U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

Despite its high-decibel MAGA rhetoric, the administration has largely upheld the regional commitments made during Joe Biden's presidency.

The new U.S. president’s remarkable but often untested initiatives add to already complex regional dynamics, hampering viable strategies and policy options seeking stable regional order.

Trump’s regional policy is likely to focus on U.S. military engagement to counter China. The Philippines thus may become a linchpin in U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States has treated the Indian Ocean as an afterthought in its Indo-Pacific vision.

How a country views the prospect of another Trump term depends in large part on whether or not it already has good relations with the United States.

As it stands, the IPS is too heavily focused on the Pacific. Adding Pakistan to the fold would bolster its ability to address Beijing’s strategic advances in the Indian Ocean.

U.S. doesn’t seek conflict or to contain China INDOPACOM chief Aquilino said, but would take action to support the region against bullying.

Washington needs to enact the concept of “strategic sequencing” to avoid fighting a two-front war against nuclear-armed rivals.

U.S. involvement in the region needs a larger economic component – an area where U.S. policy used to be strong.

President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the APEC Leaders' Meeting sends the wrong message about the U.S. economic commitment to Southeast Asia.

The increasingly stark language of competition with China will alarm countries like Bangladesh, who want to remain friendly with both sides.

Participation in the new U.S. initiative could advance Vietnam’s aspiration for economic gains and a firm status in the regional economic architecture, but its full-fledged engagement is unlikely.

IPEF’s evolution and prospects will partly hinge on how U.S. and regional partners define its value add in an increasingly competitive landscape.

The region has thrown its support behind Washington's long-awaited economic engagement plan, even as the specifics remain vague.

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy shows the U.S. does not want a Cold War with China.

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy rests on old assumptions that fail to account for the region’s dynamics and complexity.

The Biden administration took some bold steps to empower its Indo-Pacific allies and partners in 2021. But can it deliver on its promises?

New Delhi finds a prominent place in the strategy’s focus on Washington’s network of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.

The strategy document fails to answer crucial questions about the desired balance between competition and cooperation with China.

China drew Washington’s attention back to the Pacific, but regional states hope the U.S. engages beyond geopolitical competition.

Blinken’s trip to Australia for bilateral and Quad meetings will be followed by a visit to Fiji, then a Japan-South Korea-US trilateral in Hawaii.

The Biden administration should prioritize a forward-looking and impactful economic and trade agenda with the Indo-Pacific region, especially when it comes to digital trade.

A preview of the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. summit, and what it will mean for the Indo-Pacific region.

It's time to prioritize the “Indo” in “Indo-Pacific.”