The Real North Korea Threat
Image Credit: U.S. Air Force

The Real North Korea Threat

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A year has passed since North Korea conducted its unexpected shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Yet, while tensions between the two Koreas seem less intense now, the threat posed by North Korea’s military continues to be as complex and diversified as ever. Indeed, even as the North Korea looks like it is edging toward collapse, there are signs of dangerous military changes, including the further politicization of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the diversification of its military capabilities.

At first glance, the KPA’s force structure seems nothing more than a collection of Cold War military platforms. With the exception of its Mig-29s, the majority of platforms are models designed and produced during the 1960s or earlier. Ever since Pyongyang constructed its ideological stronghold on the Korean Peninsula,the North Korean government has been ingrained with the belief that modernization isn’t so much about technological innovation, but innovation in the use of existing technology.

For example, North Korea has an overwhelming stock of upgraded Y-5(the Chinese variant of the Antonov-2)transport aircraft fitted with stealth capabilities and KN-01 missiles. Against this backdrop, the modernization of the KPA doesn’t necessarily require major adjustments in investment or structural management. Instead, the process simply exploits existing conventional platforms by applying asymmetric capabilities.

Signs of North Korea realigning its conventional military capabilities have been there for at least the past two years. In January 2010, the KPA held its “Combined Maneuvers” military exercise, which involved the KPA’s ground, air and naval services. The fact that exercises of this nature have never been held (at least officially) since Kim Jong-il’s rise to power in 1992, hinted that the KPA is reconfiguring itself into something new. Following the “Combined Maneuvers” exercise, the KPA began to partially actualize its “new” capabilities by sinking the Cheonan, conducting several artillery drills near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and the deadly shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.

For North Korea, the military “provocations” of 2010 proved that the utilization of conventional platforms were just as, if not more, effective as strategic weapons for upsetting the U.S. alliance with the South. Not only did the attacks bewilder South Korea and the United States, but their response was delayed and ineffectual. There’s therefore good reason to believe that North Korea will continue to diversify its conventional military capabilities to seize its asymmetric edge over the U.S. alliance.

There have been other alarming developments in the KPA this past year.

In terms of structural developments, one area where there has been significant growth is in cyber/electronic warfare capabilities. Despite its technological weaknesses, North Korea’s knowledge-based technology seems to have advanced to the point where it’s capable of conducting DDoS and jamming attacks. Recent reports also claim that large-scale jamming facilities are currently under construction in areas near the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Meanwhile, there has been a notable increase in the activities of artillery/MLR (Multiple Launch Rocket) units in the coastal areas near the NLL with the Yeoneo (130t) and Saneo (300t) class submarines, and the recent testing of air-to-ship missiles with Ilyushin-28 bombers.

Developments in the KPA’s capabilities are diverse, but can be broadly interpreted in two ways. In offensive terms, North Korea has qualitatively diversified its conventional military capabilities by increasing the number of options to further develop its asymmetric threat. In terms of defense, recent developments could be seen as being directed at strengthening its deterrence capabilities along the DMZ and NLL.

Yet it’s another, centralized, shift that poses the biggest threat to South Korea – the increased efficiency and effectiveness in the mobilization of its special operations (SOF) troops. A recent South Korean Defense White Paper, for example, stated that North Korea has approximately 200,000 personnel designated as special operations forces, with roughly a quarter of them forward deployed along the DMZ. Successful coordination of cyber/electronic attacks and bombardment by artillery, meanwhile, would allow smoother infiltration by the KPA’s guerilla troops into South Korea.

None of this is to suggest that the KPA’s developing capabilities are flawless. Although North Korea may be diversifying its military capabilities, the KPA’s conventional forces still suffer from at least two weaknesses.

The first is over power projection capabilities – especially in the country’s air force. While the KPA has an abundant stock of air platforms, overall combat readiness is undermined not only by an aging inventory, but also because of the severe shortages of fuel. Even in emergencies, North Korean fighter jets have avoided engaging with South Korean F-15Ks. Kim Jong-il’s unsuccessful attempts at acquiring China’s J-10 fighter jets last May, meanwhile, highlights Pyongyang’s desire to remedy its inferiority in terms of airpower.

The second problem relates to the negative impact of the political process. As heir apparent Kim Jong-un rises up the ranks in the North Korean system, ideological discipline has been strengthened, while significant organizational changes have been taking place in both the KPA and the Workers Party of Korea (WPK). While this may bolster the North Korean leadership’s political security, it inevitably distracts the regime from addressing technical issues in the KPA.

The complexity of the KPA highlights the ongoing problems with North Korea’s defense planning. In 1962, Kim Il-sung issued the sa dae gunsa roson (Four Grand Military Lines), which aimed to: modernize the entire KPA; establish a cadre-based military; ensure nationwide fortification; and arm all citizens. To finance this, Kim carved out a chunk of the state’s economy for the military and established the Second Economic Committee. Ironically for North Korea, the very system designed to strengthen the KPA became the source of its defense planning failures simply because it was beyond the state’s capacity to cope with it.

Still, North Korea has displayed expertise in exploiting diplomatic weaknesses. After its returns from its nuclear ambitions proved to be slower coming than desired, Pyongyang searched for loopholes in the U.S. alliance’s system of deterrence. With its military capabilities apparently having the desired effect, North Korea is likely to continue searching for ways to keep its asymmetric capabilities one step ahead of any countermeasures.

Under such circumstances, a realignment of the deterrence strategy vis-à-vis North Korea is in order. Although North Korea has remained relatively calm since the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, there’s no guarantee that the KPA will refrain from conducting another series of provocations. Indeed, the break in North Korea’s military behavior may suggest further realignment and preparations to undermine the security of South Korea, Japan and the United States.

The U.S. alliance’s deterrence efforts to date have focused too much on North Korea’s WMD capabilities and too little on the KPA’s conventional capabilities. The alliance therefore needs to find a new strategy that’s more expansive and flexible to deal with North Korea’s military threat. Devising harsher response strategies and exercising greater surveillance over North Korea are certainly plausible options. In particular, improving human intelligence, imagery intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities vis-à-vis North Korea could be crucial.

In addition, an expanded and comprehensive approach to North Korea’s military threat will require greater trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States. Given the diversifying nature of North Korea’s military capabilities, the U.S. alliance need to broaden its strategy to encourage greater co-operation between Seoul and Tokyo, especially as Japan and South Korea don’t always see eye to eye on the threat posed by North Korea.

The KPA’s diversifying capabilities are part of longstanding efforts by Pyongyang to achieve the Four Grand Military Lines aimed at compensating forNorth Korea’s shortcomings in the regional security balance. However, while North Korea may have been successful in strengthening its military leverage, it has fallen short of guaranteeing the regime’s security. North Korea’s realignment of its military capabilities also reflects the state’s shaky domestic foundations. Regardless, while the KPA’s diversifying military capabilities are unlikely to help North Korea achieve its goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation,” they are certainly making it a potentially more deadly one.

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a Reserve Specialist with Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New South Wales – Australian Defense Force Academy, where he is researching North Korea’s military capability management. The views expressed are entirely his own.

Comments
8
Unknown
August 7, 2012 at 17:26

What about a strategic use of their nuclear arsenal, not as a mere attack weapon, not as a defensive one, but as a mean to send the american and south korean armed forces to a level similar to that of the north koreans. A nuclear blast at high altitude. It could trigger an electromagnetic pulse, that would send all south korea back to the early 19th century, and that's where the KPA would possible gain the upper hand…

The question is, has the DPRK mastered the secrets of miniaturized nuclear weapons? Bulding a bomb is one thing, miniaturizing is another… What about their ballistic missiles program? Is it capable already of evading southkorean ABMs and place a warhead at high altitude above south korea?

SocketRocket
February 15, 2012 at 04:05

Even if they manage to drop tens of thousands of SOF in South Korea itself, how on earth are they going to be resupplied before either being annihilated, captured/surrendering or even defecting?

The economic situation of the DPRK is only getting worse and more numbers of the military are going to go real hungry – including the spec ops. No matter how well-trained, indoctrinated and equipped a soldier is, hunger is going to beat all that. Chances are they’re more likely to loot anything selling food and defect than actually fight.

Regarding the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island – if OP thinks that the ROK and US response was inefficient, then he might as well be implying that they should have striked back with heavier force (for example, air or missile strikes) – thus leading to perhaps, a bigger mess.

Let’s also not forget logistics and maintenance – two things the KPA has outstandingly failed in. Not only their aircraft and ships but also their tanks and even artillery (the nightmare of maintaining over 10 thousand artillery pieces while having to care for other vehicles is quite daunting).

Lil
December 2, 2011 at 13:49

“the real Nth Korea threat” is in connection with China, I believe…. However the USA (Obama) may strive for peace ALSO.

Charles
December 2, 2011 at 03:39

Didn’t some little weirdo say an army marches on it’s stomach? So between fuel restrictions and starving people, how far are they expected to get?

S P Dudley
November 30, 2011 at 07:20

It seems to me that the Norks’ real military strategy is to rely almost entirely on special forces & infiltration type units to get into the South Korean interior and cause chaos in the nation, and then use their massive artillery forces (8,000+ tubes and rocket launchers) to destroy SK forces that are cut off. Then when that happens the rest of the 2 million man army crosses the border.

Bully if it works but highly unlikely it would as assaults with such light forces do not have staying power and units of this kind are often easily cut off. Also artillery barrages on hard targets such as the South Korean military defenses are not all that effective as well, even in large numbers. The South Koreans are preparing more of a defense in depth and not just in static positions on the DMZ to meet the threat NK currently poses.

The other real problem with that war scenario is that nearly all of the Kim regime’s most loyal units are committed in the offensive. Again, great if they can pull it off but if they’re stalled or if they fail they can’t be recalled back to defend the Great Leader. It’s a real gamble.

PeterDownUnder
November 30, 2011 at 03:07

The stealth aircraft mentioned are made of wood and cavas pretty much and has virtually zero radar signature. Although it cannot carry a massive load it can carry a bunch of armed special forces across the border undetected. Which alone can cause havoc in South Korea. Wikipedia the plane Antonov An-2. It was a Soviet era plane converted to wooden propellers and canvas wings by North Korea for ‘stealth’.

ex-AWACr
November 30, 2011 at 02:58

what by flying them at night? no really i would like to know

The AN-2 has always had a fabric covered airframe and apparently the NorKs have equipped some with wooden props (which is probably the single biggest radar reflector on it), so it probably does have a pretty small RCS. What the author fails to realize is, after you hang a Silkworm on it, it has just as big an RCS as the missile, which is pretty big. So it’s ‘stealthy’ (sort of) only as long as it’s unarmed. Yeah, that’s a real stroke of genius, no doubt about it.

applesauce
November 30, 2011 at 00:02

“transport aircraft fitted with stealth capabilities”

what by flying them at night? no really i would like to know

“North Korean government has been ingrained with the belief that modernization isn’t so much about technological innovation, but innovation in the use of existing technology.”

it has no other choice when even china has denied it weapons, SK isnt gonna get any weaker anytime soon. and NK itself isnt much in innovation, after-all your not gonna be innovating when your busy trying to find your next meal

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