Despite Russian and Chinese diplomatic maneuvers and a lack of Western intervention, the likely collapse of the Assad regime may be a regional game changer.
After 40 years of brutalizing its own people, the Assad regime, one of the most heinous on earth, is approaching its fiery end. For decades Syria's radical policies made it a regional spoiler and it now has the potential to ignite an already combustible Middle Eastern landscape.
In the absence of any American and Western intention to intervene militarily, and given Russia's and China's diplomatic obstructionism, international involvement in Syria has been inconsequential. The Annan plan, based on the illusory premise that Assad would undertake domestic reform, could not possibly have succeeded, for the reforms envisaged would have guaranteed his demise. He was thus left with no alternative but to pay lip service to international demands, to stave off possible intervention, while pursuing the only route available to him to ensure his survival – brutal repression.
Today, international intervention is probably too late, the regime will likely soon fall in any event, though thousands of lives might have been saved, and the opposition will no longer settle for less than ultimate victory. The policy of "leading from behind" pursued by the Obama administration in Libya, where it allowed Britain and France to lead, and now in Syria, where it is letting Russia and China block action, have characterized its entire approach to the dramatic changes in the region since the "Arab spring" began. Admittedly, it did not have many good options, but passivity is not a policy prescription.
Syria's deeply divided and dysfunctional opposition remains a primary obstacle to effective international involvement, but as the endgame nears, the need to forge a united, moderate and effective opposition is greater than ever. The tragedy of Syria, as in Egypt and other regional countries now undergoing transformational change, is that the chances of a moderate democratic regime evolving are minimal. Indeed, it increasingly looks like the tyranny of Assad will be replaced by an Islamist regime, possibly with strong jihadi and even al-Qaeda influences, and Syria itself may fragment. We may yet miss the relative stability and predictability of the Assad years.
In any event, the fall of the Assad regime may be a regional game changer. Iran and Hezbollah are already on the "wrong side of history", their former stature as revolutionary actors, who successfully confronted the region's conservative states, the U.S. and Israel, has been greatly tarnished by their avid support for the Assad regime. Both also face other crises as well, Iran over its nuclear program and the future of its regime, Hezbollah over its domestic and regional standing. Saudi Arabia, facilitated by Egypt's domestic preoccupation, has assumed a new regional leadership role, including in Syria. However, its own succession crisis threatens its stability and it faces significant challenges on all fronts – a rising Shiite Iran to its east, possible radical Islamic states, not subservient to its wishes, in Syria and Egypt, and an imploding Yemen.
In Lebanon, events in Syria have exacerbated long-existing sectarian tensions, raising the specter of renewed civil war. They could also have a negative spillover effect on Iraq and Jordan. Turkey's relations with Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have deteriorated severely and Kurdish aspirations, Turkey's ultimate nightmare, have gained a new opening.
For Israel, the demise of the Alawite Assad regime portends a fundamental restructuring of the regional balance of power, with a weakening and possible end to the Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah axis, the heart of the radical camp. A new regime in Syria, if more moderate, might ultimately also pose new opportunities for peace.
In the short term, however, it increasingly looks like a new regime may be as unsavory as its predecessor and may threaten the four decades of calm that have prevailed on the Golan Heights. The danger of escalation is great, especially if Syria, or its Iranian and Hezbollah allies, in a desperate attempt to save itself in its final extremis, seek to divert attention from their shared problems by using Syria's vast chemical arsenal against Israel, Syria's own citizens, or international players, should they seek to intervene. A long-established rule of dictatorship is that an external crisis is always a good means of deflecting attention from domestic challenges.
Herein, lies an opportunity, even at this late stage, for international intervention. It must be made plain to Assad that any use of chemical weapons, against domestic or external adversaries, would constitute a "red line" leading to decisive international action designed not only to ensure the regime’s demise, but his own as well. None of Syria's neighbors have any desire to become directly involved in the conflict, nor does the U.S., but an effective response to the chemical threat must be drawn up. Concomitantly, the West must do whatever possible to help build an effective and united opposition and to manage the transition period. It is probably also not too late to help create safe havens in Turkey, Jordan and possibly border regions of Syria itself.
For Israel, the use of chemical weapons, or their transfer to Hezbollah or other radical hands, are simply intolerable and it will have no alternative but to prevent this, even if this may prove to be the catalyst for the broader war it seeks to avoid.
Chuck Freilich was a Deputy National Security Advisor in Israel and is presently an International Security Program Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Photo Credit: Wikicommons
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Leonard R.
According to the Guardian, Al Qaeda is fighting against Assad and on the West's side here. This makes sense to me.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/30/al-qaida-rebels-battle-syria
spencer
Let us ask the question, "where did the Syrians get the chemical arsenal?". Could it have been bolstered by other regional Bathists?
Brian from Chicago
You're referring to Iraq. I have learned through many frustrating conversations that people don't want to acknowledge that Iraq ever had ever had WMDs. They certainly did, and US forces destroyed some of them (about half of what was documented) after the first Gulf War. In my experience, I have found that hardly anyone seems to remember that.
People also forget that Hans Blix had described Saddam Hussein's regime "in exempliary compliance" before his sons-in-law defected to the US with a treasure trove of documentation illustrating how far along Iraq had some in developing and stockpiling weapons. Saddam gushed for them to return (he wanted his daughters back) and then they both died in some random shoot-em-up shortly thereafter. But nobody remembers that either.
To answer your question, yes, it's entirely possible that the Baath regime in Iraq shared some of its unwanted WMD inventory with the Baath regime in Syria. Their relationship was close enough that Saddam could count on them being returned at any time.
tom
Matt,
Please spare us the second hand reports, from "activists" and alarmist hyperbole.
James Moore
We are absolute fools if we get involved in this. The conventional wisdom is stunning regarding this situation. There will be nothing better with Assad gone. As disgusting, brutal and odious as Damascus may be make no mistake about it, Al Qaeda will get a huge break with this situation and will get a second life as a result to this. Say what you want but this is a state, with more people who support it than people care to consider. The United States is back to where it was in the 1990's in a way. The Gulf Countries (our allies, laughable) got rich only on the protection of The US 5th Fleet in Bahrain. Without American protection every neighbor would rob the Gulf Kingdoms for everything they have. And what do we get? With this money they funded Al Qaeda, and they still do today. Gulf money is bringing back Al Qaeda in the biggest way right now inside Syria and Iraq. In the 1990's the deal was "Don't do jihad in your The Gulf Kingdoms (specifically Saudi Arabia) and we won't target you." So Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen is to be ruthlessly struck down but if your Al Qaeda in Syria or Iraq your good? The jihadists in Syria are armed to the teeth and there is a large presence of them on the ground right now. When Assad falls it will only be the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end. . .
Syria, the Syrian people knew that it was a big party from 2004-2007. They all knew that Arabs and jihadi sympathizers were flying into Damascus Airport from Europe and North Africa, bundled to the Iraqi border, and from Al Qaim went into Anbar and Greater Baghdad Area to target US Soldiers. So now we're supposed to have sympathy for them? Get all US Military Assets out of the Middle East, and now. If The Russian Navy or Chinese Navy want to put their forces there let them have at it. And they won't either if given the opportunity. Why because they know we're fools for bring in The Middle East, and if they were to take our place they would be fools too. . .
A German General Mellenthin was quoted as saying on 14 May, 1943:
"We are in the postion of a man who has seized a wold by the ears and dare not let him go."
Good luck Gulf Kingdoms. Because one way or the other we are leaving. Either we'll go bankrupt or when the younger generation replaces the statists baby-boomers of both parties we'll pull them out ourselves. We will be gone, and sooner than people think. . .
Lise Korson
I like the passion in this comment of James, and a lot of the analysis is correct.
Why should we feel sympathetic toward the Syrians when they were facilitating attacks on US soldiers by jihadis of various stripes?
All indications are that the US is not going to be in this one. Our help is limited to trying to make sure weapons supplied to opposition factions don't fall into the "wrong" hands; trying to make a viable opposition to "stand up" a post-Assad Syria; making a doable plan to safeguard Syria's chem. and other unconventional weapons; working to beef up opposition communications and command and control. We are not even the financial mainstays. They are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.
Matt
Leonard,
I've read the Asaad regime directly supports Al Qaeda. The deceased Shawkat and Assad himself dealt with them to kill US troops in Iraq. Can the next regime be worse? It's worth watching the men with American blood on their hands burn. At least we have a chance of getting a non terror state. The Christians aided this regime which aided terror against US interests. If they aren't worried about US security then damn them. They are analogous to the Vichi French.
Leonard R.
I'm not so sure. For example, Iran is Shia. Al-Qaeda is Sunni, hard-core Sunni. Does Assad's alliance with Iran really benefit Sunni militants more than the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt…in Yemen? Concerning Iraq, it's 2/3 Shia. And both the Sunnis and Shias killed their share of Americans. What the US seems to have accomplished there is to make Iraq safe for Iran to dominate & sell its oil to China.
I have serious doubts about the wisdom of this whole exercise. I hope it turns out well, because we all know Assad is going to fall. Russia and China are on a fool's errand trying to save him. But after he falls what happens? It may be that Russia and China have this right.
Leonard R.
Prof. Freilich: "A new regime in Syria, if more moderate, might ultimately also pose new opportunities for peace."
—-
Is that what happened in Egypt? Assad for all his faults, did not persecute Christians. Syrian society was pluralistic. And Assad did not attack Israel either. Now Israel will find itself surrounded by two hostile governments – both run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Is that really any better than the current Syria/Hezbollah, Iran alliance? Will the Muslim Brotherhood really clamp down on Hezbollah's rocket attacks?
Maybe Russia & China have this issue right and the West has it all wrong.