It is a myth that there are no protests in China. In fact, in the past decade, some of the most prominent protests have come from those who have, in the course of their professional careers, been trained to ideologically and politically love and support the party-state – veterans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). And on August 1, the same day the PLA celebrated with great pomp-and-show its 97th founding anniversary, a Beijinger clad in military uniform proved the prominence of such protests.
The veteran soldier, sitting atop a high-rise amid the busy streets of Wangfujing shopping district, unfurled a banner that accused the government of Kunming city, Yunnan province (where he reportedly works a resettlement job in Guandu District), of stifling the rights of a soldier transitioning after 12 years of service.
This incident is not isolated, and must be viewed as the latest in a long line of protests held by military veteran communities in China, many of which have been much larger and more organized compared to the Wangfujing soldier’s lone-man show. From peacefully marching outside the Bayi (August 1) building in Beijing – China’s equivalent to the Pentagon – in October 2016, to picking up wooden sticks and fire extinguishers in scuffles with the Shandong province police two years later, military veterans in China have long voiced concerns over poor resettlement opportunities, low or no pension benefits, and corruption by local officials in veteran affairs.
But now, within a span of two weeks, the party-state has released a new and a revised set of regulations respectively on resettlement of retired personnel and better management of pension benefits, signaling a willingness to take veteran concerns seriously. More so, these play a symbolic role in expressing support for ex-servicemen, whom Xi Jinping has referred to as “an important force in advancing Chinese modernization.”
The “Regulations on the Placement of Retired Military Personnel” (退役军人安置条例), promulgated jointly by the Central Military Commission and the State Council on July 29, 2024, revolve around the duty of the state to care for and provide preferential treatment to veterans. Perhaps the most important instruction of the Regulations is that all socioeconomic and political stakeholders are required to share in the responsibility of rightful placement of veterans post retirement or discharge.
This includes local governments, for example, which, as per Articles 6-10 of the Regulations, are required to not only implement central guidelines on veteran placements and resettlement, but also incorporate such placements into their budgets and annual work targets. In addition, they are required to establish a “responsibility, assessment and evaluation” system for placement work, adding a new parameter to the evaluation of cities and provinces as model examples of “double support work” (双拥工作) – a Communist Party ideal meaning that the government and the people must support the military, and vice-versa.
Other vital stakeholders the Regulations document implores are enterprises and institutions, which, as per Article 9, should lawfully offer jobs to veterans, or should otherwise help by educating and upskilling them to kickstart entrepreneurial endeavors of their own. If not, veterans have the option to sue under various other veteran affairs and military service legislations. And if none of these options work out, the Regulations make room for the deployment of retirement pay, one-time subsidies, disability compensations, and other funding benefits (including more affordable and accessible public education for children of martyrs).
This latest set of Regulations builds on the backs of previous legislation, such as the 2011 Regulation on the Resettlement of Enlisted Veterans and the 2020 law on support of veterans, promulgated at the 23rd session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC). The NPC law, in particular, provides for ease in accessing personal financing for loans to start new enterprises, specifically for demobilized personnel.
In the course of PLA reforms, a number of troops have been demobilized to focus on efficiency and technological upliftment of the army, and most of them have been assigned to resettlement projects. With the new Regulations on veterans in place, it is likely that local governments and banking institutions may face duplication of tasks and goals, especially as Article 17 instructs them to conduct resettlement work separately for demobilized personnel according to the differentiated laws.
To add to this bureaucratic mush, the Military Pension Benefits Regulations (军人抚恤优待条例), revised on August 5, 2024, call for local governments to create funds and working expenses to disburse pensions to retired personnel based on their “contributions.” Per the regulations, this would require, in addition to a consideration of the post during retirement, an evaluation of the medals won by the concerned personnel, the per-capita disposable income of urban residents nationwide for the previous financial year, and the dependents in the concerned family.
The comprehensiveness of the provisions for both the above-mentioned regulations, in this regard, is only as good as the ability of the bureaucracy at the local levels to break barriers of inefficiency, red tape, and corruption.
These also raise questions pertaining to household registration or hukou of veterans. The pension benefit regulations make the case that dependents of martyrs may seek relocation to the military unit’s base upon consideration by various authorities, and the local government for the unit base shall care for pension payments. However, living veterans and demobilized personnel are likely required to return to their home provinces, especially considering Xi Jinping himself has called on them to return to roots under his flagship “rural revitalization” initiative.
Given that many rural citizens are motivated to join the military by the desire for a better life, demobilization resettlement is likely to put greater pressure on local government budgets in poorer provinces. Moreover, it creates room for corruption by retirees of a higher pedigree, in gaining an urban hukou.
Overall, the Regulations extensively formalize the process of resettlement and placement for veterans at a time when discontent levels may be at their peak, given that not just veterans, but Chinese citizens as a whole are reeling from the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The effects are coupled with continuing waves of demobilization, as well as other structural issues such as local government debt and private sector insecurities. In this regard, provisions for burden-sharing with local governmental and private stakeholders such as enterprises and universities may mean greater hurdles for implementation.
Moreover, with the unemployment rate for Chinese youth (aged 16-24) standing at around 15 percent, quotas for veteran resettlements may lead to clashing priorities. But can the increased desire for talent in scientific and technological fields in China push efforts in the right direction? Time will tell.