Recent attention to nuclear dangers has been largely devoted to expanding Chinese forces, Russian nuclear threats, and the growing momentum toward a comprehensive nuclear buildup in the United States. At the same time, there is a similar but largely unseen dynamic unfolding on the Asian Subcontinent – one that emulates the great power conundrum and should be more acutely observed. The China-India-Pakistan triad raises strategic risks and instabilities, posing a perhaps more concerning threat to nuclear non-use than the ongoing competition between China, Russia, and the United States.
Long considered the most likely theater for nuclear use, the same precarities, tensions, and territorial disputes that defined the three-way relationship between India, China, and Pakistan decades ago continue to shape their interactions. A quarter-century after the nuclearization of the Asian Subcontinent, a three-sided combination of evolving nuclear postures, military-technological modernizations, and strategic competition now compound these drivers of instability and are bringing the region closer to a nuclear crisis.
Indeed, the region has seen two dangerously close calls in just five years. The 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis brought India and Pakistan into direct military confrontation, while the 2022 BrahMos cruise missile incident marked the first time in history that a nuclear-capable cruise missile of one nuclear-armed state struck another. Both incidents deescalated not because of prudent decision-making but because both sides happened upon off ramps that allowed them to construct a domestic narrative of victory around their exit from the crises.
Perhaps the most dangerous dynamics between India and Pakistan are a shared overconfidence in their own ability to control escalation and a surety that the other will refrain from escalating a small-scale conventional conflict to the nuclear level. When both sides have internalized the belief that the other is committed to demonstrating restraint, both are more likely to see brinkmanship as a strategy for victory. The next time India and Pakistan find themselves amid an unfolding crisis, the conditions for de-escalation may not be present, and there may be no off ramps to be had.
What’s more, India simultaneously must manage a precarious border relationship with China. Recurrent skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have turned deadly in the past, and although a pattern of dialogue follows these skirmishes, the potential for future flashpoints escalating to new military heights remains high as each side increasingly militarizes its border policies.
As the overall tenor of Sino-Indian relations grows more tense amid competing foreign policies, they will need to manage better military relations and interactions along the LAC. The same can be said of the contested border areas of Kashmir along the Line of Control with Pakistan.
But long-standing rivalries and the insecurities they engender are not easily overcome, and despite a pressing need for engagement on risk reduction to prevent the next territorial dispute from erupting into nuclear use, neither India, China, nor Pakistan has shown such interest.
Rather, each has justified its nuclear modernizations in part by the threat perceptions generated by their neighbors’ nuclear maneuvers. India is responding to China’s strategic buildup and regional ambitions, while Pakistan’s embrace of tactical warfighting capabilities is in response to India’s emphasis on counterforce and strategic defenses.
China’s history of military cooperation with Islamabad adds to India’s insecurity as it faces seemingly intractable border disputes with its major neighbors. China and Pakistan share a long-standing strategic partnership and common interest in countering India’s regional dominance. The two cooperate in the military domain and maintain WMD proliferation networks that were discovered to be active as recently as March 2024.
For more than two decades, India and Pakistan have competed to improve the survivability of their nuclear forces and match one another at lower levels of escalation. For India, this has meant a commitment to maturing its ballistic missile submarine fleet, developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), exploring options for expanded missile defense, and prioritizing its Agni family of mobile missiles. Pakistan, in addition to expanding its strategic forces and hardening its command and control, has also built out a suite of lower threshold nuclear capabilities designed to be fitted with tactical nuclear warheads intended for the battlefield. With India likewise developing dual-capable cruise missile and battlefield nuclear capabilities, the chances for lower-level nuclear conflict are growing on the Subcontinent.
China’s nuclear modernization and expansion, meanwhile, are ostensibly geared toward the United States. The majority of Chinese nuclear-capable missiles, however, cannot reach the U.S. mainland but could easily strike Indian population centers. Beijing nonetheless has had to acknowledge an evolution in the Sino-Indian strategic relationship. Amid intensifying geostrategic competition, India has improved the range of its strategic missiles to cover all of mainland China.
New Delhi is also restructuring its ballistic missile forces into the Integrated Rocket Force, managing both nuclear-capable and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. The entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities will introduce new ambiguities into Sino-Indian deterrence. India’s pursuit of MIRVs also implicates China in addition to Pakistan, as a MIRV-capable force could threaten to negate any perceived Chinese advantage in missile defense and could reinforce the risk of escalation at the conventional level if Chinese and Indian strategists begin concluding that a relative strategic balance has been reached.
Thus, despite China’s purported focus on competition with the United States, India’s overt fixation on deterrence vis-à-vis China is bringing the two into a more precarious nuclear relationship than they have ever known.
South Asia is the only place in the world where three nuclear-armed nations sit in such proximity and are bound by violently contested borders. The fuse in South Asia may be shorter than at any time in recent memory, and yet the China-India-Pakistan triad continues to receive inadequate attention outside the region. Given the escalating strategic risks in the triad, several measures can enhance stability and reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict.
First, India and Pakistan should update the 1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities to reflect contemporary technological advancements. This modernization should include clearer definitions of nuclear-related targets and expanded mechanisms for verification and compliance.
Additionally, the existing notification regime, which currently covers ballistic missile tests, should be extended to include theater cruise missile tests. Moreover, the regime’s envelope could be expanded to include not only the test firing of missile capabilities, but also notifications of other development activities such as static tests. Including such tests in the notification regime would enhance transparency and build confidence between the two nations at a time when trust is at a premium. Ideally, these arrangements should be extended to China, although Beijing may be initially unwilling to engage.
Second, India and China, as well as India and Pakistan, should pursue cooperative border management efforts, including demilitarizing contested borders, enlarging buffer zones, and withdrawing forces from the uninhabitable Siachen Glacier. Enhanced deconfliction channels and regular border management meetings can help manage and deescalate potential conflicts.
Furthermore, India, China, and Pakistan should collaborate on counterterrorism efforts to stymie attacks by non-state groups that could plunge the region into a crisis. Specifically, Pakistan should realize that its tolerance of anti-Indian terrorism only serves to make Pakistan less secure by inflaming Indian threat perceptions. Joint counterterrorism operations and associated intelligence sharing can contribute to reducing the threat posed by non-state groups, improving the tangible security of the region while simultaneously opening up greater space for cooperation on other issues.
Third, India, China, and Pakistan should prioritize the establishment of a trilateral Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) to facilitate real-time communication during crises and enhance mutual understanding. A South Asia NRRC could help manage and mitigate the risks associated with misinterpretations, low-level conflict or subconventional skirmishes, and accidental missile launches, and would furthermore contribute to managing threat perceptions between the three.
Initiating a formal nuclear dialogue between India and China is also imperative. Mechanisms that manage nuclear and broader military competition amid the backdrop of strategic competition would be to the benefit of all parties. Such a mechanism should promote the discussion of nuclear postures, doctrines, and intentions. This dialogue would help clarify mutual perceptions, reduce the risk of miscalculations, and foster transparency in nuclear policies.
Premeditated nuclear attacks remain improbable triggers for a nuclear conflict on the Subcontinent, but the combination of expanding nuclear arsenals, interest in nuclear warfighting postures, simmering territorial disputes, and the continued reach of extremist groups leaves the region prone to sudden and inadvertent escalation. There is a pressing need for the United States and the international community to extend their diplomacy beyond the primary concerns of China and Russia and to observe and address the fragile security dynamics in South Asia.
Regrettably, South Asia’s nuclear dynamics remain under the shadow of escalating great power nuclear competition, but overlooking the instabilities among India, China, and Pakistan risks neglecting a fuse that could ignite regional and global catastrophe. As global attention often focuses elsewhere, vigilance and proactive engagement are essential to prevent the China-India-Pakistan triad from becoming a crucible of nuclear conflict.