U.S.-Taiwan defense relations

U.S. military aid and strategic support for Taiwan are being reshaped. What will that mean for arms sales, military assistance, and strategic commitments?

Taiwan’s defense challenges do not stem from a lack of spending per se but from inefficiencies in how its defense funds are allocated and utilized.

We can expect China to test the resilience of the Taiwan-U.S. partnership under Trump with more gray-zone operations.

Taipei is bracing for reduced patience and heightened pressure from the incoming Trump administration.

Overwarning and miscommunication risk Washington’s ability to detect – and convince Taiwanese about – real threats in the Taiwan Strait.

With arms sales dropping and recent deliveries fraught with problems, doubts continue to mount over the United States’ true commitment to Taiwan’s security.

Biden’s vice president seems less enthusiastic about fully committing the United States to defend Taiwan. For that matter, so does her rival in the presidential race.

The situation recalls the early 1950s, when U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were delayed by other priorities. Unfortunately, Taiwan’s need is much greater today.

The current political turmoil is a worrying sign not just for America’s European allies, but also those in Asia.

Should China mount an invasion, Taiwan's political leadership and degree of social cohesion will be the most important factors in its defense.

As the U.S. urges Taiwan to adopt a security strategy that requires foreign intervention, it also upholds a policy of strategic ambiguity, making it difficult for Taipei to commit to a purely defensive approach.

The United States bars most sales of weapons-related technology to China anyway, so it’s unclear what effect the sanctions will have.