In August 2023, the Cambodian people witnessed a historic event: the intergenerational transfer of power from long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen to his son Hun Manet. As part of this process, a younger generation of leaders replaced the old guard of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in key positions throughout the government. In the year and a half since Hun Manet’s succession, the new government has begun to articulate its priorities, including one notable shift in policy – Cambodia’s apparent deviation from its close relationship with Vietnam.
During his 38 years in power, Hun Sen maintained very close ties with Vietnam and made many public displays of gratitude for the role Vietnam played in helping to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. He has said that “without the help of Vietnam, Cambodia would absolutely not be where it is today,” and even described the relationship as being akin to “lips and teeth.”
The government under Hun Manet seems to have adopted a different, and altogether contradictory, approach toward Vietnam. Two major policy decisions appear to mark a shift in the country’s approach toward Vietnam. First, after becoming prime minister, Hun Manet announced his plan to construct the Funan Techo Canal, a 180-kilometer-long waterway connecting Phnom Penh to Cambodia’s deep seaport in Preah Sihanouk province. Senior Cambodian government officials say that the purpose of the canal is to reduce Cambodia’s dependence on Vietnam for transportation and thereby strengthen its sovereignty. Cambodia currently transports a large quantity of goods via the Vietnamese seaport, Cai Mep, with an estimated 33 percent of Cambodian manufactured goods exports transiting through the port annually.
Then, in September 2024, Cambodia’s government announced its withdrawal from the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Triangle Development Area (CLV-DTA), a regional agreement signed with Vietnam and Laos in 2004. In doing so, it cited the significant public opposition to the agreement. To its critics, including many opponents of the CPP, the CLV-DTA has helped Vietnam to strengthen its influence over Cambodia and Laos. Coupled with the construction of the Funan Techo Canal, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA has been interpreted as an effort to step out from Vietnam’s shadow.
Before further analysis, it is necessary to emphasize that Hun Sen continues to wield tremendous power and has played a significant role in helping Hun Manet establish his own legacy. Hun Sen promoted plans for the Funan Techo Canal even before Hun Manet’s election and has provided “backup” rhetoric regarding Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA. It would be inaccurate to suggest that the change in policy toward Vietnam is unfolding without Hun Sen’s influence or support, or that Hun Manet is solely responsible for driving this change. However, it is evident that since Hun Manet took power, Cambodia’s policy toward Vietnam has undergone a distinct and visible shift. The question is: why now?
This article will explain why Cambodia has decided to move away from Vietnamese influence under the Hun Manet administration, with a focus on three major motivating factors: Hun Manet’s need to forge his own legacy, a shift in the relationship and personal ties between the CPP and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), and Cambodia’s pursuit of increasing autonomy in its foreign relations.
Hun Manet is Trying to Build His Own Legacy
As the new Cambodian leader, it is crucial for Hun Manet to demonstrate accomplishment in order to gain popular support from the Cambodian people and establish an identity separate from that of his father. Helping end the rule of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and the Cambodian civil war in the late 1990s are claimed as Hun Sen’s greatest achievements, and, along with political stability and economic development, form the basis of the CPP’s claim to legitimacy. Hun Manet must now pursue public approval through alternative accomplishments. Hun Manet’s effort to move Cambodia away from Vietnam is one way that he could improve public perceptions of his government and defuse the opposition’s criticism.
Many Cambodians believe that Vietnam has wielded significant influence in Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, when it installed the CPP, then known as the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party, in power. These perceptions have been infused with the anti-Vietnamese sentiment and suspicions that run deep in Cambodian society, and the popular fear that Vietnam has long sought to absorb parts of Cambodia’s border regions. Lying behind this are memories of the “loss” to Vietnam of Kampuchea Krom, as many Cambodians refer to the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam, and Koh Tral (Phu Quoc Island).
Widespread anti-Vietnamese sentiment has also long been harnessed by opposition leaders in order to discredit Hun Sen and the CPP. These include those of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), which, prior to its dissolution in 2017, was the last major source of opposition to the CPP.
The appeal of such rhetoric was evidenced in the 2013 national election, when the CNRP won 55 out of 123 seats. While not the only reason for the CNRP’s strong performance, anti-Vietnamese rhetoric was a key part of the CNRP’s strategy and significantly boosted its electoral gains. Despite the party’s dissolution, anti-Vietnamese sentiment remains extremely prevalent among the CPP’s opponents and in the diaspora communities that provide their main base of support. This can be seen in the protest against the establishment of a department of Vietnamese studies at the Royal University of Phnom Penh in 2022, as well as in last year’s upsurge of opposition to the CLV-DTA.
Understanding that popular opinion in Cambodia does not favor close cooperation with Hanoi, the new government is choosing visibly to deviate from Vietnam. This can be seen in the rhetoric that it has used in its public statements about the Funan Techo Canal. In response to Vietnamese concerns about the project, particularly its economic, environmental, and security implications, Cambodian leaders have framed the project in terms of Cambodian pride and sovereignty. They have asserted that the canal will enable Cambodia to reduce its dependence on the Vietnamese seaport – to “breathe through its own nose,” as Hun Manet has phrased it. “We are not having any negative thoughts about Vietnam,” So Naro, minister delegate attached to the prime minister in charge of ASEAN affairs, told the Khmer Times last month. “However, when we depend on others for our own survival, it means we are losing some part of our independence.” He referred to the canal as a “significant achievement” for Cambodia. The same rhetoric has been spread by senior Cambodian government officials via social media.
While the canal is not expected to be operational until 2028 (if it is built at all), the announcement of the project and the accompanying rhetoric were strategically timed to follow Hun Manet’s succession. The new Cambodian government appears eager to demonstrate a significant achievement for Hun Manet and distance itself from Vietnam. This framing has also allowed it to defuse opposition claims that the CPP is still under heavy Vietnamese influence.
This can also be seen in how the government responded to last year’s surge of criticism about the CLV-DTA pact. In response to planned protests against the agreement, which critics claimed had led to the loss of land and resources to Vietnam, the government came down hard on anyone criticizing the project, arresting nearly 100 people. A month later, Cambodia announced its withdrawal from the CLV-DTA. Hun Manet stated “let’s not dwell on the DTA issue anymore. We need to work together to develop our country.” Cambodia’s withdrawal from CLV-DTA could help increase Hun Manet’s popularity among the Cambodian people, particularly his perception as a leader who is capable of walking out of the shadow of Cambodia’s larger eastern neighbor.
The Politics of Gratitude
One reason why Hun Sen’s government was unable to distance itself from Vietnam in this way was the “politics of gratitude”: a narrative emphasizing the role that Vietnam played in toppling the murderous Khmer Rouge from power in early 1979 and in the subsequent decade, when Vietnam maintained a strong influence over the Cambodian government. This was further reinforced by the close personal ties established between Cambodian and Vietnamese leaders of this generation. For this reason, Hun Sen continued to extol the good relations with Vietnam – even as his opponents accused him of being a “puppet” of Hanoi.
However, Hun Manet and his generation of leaders do not have such close personal ties with their Vietnamese counterparts, nor do they have much memory of the time when the CPP relied heavily on Vietnam for its survival. Therefore, Hun Manet has fewer reasons to resist moving out from under Vietnam’s shadow and might receive less backlash and concern, both domestically and from Vietnam. Cambodia’s growing relationship with China has also significantly lessened its dependence on Vietnam. Economic and defense cooperation with China, and significant infrastructure development (including the China-backed Funan Techo Canal) have emboldened the CPP to distance itself from Vietnam. No longer threatened by the Cambodian opposition, and having navigated the transition of power to Hun Manet, domestic political factors now support Phnom Penh’s deviation from Vietnam more than ever.
Cambodia’s Strategic Autonomy
Cambodia’s movement away from Vietnam also reflects a broader shift in Cambodia’s foreign policy goals and priorities. Historically, Cambodia has faced major challenges in its struggle for strategic autonomy; its geographic and geopolitical position has made it prone to overdependence on both Vietnam and China. Under Hun Manet, Cambodia is working to mitigate this over-dependence and to counter perceptions that China has “captured” Cambodian elites. Phnom Penh is aspiring to maintain its own autonomy by taking on a more assertive role on the global stage.
As the Cambodian government works to demonstrate a more independent role in international politics, it may ultimately shift its priorities away from Hanoi (and Beijing, when possible) and toward the budding relationships that can help to diversify investments and partnerships. In particular, Cambodia has strengthened relationships with Japan and South Korea, emphasizing economic and security cooperation. In 2023, Cambodia and Japan elevated their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, a status reserved for Cambodia’s close allies, and the Japanese Navy has visited Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, the subject of controversial Chinese-funded refurbishment, several times. This year, Cambodia and South Korea elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership.
Cambodia also demonstrated international agency as one of few Southeast Asian states to publicly declare support for Ukraine and take a stand against Russia after its invasion in February 2022. Hun Sen said that Cambodia could not remain neutral in light of Moscow’s “act of aggression,” and offered humanitarian aid, including Cambodian support in training Ukrainian de-miners. This position was well received by Western powers; in a joint letter European ambassadors wrote that Cambodia was standing “on the right side of history.” Cambodia’s engagement with Ukraine was widely regarded as a diplomatic triumph, demonstrating the importance of Hun Manet continuing this work and flexing Cambodia’s strategic autonomy.
Cambodia’s ability to demonstrate its strategic autonomy, a goal that originated under Hun Sen and is now being carried out by Hun Manet’s government, is critical to the success of the next generation of leadership. Phnom Penh’s decision to distance itself somewhat from Hanoi serves this goal. Following Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA, the government addressed a letter to Vietnam stating, “At this point, we believe that each country is fully capable of continuing and ensuring the independent development of its respective nation.” While Vietnam and Cambodia still have many mutual interests, Cambodia has made clear its intent to prioritize its own self-interests in both its regional and global policies.
To be sure, it is important not to overstate the extent of the shift: Cambodia still highly values its relationship with Vietnam, and the governments remain generally friendly. However, the relationship will likely face challenges in the near future. As Cambodia pursues ambitious development goals and a more assertive foreign policy, the government should be careful to balance its relationships with Vietnam, China, and other regional and global partners. While Cambodia’s shift could be a significant achievement for the country in terms of its ability to act more autonomously, it could also be interpreted as part of the country’s recent shift toward China. For Hun Manet’s government to counter such perceptions, Cambodia must continue to diversify its foreign relationships and demonstrate true autonomy in its foreign policy.