Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, all five Central Asian governments have been closely watched and courted by competing global powers. Russia understands that the global rebuke of its war efforts and unprecedented sanctions have made it a pariah state, and because of these reasons, it risks losing its close allies such as the Central Asian countries. This is especially true given that the Western bloc, led by the United States, has constantly pressured Central Asian nations to distance themselves from Russia. In addition, China, a rising global power, is ready to step in and increase its presence in the region to fill the potential political, economic and security vacuum.
In light of these events, the speeches delivered by the five Central Asian nations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) provide rich information about their foreign policy stances.
This is the third year that the UNGA, held each September, has convened since the start of the conflict. As such, it is timely to analyze how, if at all, the speeches of the Central Asian countries have evolved over time. The conflict seems to have reached a stalemate – and Central Asian countries may have to decide whether it would benefit them to distance themselves from Russia or whether it would hurt them, seeing that no clear winner has emerged. Moreover, Russia seems to be doing fine economically despite the unprecedented sanctions. In short, are Central Asian governments continuing their multi-vector foreign policies and maintaining cordial relationships with all major global powers or are they increasingly distancing themselves from Putin’s Russia?
The recent speeches by Central Asian leaders and top officials suggest that they may have gotten wary of the stalemate and chosen to stay neutral as evidenced by the fact that they are less willing to even discuss the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the same direct manner they did last year. Despite not challenging Russia in their speeches, some Central Asian countries have been quietly resisting Russian influence, and seeking partners elsewhere. Turkiye seems to be one of such newly rediscovered partners.
79th UNGA Session
The General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly gives nations an avenue to express what they deem to be important through their speeches, which reverberate through both domestic and external audiences. The UNGA is particularly important for smaller states, which do not wield as much influence within the global arena. For them, it is an opportunity to clearly state their stances on relevant issues, advocate on problems within the domestic domain, and be heard by powerful states – the wide coverage of the event in the popular press ensures it.
Central Asian countries’ speeches at the UNGA have historically been quite neutral, rarely voicing support or disapproval toward one side of any given conflict. When it came to the various Russia-related conflicts of the past few decades – be it the annexation of Crimea in 2014 or the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 – Central Asian nations have typically been careful even with the invocation of sovereignty-related concepts in their speeches. Too many mentions of the concept of sovereignty within Central Asian countries’ speeches during these conflicts could have been construed as an indirect opposition to Russia’s actions.
However, with the unprecedented attack on Ukraine by Russian forces in 2022, Central Asian nations somewhat ended their covert support – or, at the very least, a lack of overt opposition – toward Russia. For instance, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were a lot more direct with their mentions of the war in Ukraine in their UNGA speeches last year.
This year, Central Asian leaders’ speeches, however, marked yet another change. Most of the speeches this year from the Central Asian states ignored Russia and anything related to it, instead focusing on other issues.
Kazakhstan’s speech, for instance, did not address Ukraine by name, instead it chose to mention several different conflicts in a collective manner. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Murat Nurtleu, who delivered Kazakhstan’s remarks, said that “[t]he plight of millions of conflict victims worldwide, across the Middle East, Eastern Europe and parts of Africa, deserve immediate, decisive and collective action.” Despite it still being clear which conflict “Eastern Europe” refers to, this year’s speech was not as overt and direct at calling out Russia as it was last year. This links back to the country’s multi-vector foreign policy, first introduced by former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, by which Kazakhstan actively attempts to distance itself from the conventional “side-picking” approach, instead maintaining friendly and fruitful relations with all of the key global blocs (namely, the West, China, and Russia).
This year’s regression in overtness highlights Kazakhstan’s struggle to distance itself from its northern neighbor. Kazakhstan is undeniably and, possibly, irrevocably linked with and dependent on Russia – especially on the economic front. A mere 2 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil is exported through routes that do not include Russia. Such a level of economic integration and dependence ties the hands of the nation and leaves it no choice but to be careful in distancing itself from Russia. This year’s speech reflects this struggle and balance between satisfying the likes of the West by mentioning the conflict and not angering Russia by not calling anyone out by name.
Kyrgyzstan went further, with a significant portion of its speech being a rumination on military spending and armed conflicts. However, it is unclear whether this was based on the war in Ukraine or on a different conflict, because there was no direct mention of any one specific conflict. In Kyrgyzstan’s speech, President Sadyr Japarov said: “We must ensure that the money that allocates to wars, destruction, death, could go to creation or to solving global challenges for all of humanity.” Most likely, this detailed discussion on war is targeted at the Israel-Hamas war; however, no clear conclusions can be drawn due to the ambiguous nature of the speech.
Tajikistan’s speech, which was delivered by the President Emomali Rahmon, reflected a similar stance, refusing to mention Russia by name. Instead, Rahmon alluded to the war in Ukraine with such phrases as “controversial geopolitical processes,” “armed conflicts,” and “global jeopardies and threats.” Despite this ambiguity, he did state that “Tajikistan always advocates the solution of all conflicts only through political and diplomatic aims,” making clear Tajikistan’s desire to see an end to conflicts around the world without delving into specifics and name-calling.
Other nations in the region – Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – did not go beyond mentioning conflict or war just once in their speeches, thereby taking a more passive stance on the war in Ukraine.
All of this suggests that Central Asian nations have slowed their movement away from Russia, demonstrated by a switch to a more neutral tone in their UNGA speeches. However, it would be wrong to interpret the region’s slowing-down as a retrograde movement back toward Russia. Most recently Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan rejected invitations to join Russia-dominated international organizations, choosing instead to take on an observing role for the time being. Kazakhstan clearly stated its refusal to join BRICS, and Uzbekistan did the same with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). For the former, Russia responded almost immediately – restricting agricultural imports from Kazakhstan shortly after the announcement.
With such instantaneous punishments from its northern neighbor, it is not surprising that the region was more careful with its mention of Russia and Ukraine in this year’s UNGA speeches. However, Kazakhstan, along with some other Central Asian nations, still stand firm in their backing away from Russia. The BRICS comments, for example, came after UNGA had concluded. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been much more direct with their non-participant observer status within Russia-related and -led organizations.
Looking Onward
Starting last year, the nations of Central Asia began distancing themselves from Russia or, at the very least, establishing stronger ties to other global blocs. Some were more active in this shift of affairs, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan interacting the most with Russia’s adversary – the United States – and also with China. Turkmenistan overtook Russia in revenue from gas exports to China in the first quarter of this year, generating 20 percent more income than Russia.
Turkiye is one of the region’s more recent partners, actively trying to replace Russia where it can. In light of the region’s desire to depend less on its northern neighbor, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan bought Turkish drones, and Kazakhstan signed a deal to produce Turkiye’s drones for them. Slowly, the center of influence is shifting south, moving closer to Turkey and its Middle Corridor – a Caspian Sea-centered trade route – via which trade saw an eightfold increase in the past few years, as mentioned by Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko.
Establishing stronger economic relations with Turkiye is not a bad option for Central Asia, given Ankara’s role in the war in Ukraine. Turkiye has made it clear that it supports Ukraine’s right to defend itself and has large stakes in maintaining peace within the Black Sea region. Given Turkiye’s involvement, Russia is not likely to outright pressure Central Asia to back away from trade partnerships with Ankara.
The Central Asian region, however, is not only interested in fortifying its relations with powers like Turkiye, the United States, and China, but also plans to further strengthen ties within the region itself. Most recently, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev shared his vision of a united Central Asian bloc, in which he believes his neighboring states should currently focus on regional defense cooperation efforts. The title of the article – “Renaissance of Central Asia” – speaks for itself. Central Asia is planning on putting itself on the map as a powerful region that is highly cooperative as a single unit.
Of course, the implementation of such a dream will not come without its bumps in the road, given the deeply rooted ties the whole region has with Russia; however, the efforts that are being observed currently seem to move the region closer to its goal. Just last month, the fifth World Nomad Games were hosted in Astana, in which the spirit of the nomadic nations reverberated and could have been felt throughout the region.
Central Asia is slowly freeing itself of the shackles of its northern neighbor, but the economic dependence of the region on Russia is significantly slowing the process, which is only exacerbated by the sporadic threats and “warnings” Central Asian states receive from the aggressor. And this is especially true as Western sanctions have not worked as planned to cripple Russia’s economy, and given that emerging world powers have refused to condemn its full-scale invasion, which has only emboldened Moscow.
A cornered and defiant Russia is still rattling nerves in the Central Asian region. How Central Asian countries will handle a belligerent yet powerful regional neighbor into the future is yet to be seen.