perception that the Taliban regime is a sponsor of the group. This perception continues to deter the international community from recognizing the Taliban government.
Despite certain positive reforms in economic development, taxation, and countering opium cultivation – potential indicators of efforts to establish a functioning state – elements of radicalization persist in the Taliban. The ban on education for girls and women remains a major point of contention globally. The Taliban has not fully shed its association with terrorism and radicalism and this negatively impacts the question of international recognition, overshadowing any governance achievements.
Taliban’s Response
The Taliban authorities recognize the evolving international stance toward their regime and have taken steps to adjust . Afghanistan is actively engaged in several international projects, including the TAPI gas pipeline, CASA-1000 energy initiative, and the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. The Taliban have also expressed interest in major initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the International North-South Transport Corridor, and the Chabahar port project. In northern Afghanistan, the large-scale Qosh Tepa Canal construction is underway, further demonstrating the Taliban’s commitment to economic development and state governance.
However, a lack of economic resources severely hinders the full realization of these goals, limiting their impact on the global stage. As a result, Taliban efforts receive insufficient international recognition, while Afghanistan’s economic fragility remains a critical factor in the regime’s struggle for legitimacy.
What Next?
The path forward requires gradual political pluralism, even at a minimal level, to reshape international perceptions. Resolving the country’s internal political fragmentation is also crucial, as the ambiguity surrounding the authority of Kandahar versus Kabul complicates diplomatic engagement. Strengthening ties with countries that already maintain a de facto dialogue with the Taliban could keep Afghanistan relevant in global discussions, encourage the development of tailored recognition mechanisms, and facilitate the unfreezing of Afghan foreign assets.
Additional measures should focus on curbing drug trafficking and reassessing the benefits of cooperating with groups like the TTP. These steps could enhance Afghanistan’s economic standing, attract more international partners, and enable participation in major global projects. Socioeconomic stability will be key to achieving these goals. However, the Taliban’s rigid stance on women’s rights and human rights remains a significant barrier. Viewing international calls for reform as interference in domestic affairs, combined with political intransigence, may undermine Afghanistan’s prospects for pragmatic and sustainable progress.