China invasion of Taiwan

The steep costs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will bolster China's continued use of its effective salami-slicing and grey zone tactics.

Taiwan can use long-range anti-ship missiles to create its own A2/AD strategy.

Insights from Joel Wuthnow.

Since Pelosi’s visit, the future of the cross-strait issue has surged toward military conflict, as the Chinese public started to dismiss the possibility of peaceful reunification.

Half of the global container fleet passed through the Taiwan Strait this year, making it a critical waterway for global supply chains.

Instead of deterring China, such visits in fact increase the risk of an invasion of Taiwan, because they create a nefarious incentive for it.

For the first time, Beijing leaves open the possibility of an extended military occupation after unification, adding to fears that Taiwanese would be subject to a “re-education” campaign.

The Quad is supposed to help counterbalance China’s rise, but it remains unclear whether the bloc would intervene in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.

The differences between each are stark enough that we can draw few useful parallels from the Ukraine War for Taiwan.

Xi might look at what has happened in Ukraine, and to the Russians, and think he’s got a reasonable shot at Taiwan.

If “China can unify Taiwan while eliminating U.S. interference. This is the best scenario for China... The surrounding countries cannot help Taiwan.”