In his speech accepting the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, former U.S. President Donald Trump flaunted his supposedly solid personal ties with Kim Jong Un and suggested the North Korean leader probably wanted him back in the White House, saying, “I think he misses me.” A few days later, however, the state-run Korean Central News Agency of North Korea delivered a stinging rebuke to Trump, saying, “No matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.”
However, it’s worth considering if Kim honestly “does not care” about the upcoming U.S. presidential election. I would argue that he does, and quite significantly, depending on who takes the helm in the White House. For Kim Jong Un, the next five years could be a period of profound uncertainty, with potential outcomes ranging from the worst-case scenario to a situation ripe for negotiations.
The worst-case scenario for Kim would be a victory by Vice President Kamala Harris, who has been endorsed by incumbent President Joe Biden as his successor as the Democratic presidential candidate. Harris’ approach to North Korea is anticipated to continue to mirror Biden’s. The Biden administration has primarily focused on pressuring the international community to enforce sanctions against North Korea, blocking illicit funds that Pyongyang could use for weapons of mass destruction, and highlighting human rights abuses under Kim’s rule. With close bilateral and trilateral cooperation with allies South Korea and Japan, strengthening deterrence against North Korea has been a critical focus of Biden’s North Korea policy. Harris’ past comments on North Korea also suggest that she would continue this policy, which would significantly impact Kim’s regime.
For Kim, a Harris administration would raise various concerns inside and outside North Korea. First, the constant updates to sanctions on North Korea, which the Biden administration has been eagerly leading, are one of the central obstacles to economic development. While the Bank of Korea recently reported that North Korea’s GDP rose 3.1 percent in 2023 due to eased COVID-19 restrictions and favorable weather conditions, assessments still suggest that this economic rebound would likely be temporary.
If Harris becomes president, the trend of ever-tighter economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. against North Korea will be firmly maintained, thereby reducing the number of options available to Kim Jong Un by further restricting trade, limiting foreign exchange earnings, and isolating financial institutions. In a worst-case scenario, economic suffering could make it difficult for Kim to maintain his regime.
The weakening royal status of North Korea’s ruling family, especially among young, tech-savvy North Koreans, is also one of the significant political challenges faced by Kim Jong Un. Many North Korean defectors report growing negative evaluations of Kim, increased dissatisfaction with Kim’s hereditary succession, and rising antipathy toward the “Baekdu bloodline” on which the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty is based. The Kim family’s divine presence has diminished significantly since Kim Jong Un came to power.
The influx of information into North Korea, such as South Korean drama and K-pop, has exposed North Koreans, especially young people, to alternative perspectives, economic disparities, and global culture – despite the Kim regime criminalizing such exchanges. The Biden administration’s effort to increase access of North Koreans to outside information, which Harris would continue, would keep threatening the state propaganda by broadening awareness of North Koreans and opening minds to reality – including the reality of human rights violations in North Korea, which is aiming to maintain the power of the royal family, not aiming for the prosperity of North Korean citizens.
Diplomatically, strengthening the trilateral security cooperation of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, an effort that will be maintained if Harris becomes president, is not good news for Kim, either. North Korea recently achieved a diplomatic accomplishment through the Russia-North Korea pact thanks to the intensified “new cold war” tensions. Some see this as evidence that the increasing trilateral partnership between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan has backfired. However, Kim knows the Russia-North Korea alliance is not as strong as the bilateral alliance between South Korea and the United States. Kim also recognizes that North Korea’s partnership with China, which considers Pyongyang an oddity, if not an outright burden, is not much different from Russia’s.
The South Korea-Japan-U.S. trilateral, which Harris will maintain or strengthen if she is elected this November, will keep strengthening deterrence against North Korean aggression, increasing regional security cooperation, and presenting a unified front in negotiations. This will limit Kim’s international influence and legitimacy, constraining North Korea’s diplomatic maneuverability.
Compared to Harris, Trump would be the lesser of two evils for Kim Jong Un. Trump may try to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, thinking that the U.S. troops are not needed on the peninsula. That is what Kim also wants. Additionally, Trump’s volatility could cause a rift in the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which could be disconcerting for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which has consistently pursued a North Korean policy based on pressure. Beyond that, a second Trump administration might damage the broad framework of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South Korea-Japan-U.S. trilateral, established by the Biden administration, which would be to Kim’s advantage.
The previous Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea was “final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD),” the same policy other U.S. leaders have maintained, albeit with different terminology. However, Trump’s caprice suggests this is not set in stone, as he showed during his recent acceptance speech. His comment, “It’s nice to get along with somebody that has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” suggests that Trump might treat Kim as the leader of a nuclear state.
In addition, Trump previously proved willing to neglect North Korean human rights issues – which Pyongyang doesn’t want the international community to stir up – during his nuclear negotiations with Kim. Overall, if Trump is elected, this would buy time for Kim to deal with the economic, political, and diplomatic issues faced by North Korea.
However, keep in mind that Kim Jong Un experienced the breakdown of the Hanoi summit as a humiliating diplomatic failure. A Trump victory, and the possibility of a repeat summit, is unlikely to be an enjoyable alternative for Kim.
Although Kim Jong Un said he “doesn’t care” about the upcoming U.S. presidential election, he might secretly be hoping for Trump to win. Kim must have many worries as he watches the U.S. presidential election turnaround with Harris taking the Democratic candidacy. However, we can expect Kim to ultimately reaffirm his commitment to nurturing a “self-reliant” North Korea that no longer must suffer being dragged around by the great powers. There is no doubt that this commitment will result in Kim’s actions to accelerate the advancement of nuclear weapons.