Following Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the 2024 presidential elections, he made his first overseas visit as president-elect to China, where he was warmly welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People. This visit underscored the deepening bilateral ties between the two countries, highlighting their robust economic relations and vibrant people-to-people exchanges.
Despite these strong connections, military relations between Indonesia and China have been relatively subdued. Bilateral military exercises, a significant component of defense cooperation between states, were suspended in 2015 due to disputes in the North Natuna Sea. However, on August 13, 2024, during the China-Indonesia joint foreign and defense dialogue, senior officials from both countries agreed to resume joint military exercises, thereby revitalizing their defense collaboration.
While the exercises have yet to be conducted, this development raises a crucial question: Why are Indonesia and China resuming their joint military exercises?
For Indonesia, military exercises are a means of demonstrating its “Active and Free” (Aktif dan Bebas) foreign policy amid rising geopolitical tensions in Southeast Asia. As a key participant in U.S.-led military exercises in the region, Indonesia’s decision to conduct bilateral military exercises with China sends a clear signal to both the United States and China that it will not choose sides in the ongoing geopolitical contest.
On the other hand, China wants to use military exercises to build trust with Indonesia, recognizing that Indonesia is often considered the de facto leader of ASEAN, with a unique ability to rally Southeast Asian states and influence regional security dynamics.
An “Active and Free” Foreign Policy
Indonesia’s “Active and Free” foreign policy, established after independence in 1949, emphasizes non-alignment while actively engaging in diplomacy to promote regional and global stability. This principle was shaped by Indonesia’s historical experiences, including the Chola-Majapahit conflicts in the 1000s, Dutch colonization, the Japanese invasion during World War II, and Cold War dynamics between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Before 2007, Indonesia avoided bilateral military exercises with major powers, including the U.S., due to its aversion to hosting foreign troops, a sentiment rooted in its colonial past. However, post-Cold War, Indonesia began joint exercises with the U.S., exemplified by the annual “Garuda Shield” since 2007, aimed at enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. These exercises have been crucial for Indonesia, the sixth largest contributor to U.N. Peacekeeping. Indonesia’s joint drills with the U.S. provide realistic combat experience, access to military technology for archipelago defense, and strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts, especially after the deadly 2004 Boxing Day tsunami.
In keeping with its “Active and Free” policy, Indonesia signed a defense cooperation agreement with China in 2007, which included joint military exercises. From 2011 to 2014, the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD) and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted annual “Sharp Knife” counterterrorism exercises. However, these were smaller in scale compared to the Indonesia-U.S. Garuda Shield exercises, partly due to language barriers and operational differences.
The biggest challenge, however, was the dispute over the North Natuna Sea, where the nebulous “ten-dash line” (formerly the “nine-dash line”) denoting China’s maritime claims intersects with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Sharp Knife exercises were suspended in 2015 after Indonesia’s actions against illegal Chinese fishing vessels and subsequent diplomatic tensions. Since then, no bilateral military exercises have taken place between the PLA and TNI-AD, although Indonesia has invited China to join multinational drills, such as the biannual Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo.
In April 2024, Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to discuss military exchanges and the resumption of joint exercises between their countries. This renewed interest is driven by the intensifying China-U.S. competition and concerns that increased U.S. military activities in the region could draw Indonesia into the conflict.
During the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced plans to upgrade the Garuda Shield exercises from a bilateral to a multilateral format, now named “Super Garuda Shield,” to support a “rules-based international order.” In response, China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun, criticized the U.S. for escalating its military presence and fueling regional tensions.
The potential resumption of joint military exercises between Indonesia and China aims to achieve two key objectives. First, Indonesia seeks to reassure China that its participation in the U.S.-led Super Garuda Shield exercises remains focused on strengthening capabilities to address non-traditional security threats, such as natural disasters, and improving U.N. Peacekeeping operations. Second, by resuming joint exercises with China, Indonesia signals to the U.S. that it remains neutral and will not choose sides between the two great powers.
China’s Motivations: Building Trust and Defusing Regional Tensions
China’s interest in resuming joint military exercises with Indonesia is driven by a desire to build trust. According to the 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey, nearly 57 percent of Indonesian respondents remain wary of China’s regional influence due to bilateral maritime disputes in the North Natuna Sea, tensions in the wider South China Sea, and historical suspicions of Chinese interference in Indonesian politics. China’s growing assertiveness has led Southeast Asian states to welcome the U.S. military presence to counterbalance China, raising concerns about potential containment.
Although China has not conducted bilateral military exercises with Indonesia since 2015, its participation in Indonesia’s Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo has been crucial in fostering trust, as both countries collaborate on issues like piracy and natural disasters.
By building trust with Indonesia through joint military exercises, China aims to resolve its maritime disputes bilaterally with its neighbors. Indonesia, traditionally able to rally Southeast Asian states against China’s assertiveness, demonstrated this leadership in September 2023 by initiating the tri-service “ASEAN-Solidarity” exercise, involving six other ASEAN states, including China’s closest partner, Cambodia. This exercise showcased ASEAN’s unity and commitment to international law amidst South China Sea disputes.
Despite China’s preference for bilateral negotiations, ASEAN solidarity forces China to engage with the bloc as a whole. Thus, by fostering trust with Indonesia, China hopes to minimize the impact of non-claimant states while maintaining influence in bilateral negotiations over maritime disputes.
Resuming Joint Military Exercises?
The specifics of the pending military exercises between China and Indonesia are still being finalized, but analysts anticipate they will focus on low-level, small-scale non-traditional security issues such as piracy and counterterrorism.
For Indonesia, resuming joint military exercises with China will reinforce its “Active and Free” foreign policy amid intensifying great power rivalry. This approach allows Indonesia to maintain a balanced stance and showcase its ability to manage complex geopolitical tensions. However, ongoing regional tensions, particularly in the North Natuna Sea and the South China Sea could complicate the full resumption of these exercises, as they jeopardize the stability of the regional environment crucial for Indonesia’s economic development.
For China, the resumption of military exercises with Indonesia is a strategic maneuver aimed at building trust and addressing regional tensions. It reflects China’s broader strategy of strengthening bilateral relations and mitigating regional discord.
For ASEAN, Indonesia’s decision to resume joint exercises with China could contribute to a more cooperative regional security order. This collaboration is particularly valuable in addressing pressing non-traditional security issues, potentially laying the groundwork for a less tense regional security environment.