U.S. deterrence

The Trump administration faces a critical test of credibility and commitment toward supporting Taiwan. Rhetoric alone will not suffice.

A failure to enhance deterrence could incentivize Beijing and Moscow to undertake greater geopolitical risks at the United States’ expense. 

Any direct deterrent contribution – meaning participation in high-end military operations – will arguably stem from these long-standing and increasingly united U.S. allies.

Rather than preventing a war with China over Taiwan, a policy centered on military deterrence could spark one.

Success depends on decreasing the perceived likelihood that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would succeed, minimizing the perceived benefits, and increasing the expected costs. 

Rethinking “strategic ambiguity” is important, but in the meantime Washington must compensate for its dwindling military advantage over China with more costly signals of political resolve.

The arguments that U.S. credibility on Taiwan hinges on Ukraine is the latest version of the discredited domino theory.

The strategic lessons to be learned in a potential Ukraine conflict are limited – and potentially misleading when applied to Taiwan.

Long before the Afghanistan withdrawal, China had become convinced that the U.S. does not have the stomach for a protracted fight over Taiwan.