When escalating tensions between Israel and Iran in April 2024 spurred fears of a wider Middle Eastern war, U.S. partners in the region reportedly attempted to limit the United States’ ability to attack Iranian forces from their territory. In an increasingly non-aligned world, and where U.S. influence is relatively less than in the Cold War, military access and logistics should not be taken for granted. This is not because of any insurmountable military problems but rather political ones as many countries hedge between great powers.
This issue is perhaps most urgent in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. force projection in the critical region relies upon overseas bases and military access agreements. Although the United States has strong alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, other U.S. partners are considerably more reluctant to outwardly go against Beijing, especially in South and Southeast Asia.
While the United States has steadily improved relations with many important regional allies and partners, a persistent commitment to hedging in South and Southeast Asia raises concerns about U.S. force projection into the region during a potential conflict with China. Only by putting in real effort to enhance trust and providing greater, more reliable economic incentives can the United States improve the likelihood that key “swing states” are amendable to U.S. military access and logistics support in an Indo-Pacific crisis.
U.S. Force Posture in the Indo-Pacific and Power Projection
The Indo-Pacific flashpoints of the East China Sea, Korean Peninsula, South China Sea, and Taiwan all lie thousands of miles from the continental United States, greatly complicating power projection. Given the need to transport and deploy forces across the vast Pacific, U.S. access and logistics are no less vital today than they were in World War II.
Current U.S. logistics capabilities, such as sealift, may not be sufficient for the significant challenges of operating over such long distances, especially under threat from enemy ballistic missiles and anti-access and area denial capabilities. Moreover, U.S. force posture has traditionally oriented toward Northeast Asia, leaving access in Southeast Asia much less firm since the Cold War ended.
That said, U.S. diplomatic efforts have improved preparedness and relations with traditional allies and partners in service to filling out an emerging “latticework” security architecture. The AUKUS agreement includes plans to host a rotational submarine presence in Western Australia at HMAS Stirling.
The United States and Japan are actively optimizing their forces in Japan’s southwestern islands facing Taiwan. The U.S.-Japan summit in 2024 resulted in a variety of important alliance developments, including revising their command-and-control framework, with the two allies later announcing the creation of a joint force headquarters.
The Japan-Philippines-U.S. trilateral after the U.S.-Japan summit built on the earlier Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) announcement of four more sites with further useful developments. Notably, the Luzon Economic Corridor will enhance infrastructure in the northern Philippines facing the South China Sea and Taiwan. It also presents a viable alternative to failed Chinese investments.
Additionally, Washington recently approved the funding and approval for the renewed Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements in the Pacific, thus securing access through Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.
Throughout the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. military is also prepositioning supplies and equipment for use during a contingency. The services, especially the Marines, are actively pioneering new operational concepts and capabilities to better counter China’s anti-access and area denial threat. These force posture developments are welcome and crucial for enhancing deterrence.
Hedging and U.S. Military Access
However, political problems remain. U.S. partners in the South and Southeast Asia generally prefer to hedge and avoid outright alignment with the United States against China.
Despite a long record of regional multilateral and bilateral military exercises with key allies and partners like Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and others, regional governments are far from aligned with either the United States or China. They fear investment drying up, the loss of lucrative trade, and other forms of economic and political retaliation if they anger Beijing. With U.S. economic influence viewed as less than China’s, U.S. allies and partners may be hesitant to allow U.S. forces to operate from their territory in the event of a China-U.S. military conflict.
While the Philippines has emerged over the past year as the United States’ closest ally in Southeast Asia, it is important to reiterate that Washington should not rest on its laurels. Indeed, although U.S. efforts helped court the Philippines, Manila’s turn to Washington should be viewed as largely a response to Chinese foreign policy failures instead of U.S. successes. China failed to provide the billions in Belt and Road infrastructure it promised former President Rodrigo Duterte, and Beijing’s continued aggression in the South China Sea alienated President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and other elites, as well as the public. Washington did well to meet the Marcos administration with open arms, but there are few long-term guarantees in Philippine politics.
Duterte, now out of office but still influential – especially with his daughter serving as the current vice president – represents a potential pro-China camp in Philippine politics. If anti-American sentiment returned to Malacañang, such as through Vice President Sara Duterte winning in 2028, the stipulation in EDCA that “all United States access to and use of facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines” means Washington cannot rest too easy.
The other U.S. treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, is another challenge altogether. During the Cold War, the United States enjoyed close relations with Thailand and based many of its forces operating in the Vietnam War there. Today, this history is reflected in sometime access to an air base at U-Tapao in southern Thailand.
However, Thailand-U.S. relations have been bumpy since Bangkok’s 2014 coup d’etat, despite some improvement under the new Pheu Thai-led government. Military-monarchy elites in Thailand view China as a partner rather than a rival, and U.S. access to U-Tapao is unlikely in any conflict against Beijing.
Singapore is arguably the closest partner in the region that remains a non-ally. It grants the United States regular use of Changi port and air base, a rotational presence, and substantial logistics facilities. It also hosts approximately 800 U.S. personnel and civilians. However, it is probable that Singapore will assert neutrality during a potential U.S. war with China. Allowing U.S. access for combat operations against Chinese forces would provoke Beijing, which Singapore is likely to avoid.
Beyond that, regional U.S. access is much weaker. The Nusantara archipelago and the Malacca Strait, among other nearby waters, will prove critical for U.S. and allied forces passing through to enter the first island chain. Yet, Indonesia and Malaysia may attempt to restrict access by the belligerents’ armed forces in a regional conflict. Hampered or delayed naval passage through the straits in maritime Southeast Asia would constitute a problem for U.S. and allied forces operating out of Australia and transiting the Indian Ocean.
Building on their deepening bilateral relationship, the United States and India recently agreed that New Delhi would serve as a U.S. Navy maintenance hub in the Indian Ocean. Former U.S. officials have even mentioned India’s military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as having potential for U.S. military access in the Indian Ocean. However, India is not a formal military ally and remains highly unlikely to enter a China-U.S. military conflict.
Doing What It Can To Enhance Ties
Considering the predominantly non-aligned foreign policies in the region, U.S. military access in the southern reaches of the first island chain and the hinge of the Indo-Pacific is far from guaranteed during a war with China. It rests upon regional partners’ agreement and support and is thus dependent upon trust, goodwill, and incentives.
As such, the United States must do more to actively fulfill its commitments and provide alternatives to dependence upon China. Fundamentally, this means stepping up economically in the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
While U.S. defense cooperation has expanded throughout the Indo-Pacific, Washington’s offerings on the economic side are noticeably underperforming. For instance, per recent polling of elite views in ASEAN by the Singaporean think tank ISEAS, only 14.3 percent of respondents listed the United States as the most influential economic power in the region, versus 59.5 percent for China.
Due to its size, proximity, and regular engagement, dependence upon China’s economy is widespread in the region, which complicates regional decision making. If asked to choose between the United States and China, about half of respondents in ISEAS’ 2024 polling said they would side with Beijing. Although issues like the U.S. position on the war in Gaza and fears of another Cold War also influence their thinking, the fundamental fact of the matter is that the United States has not successfully provided an economic alternative to China.
Moreover, the United States all too often allows its domestic political dynamics to upend its commitments abroad. For example, delays in renegotiating and then approving the COFA agreements in Congress put U.S. access in the Pacific in real jeopardy. In Indonesia, a key state in Southeast Asia sitting astride highly strategic shipping routes, irritation with Washington’s limited diplomatic engagement, delays in funding some projects, and lack of appetite for a limited free trade agreement on critical minerals has grown. This year, a Quad summit appears in question due to the U.S. election.
To be sure, expecting outright alignment with the United States from most regional countries is unrealistic and counterproductive, but Washington must do more to increase the likelihood of military access and logistics support during a contingency. This means expanding its economic offerings in the Indo-Pacific to change the structural incentives that currently benefit China and carrying out existing commitments such as the Luzon Corridor in the Philippines. But, most fundamentally, it requires flexible and regular engagement to build trust and reaffirm that the United States is in the Indo-Pacific to stay.