As Washington fixates on chips in the Taiwan Strait and maritime militias in the South China Sea, it unwittingly leaves the Indo-Pacific’s western flank exposed. In waters once considered the United States’ strategic backyard, two formidable actors – Iran and Pakistan – are being lured by the siren song of Chinese influence.
In the last few years, “Indo-Pacific” has become common parlance in U.S. strategy. With the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gaining ground across oceans, this shift from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” became a convenient expression to highlight the cooperation of four countries committed to the global rules-based order – the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.
However, the United States has since treated the Indian Ocean as an afterthought in its Indo-Pacific vision.
The 2017 National Security Strategy defined the Indo-Pacific as stretching from “the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States,” conveniently ignoring the entire western Indian Ocean Region. This myopic view may prove costly.
Pakistan, traditionally a U.S. ally, has been drifting toward China, enticed by the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and growing disillusionment with Washington’s perceived favoritism toward India. The billions China has loaned Pakistan for the BRI’s crown jewel, CPEC, have generated few returns. This has perpetuated a positive feedback loop with large-scale borrowing necessitating emergency rescue lending, which China has obliged to provide, appearing as the messiah for a debt crisis it created.
Similarly, Iran, facing the economic drought of U.S. sanctions, is willing to align more closely with China. The first-ever trilateral naval exercise that China, Iran, and Russia conducted last year in the Gulf of Oman is a clear indicator. Moreover, Iran’s oil exports grew by 50 percent last year, reaching 1.29 million barrels per day. European research firm Kpler noted China bought 90 percent of these exports. The Tehran-Beijing comprehensive partnership signed in 2021 isn’t just an economic deal; it is the building block of a new power dynamic.
The consequences? Chinese warships could dock at Gwadar, the meek fishing village transformed into Pakistan’s deep-sea port, while Chinese surveillance vessels prowl the Strait of Hormuz, through which 25 percent of the world’s oil passes daily.
These developments, if ever realized, would pose a direct challenge to U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) operations in the region. This would disrupt military activities and complicate U.S. humanitarian efforts in the region like CENTCOM’s aid delivery to Gaza. And this is one of the more geographically-restricted concerns. Control of these waters means control of global energy flows, trade routes, and strategic chokepoints.
India remains the United States’ hoped-for counterweight in the region, highlighting the “Indo” in “Indo-Pacific.” However, expecting India to deploy substantial resources to counter Chinese influence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf may be overly optimistic. While increasingly aligned with U.S. interests, India would be stretched thin trying to counter Chinese assets along its western seaboard while simultaneously maintaining vigilance in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.
With a defense budget less than a third of China’s and a navy still finding its blue-water sea legs, expecting New Delhi to shoulder the burden of countering China is like having Patroclus don Achilles’ armor – brave, but potentially tragic. The U.S. Navy, already performing a delicate balancing act between its global commitments, would find itself in an even tighter squeeze.
The irony is palpable. In its rush to contain China in the Pacific, the United States may be inadvertently ceding control of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. As one naval officer noted, “We’re so focused on the dragon’s head that we’ve forgotten about its tail. And that tail is now wrapping around our ankles.”
Washington needs to expand its Indo-Pacific vision westward. The entire Indian Ocean, from the Strait of Malacca to the Mozambique Channel, must be seen as a single, interconnected theater. And while strategic priorities may currently favor the Pacific theater, the United States cannot turn a blind eye elsewhere, because China will not.
Moreover, the U.S. must leverage its existing assets more effectively. The strategic islands of Diego Garcia, along with allies’ territories like Cocos Keeling (Australia) and Réunion (France), offer unparalleled reach across the Indian Ocean. These dots on a map are potential game-changers in the new Great Game. The United States must strengthen its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, leveraging partnerships like the Quad to create a robust maritime coalition.
But considering India a crucial partner should not inhibit the U.S. from cultivating stronger ties with other Indian Ocean nations, including Pakistan, island states, and littoral countries. This diversified approach would create a more robust network of partnerships capable of countering Chinese influence across the entire region. Letting India’s concerns about neighbors such as Pakistan or Bangladesh prevent separate deals with these critical countries is poor strategy.
Similarly, U.S. policymakers make a mistake when they assume that India’s size and population will be enough to attain pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region. Smaller players are important, too. For instance, the Maldives has a 900,000 square kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone, more than one-third the size of India’s EEZ despite its land territory being approximately 0.01 percent the size of India. China has realized its potential and in March, signed a military package on top of its $200 million China-Maldives Friendship Bridge.
Washington could also engage with Tehran and Islamabad diplomatically, seeking to prevent a categorical alignment with China. This could involve a mix of incentives and pressures, from trade agreements to security cooperation, aimed at maintaining a balance of power in the region.
The United States’ hubris in the Indo-Pacific might just be another display of its Icarus Syndrome, marking the eve of another possible war.
The Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, once bastions of U.S. naval supremacy, are slowly transforming into the Achilles’ heel of American grand strategy. Every day that passes sees China’s influence grow and U.S. options shrink. The question isn’t whether Washington can afford to act – it’s whether it can afford not to.