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Minilateralism Is the Driver of India’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

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Minilateralism Is the Driver of India’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

As question marks are raised globally about the future of multilateralism, can India’s approach meet its strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific?

Minilateralism Is the Driver of India’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

An Indian Air Force C-130 is loaded with humanitarian aid bound for Myanmar following the major earthquake, Mar. 28, 2025.

Credit: X/ Dr. S. Jaishankar

Within the space of six weeks, over February and March, I went from Fiji to Munich to Delhi. The tensions that arose from announcements of the U.S. cutting significant chunks of aid to Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference were palpable and rising. 

A number of announcements by the Trump administration in the last two months have left traditional partners baffled, and the norm now is to give precedence to short-term wins over long-term commitments.

While the Munich Security Conference was incredibly gloomy – and it wasn’t the weather – the Raisina Dialogue was oddly calm and, in many ways, more engaged than ever before.

This can be attributed in part to the hosting Observer Research Foundation’s ability to bring together an incredibly diverse set of people, often those who would not be found together at the same conference elsewhere in the globe. Beyond that, the mood was very reflective of India’s growing place in the world – its very “Indian” approach to a fractured international order and the very serious expectation for New Delhi to step up and fill the escalating power vacuum

While the global systems and rules-based order as we know it might be broken, the significant challenges present a number of opportunities for shaping new systems – ones that are strategic yet offer greater flexibility.

In the wake of shifting global power dynamics, India is increasingly embracing minilateralism and multialignment in its diplomatic strategy. This pragmatic approach prioritizes smaller coalitions of states, where interests and values align, to more efficiently achieve common goals. With a variety of minilateral agreements, New Delhi is ensuring that it addresses security threats effectively, but it is also positioning itself as a central player in shaping emerging strategic architectures. This is especially the case in the Indo-Pacific, likely to be the new theater of conflict, whether in the form of trade wars, threats to shipping and undersea cables, or climate change. 

Minilateral alliances are nimble and agile – unlike traditional large multilateral institutions that are now seemingly plagued with bureaucratic inertia, internal disagreements, and competing national interests. Their smaller size and focused membership allow for quicker decision making, notably when it involves the sharing of intelligence, adaptability, and targeted action.

With minilateralism at the cornerstone of its foreign policy, India can continue to pursue more targeted strategic coalitions that reinforce a strong “Global South”-centric roadmap, as opposed to prioritizing advanced nations.

There is increasing skepticism about Washington’s long-term commitment among regional leaders in the Indo-Pacific. While the Obama-era “rebalance to Asia” aimed to deepen the United States’ engagement in the region, the subsequent administrations have shied away from maintaining consistent focus on this strategy.

The Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariffs have only exacerbated the skepticism, and questions are arising over Washington’s ability and desire to assert influence in the region.

With growing gaps, there is no doubt China will seek to reshape the regional order, using economic coercion, diplomatic outreach, or assertive military posturing as needed. 

Meanwhile, India is rethinking and drastically reassessing its options and abilities, as was clear from the many remarks from high level government officials during the Raisina Dialogue. While New Delhi will continue to work with a wide range of partners based on strategic needs, the multialignment game with Indian characteristics will prove useful and pragmatic going forward.

India has, for example, largely steered clear of joining multilateral military alliances, even as the Philippines has appealed for India to join the Squad, a strategic alliance currently comprising of Australia, Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. Instead, India has opted for bilateral defense exercises and doubled down on increasing the shipment of its defense equipment to its chosen allies

India expects to sell short-range missiles of over $200 million this year to the Philippines, on the heels of the $375-million sale of the mid-range BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. India is also in advanced stages of the $450 million deal to export BrahMos missiles to Indonesia.

Last November, a 25 personnel Indian Army contingent participated in Garud Shakti 24, the ninth edition of the India-Indonesia Joint Special Forces Exercise, again showcasing strong defense cooperation directly between the two. 

Regional shared challenges from disaster relief or supply chain resilience offer a different set of opportunities and partnerships. Last year, the Indian Navy, in cooperation with Seychelles and Sri Lanka, successfully rescued a Sri Lankan fishing vessel, demonstrating a strong partnership in maritime security.

History is testament that India has always played a proactive role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) to combat traditional and nontraditional security threats, including natural disasters, in the region – be it the ongoing Operation Brahma (following the 2025 Myanmar earthquake), Operation Dost (2023 Turkiye and Syria earthquake) or Operation Maitri (2015 Nepal earthquake). 

With significant cuts to global aid from the United States, United Kingdom and others, smaller nations – especially those in the Pacific – are relying more heavily on India along with traditional partners such as Australia for relief, but also long-term partnerships. 

A stronger Australia-India relationship that pushes for more localized, issue-based partnerships across the region can work toward a more stable Indo-Pacific that countries are hoping for. 

With Pacific countries at the frontlines of climate catastrophes, India can take a firmer leadership role to work directly with other regional partners to build local resilience and fill gaps created by massive global funding shortages and other global uncertainties.

In many cases while India might work bilaterally with its partners, it also operates under the aegis of a strategic alliance, such as within the Quad for humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster or broader challenges to regional stability and security.

With optimal resource sharing and operational efficiency, within smaller groupings, responses are quicker and often less immune to global shocks. 

Minilateral alliances also encourage nations to abide more closely to their security agreements and promises, contrary to multilateral institutions that are often dogged by a value-based system they had little say in.

As the Indo-Pacific continues to evolve, minilateralism can bolster India’s centrality in regional diplomacy and ensure a balanced approach for fostering an open, inclusive and rule-based Indo-Pacific. 

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