Myanmar civil war

China has a growing ability to dictate outcomes on the ground in Myanmar. For resistance forces, the implications are profound.

Myanmar’s people confront a sense that the country’s crises are escalating in scale, even as foreign support becomes more difficult to secure.

The coming together of areas inhabited by communities in India’s Mizoram and Myanmar’s Chin State has New Delhi’s tacit support. Myanmar’s junta is not amused.

Starved of outside support, resistance groups have been forced to adopt low-cost solutions to battlefield challenges.

The case of CMEC and other Chinese business activities in Myanmar show how exposed China is to escalating conflict risks, and offer insight to the role it is playing in the ongoing civil war. 

But they may not be enough to prevent an impending crisis in Arakan brought on by scarcity of essential commodities and soaring prices.

In the region of Myanmar now held by the Arakan Army, the impacts of war and decades of economic neglect are easily visible.

Interviews with resistance soldiers, activists, and internally displaced civilians in the KNU-controlled jungle reveal a life that blurs the line between resistance and routine.

As the conflict spreads to the Bamar heartland, there are growing reports of abuses and internecine fighting among resistance groups.

“We are always in favor of repatriation [of Rohingya Muslims] in principle, and there should be voluntary, dignified, and safe repatriation under conducive conditions.”

The military regime collaborated with the Rohingya terror group to defend Buthidaung against the Arakan Army, according to a captured Myanmar military major.

The hands-off approach to the ongoing conflict in Myanmar is a significant foreign policy mistake.