Oceania

Powerplay in the Pacific: A Little Competition Doesn’t Hurt

Recent Features

Oceania | Diplomacy | Oceania

Powerplay in the Pacific: A Little Competition Doesn’t Hurt

From policing assistance to digital infrastructure, strategic competition has led to better terms and more options for the Pacific Island nations.

Powerplay in the Pacific: A Little Competition Doesn’t Hurt

Leaders attend the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum in Tonga, Aug. 27, 2024.

Credit: Facebook/Pacific Islands Forum

The 53rd Pacific Island Forum (PIF) convened recently in Tonga. While the media spotlight focused on the diplomatic tensions between China and Taiwan, particularly China’s objections to Taiwan being recognized as a “development partner,” the broader takeaway from the meeting was that the great power competition in the region is significantly increasing the attention and resources available to Pacific Island nations.

Founded in 1971, the PIF brings together 18 member states to discuss and coordinate responses to issues such as climate change, economic development, and regional security across the Pacific. For the first few decades, the annual meetings of PIF leaders received little attention. However, that changed after China intensified aid, diplomacy, and security engagement in the region, drawing greater international focus.

This engagement by China came with political caveats. For instance, faced with considerable pressure from China, member nations at the forum this year felt compelled to amend the official communique, ultimately omitting any mention of Taiwan. Checkbook diplomacy between China and Taiwan has been a source of inconsistent and opportunistic aid and investment. China increased aid to the Solomon Islands and neighboring Kiribati after they switched diplomatic allegiances to Beijing from Taiwan in 2019.

In 2022, China signed a secret security pact with the Solomon Islands that sent ripples across the ocean. The agreement allowed China to send police and other security personnel to the Solomon Islands to maintain social order, protect Chinese investments, and respond to emergencies. Australia and other Western countries feared that these security ties could be a precursor to a more permanent Chinese military presence.

The broader policing arrangements under China’s regional diplomacy framework have also included law enforcement cooperation with countries like Fiji and Papua New Guinea. In response, Australia, at the PIF this year, announced funding for a regional policing plan to improve training and create a multinational crisis reaction force. The initiative will also create a multi-country policing force to be deployed to countries in the region in the event of major events or crises.

For decades, the Pacific Islands remained on the periphery of U.S. foreign policy, with sporadic engagement mostly linked to military bases or missile testing. However, beyond these security arrangements, Washington paid minimal attention to the region’s economic and developmental needs, neglecting consistent diplomatic presence or long-term investment. In response to China’s moves, the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, Australia’s Pacific Step-Up initiative and New Zealand’s Pacific Reset policy all aim to reassert their presence through diplomatic visits and renewals of strategic pacts with Pacific nations.

Estimates suggest that between 2006 and 2020, China committed around $1.5 billion in aid to the Pacific Islands region, making it one of the largest external funders. This includes a mix of grants, concessional loans, and infrastructure deals. Beijing has also provided significant financial aid to the Solomon Islands, with a promised $730 million package.

Official statements and policies from the Chinese government identify the Pacific Islands as integral to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a key element of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. Yet China’s attention has recently shifted to its rapid expansion of a BRI offshoot – the Digital Silk Road, which focuses on digital technologies in developing countries. In 2018, in Papua New Guinea, Chinese tech giant Huawei built a data center for the government’s entire data archive, using a $53 million development loan from China’s Exim Bank.

As China increased its footprint through projects and loans, states like the United States and Australia responded by boosting their own contributions to ensure they remain favorable partners. This competition has led to better terms and more options for the recipient nations. Increased interaction with the diverse global powers also brought various cultural and social benefits, including educational exchanges and healthcare improvements.

In 2020, the United States announced the “Pacific Pledge,” a multi-year commitment of funding to support the development and resilience of Pacific Island nations. Subsequently, it released the first-ever U.S. Pacific Partnership Strategy in 2022 and hosted two U.S.-Pacific Islands summits in September 2022 and September 2023. 

In May 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted his department’s commitment to working with Congress to secure over $7.2 billion in new funding and programs for the Pacific Islands region.

As a response to China’s growing contribution to infrastructure development in the region, including roads, government buildings, and ports, Fiji signed a deal with Australia earlier this year to upgrade ports and shipbuilding infrastructure, months after its prime minister said it was likely to partner with China on the project.

Thus, the involvement of multiple powers has led to higher-quality projects, as each competitor seeks to prove the value of their investment to the host country. Further, since investors require stable conditions and clear regulatory frameworks, the scrutiny that comes with foreign investments has also led to improvements in governance and transparency within these nations. By balancing relationships with multiple players, these nations can now negotiate better terms for trade agreements, security pacts, and environmental cooperation.

While harnessing the tide of competition has proven fruitful for PIF nations, they must be wary of the hidden hazards. Great power rivalry can force smaller nations into strategic alignments that may not align with their own interests but rather serve the agenda of competing powers. Further, such competition can lead to the militarization of regions, increasing the risks of conflict and undermining regional stability. 

While this competition undoubtedly presents challenges, including dependency and sovereignty concerns, it also provides tangible benefits that can enhance development, governance, and diplomatic leverage for PIF countries. Therefore, it is essential for all parties to ensure that the development and assistance provided lead to genuinely beneficial outcomes for the local populations without compromising their autonomy, long-term interests, and sustainability.

Once treated as mere pawns in a geopolitical chess game, Pacific Island nations appear to have flipped the board. They are actively shaping the game and asserting their agency to influence the power dynamics in their favor. As long as these nations steer their international relationships carefully, they can markedly benefit from the competitive attention they receive from large global players.