Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), passed away on July 19 at the age of 80. He was the second-longest serving party chief after Le Duan and arguably one of the most impactful architects of Vietnam’s foreign policy since Vietnam’s reunification. Vietnam’s post-Cold War foreign policy has been based on the “Three Nos” principles since the 1990s, but it was Trong who coined the term “bamboo diplomacy” in 2016 to describe the country’s national foreign policy and won it international attention through his successful management of Vietnam’s ties with China, Russia, and the United States at a time of growing geopolitical polarization.
Bamboo, a frequent presence in Vietnamese folklore, is famous for its “strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches.” Trong’s idea behind “bamboo diplomacy” is based on President Ho Chi Minh’s famous dictum, “Firm in objectives, flexible in strategies and tactics,” first laid out in 1946. As such, the two leaders did not let ideological differences undermine their ultimate objective, which was to defend the national interest. For Ho, it was the outreach to U.S. President Harry Truman and his comprehensive efforts to expand the young Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s diplomatic presence to gain international legitimacy as the French were returning to Indochina. Vietnam’s multilateral foreign policy also began with Ho.
Trong similarly perceived the United States as an important diplomatic partner that could be embedded within Vietnam’s growing diplomatic network in a bid to deter China. He made an unprecedented visit to the White House in 2015, the first CPV chief to do so. Under his watch, U.S.-Vietnam relations substantially expanded, despite some concerns that Trong, as a committed communist, would not value ties with the United States. And by inviting U.S. President Joe Biden to Hanoi as a counterpart, Trong made clear to the world that Vietnam would not let ideological differences get in the way of national interests. On the contrary, by having Biden deal directly with the CPV, Trong succeeded in committing the U.S. to not overthrow the CPV and further enhancing the ideological authority of the Party. Trong’s passing will not herald an end to the upward trajectory of U.S.-Vietnam relations.
In a statement on Trong’s passing, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper affirmed that Washington would “look forward to working closely with President To Lam and all Party, State, and National Assembly leadership.” The United States has supported Trong’s bamboo diplomacy by adding the word “resilient” to its Vietnam policy, perceiving and expecting that Hanoi will not simply capitulate in the face of Chinese bullying. Besides the United States, Trong also elevated Vietnam’s relations with other U.S. allies as well, inking comprehensive strategic partnerships with South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
What is remarkable about “bamboo diplomacy” is Vietnam’s ability to turn a zero-sum game among the great powers into a positive-sum game for Vietnam. Hanoi’s growing ties with Washington have not come at the cost of its ties with Beijing and Moscow.
In the decade after the 2014 HD-981 oil rig incident, Vietnam and China successfully managed their differences at sea and have since avoided a second crisis of the same magnitude. Trong leveraged the ties between the CPV and its Chinese counterpart to signal to China that the two nations still have many common interests despite their territorial disputes. Vietnam’s decision to join China’s “community of common destiny” during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Hanoi in December 2023 is an example of this logic. From the Chinese perspective, Trong’s bamboo diplomacy is an assurance that Hanoi will not ally with an extra-regional power at China’s expense so long as China exercises restraint towards Vietnam. Vietnam’s South China Sea policy has thus proved more efficient than that of the Philippines, as China has largely turned a blind eye to Vietnam’s island reclamation activities while using force to impede the Philippines’ resupplying missions to the Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal.
Xi himself paid a visit to Vietnam’s Embassy in Beijing to pay condolences to Trong. The Chinese President remarked that Trong’s passing “deprived us of a promoter of China-Vietnam relations and a companion for the cause of socialism.”
In his last days, Trong pulled the last but not least diplomatic feat by welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin to Hanoi. Vietnam’s hosting of the Russian leader was not the result of a historical debt but a shrewd calculation of its interests. By expanding joint Russia-Vietnam cooperation over oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, Vietnam could exert its maritime claims. Importantly, Vietnam’s decision to work closely with Russia, instead of the United States, on this front would not be a menace to China because Russia and China have been on generally good terms.
Again, the remarkable success of Trong’s bamboo diplomacy lies in Vietnam’s ability to turn a global zero-sum game into a positive-sum game for itself. The United States voiced its upset at the decision to host the visit, but it did not undertake any concrete actions to roll back the cooperation with Vietnam. Hanoi continues looking for Russian arms deals despite upgrading its ties with the United States in order to not upset China while leaving the U.S. arms purchasing option open. From the Russian perspective, Trong’s bamboo diplomacy is a commitment that Hanoi will not join a Western-led anti-Russia coalition, the same commitment that both Moscow and Hanoi made in their 1994 Treaty on the Basic Principles of the Vietnam-Russia Relationship. Putin’s message of condolence to Vietnam praised Trong for his “huge personal contribution to the establishment and development of a comprehensive strategic partnership.”
However, the most important foreign policy legacy of Trong lies not in Vietnam’s foreign ties, but in his willingness to assert Vietnam’s agency. Small powers like Vietnam tend to get swallowed by their much bigger diplomatic partners, all the more so at a time of polarization. The central idea behind “bamboo diplomacy” is to build an independent and self-reliant Vietnam. From Trong’s perspective, foreign friends are a means, not an end. Vietnam’s diplomatic partners can help it to some degree, but it will be Vietnam’s internal reforms and modernization that best guarantee the country’s survival and prosperity.
Trong’s anti-corruption campaign was thus an undetachable element of his vision, for only an uncorrupted CPV would be strong enough to effectively carry out economic reforms and military modernization in service of its long-term political survival. In other words, the bamboo needs to establish “strong roots” first. Under his watch, Vietnam was the only country that welcomed the Chinese, Russian, and U.S. presidents in a span of nine months. Such a feat would not have happened had the country been a weak party-state. Major powers understand Trong’s “bamboo diplomacy” in their own ways, but the common point is that they accept Vietnam’s growing international role because they see that the country’s increased prominence will not come at their expense.
Given Trong’s successful coining of the term “bamboo diplomacy” and the international recognition it has earned, Vietnam’s foreign policy is not likely to change after his passing. The country’s collective decision-making structure is resistant to sudden changes, and Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy is working well, as its architect expected. Trong’s famous words to describe the success of Vietnam were “our country has never had the potential, position and prestige it has today.” And he delivered, as seen by the massive number of Vietnamese netizens blacking out their social media profile pictures the past several days to mourn the passing leader. It will be up to his successors to continue and champion his legacy in the international arena.