Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Central Asian leaders have been increasingly wary of the Kremlin’s policies toward the region. Russian media started relaying rhetoric by Russian scholars and politicians who argued that the borders and even the statehood of the post-Soviet Central Asian states may be mere temporary constructs. The doubts cast by Russian speakers and representatives on the legitimacy and sovereignty of Central Asia have been perceived with particular caution in the region and seen as a challenge to their independence, especially against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been particularly targeted by pro-Russian political figures.
Challenging Historical Statehood
Most frequently, Russian commentators have questioned the historical legitimacy of the statehood of Central Asian nations, thus targeting the very notion of their independence.
For instance, in January 2024, Russian historian Mikhail Smolin claimed on Russian television that Central Asian identities, like those of Uzbeks and Kazakhs, were fabricated constructs created by the Soviet Union
“For example, Uzbeks never existed before the revolution,” he said. “There was no such ethnic name.”
Smolin argued that historically, Central Asia never had any statehood or unity before Russia’s control. Such narratives frame Russia and its actions as pivotal to the Central Asian identities and borders.
Smolin’s attack on Kazakhs and Uzbeks seemed to have been too harsh even for Moscow. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova made a statement distancing the official position of Russia from Smolin’s words, which were described as “purely subjective in nature,” having “nothing in common with the realities.”
Despite the Kremlin indicating that such statements are not part of the official Russian political agenda, many Central Asians saw this narrative as an attempt to delegitimize their independence and identity. Such statements suggest that it is Russia, rather than the people of Central Asia, that positions itself as the ultimate authority over the region.
Calling for Annexation and Integration
A month before Smolin’s remarks, Zakhar Prilepin, a prominent Russian nationalist, writer, and co-chair of the “Just Russia” party, explicitly called for reintegrating former Soviet territories. In December 2023, he proposed annexing Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states and argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union should be annulled. According to Prilepin, since there are already millions of Central Asian migrants in Russia, Russian people can “lay claim” on Central Asian territories.
Prilepin’s statements sparked a big backlash in the region.
The Russian ambassador to Uzbekistan was summoned to the Uzbek Foreign Ministry. Uzbek scholars and experts agreed that such narratives are extremely dangerous as “the invasion of Ukraine began with exactly the same general theses.” The Russian people have been continuously told that Ukraine had no history or nationhood and was an artificial state.
Uzbek officials publicly rejected Prilepin’s rhetoric as imperialistic and detrimental to bilateral relations. The reactions in Uzbekistan included calls for legal action against Prilepin. They indicated at least a formal expression of intolerance for language that appears to be harmful to the sovereignty of Central Asian nations.
Even though the Russian Foreign Ministry distanced itself from Prilepin’s statements, the frequency of such narratives has contributed to the heightened uneasiness in Central Asia toward Russia.
Framing Independence as Conditional
Various speakers and politicians in Russia have continuously attempted to link the independence of Central Asian states to their alignment with Russia.
For example, the Russian State Duma member Yevgeniy Fyodorov has systematically challenged the statehood of the Central Asian states and argued that the Central Asian and other post-Soviet republics left the USSR illegally, thus violating “Russia’s territorial interests.”
In line with Fyodorov’s narrative, post-Soviet republics are therefore prone to start a “conflict… with Russia” if the Russian government fails to “restructure relations with them [and] renegotiate with them about their current status.”
Fyodorov has been known for continuously questioning Kazakhstan’s statehood and territorial integrity. Back in 2020, he claimed that Kazakhstan received its lands as a gift or leased territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that Russia has the right to demand these territories back. In 2023, Fyodorov stated that Kazakhstan is of “not entirely legal nature” as a political entity, again pointing out the allegedly unlawful separation of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states from the USSR.
Yet again, such rhetoric painted a picture in which Central Asian states’ independence is conditional and subject to Russia’s approval, which contradicts international norms, fundamentally misreads history, and injects mistrust in bilateral relations with Russia.
Former Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi said that Fyodorov’s statements did not reflect Moscow’s official position but that, nevertheless, such narratives were hurtful to Kazakh citizens’ pride.
Other reactions were less diplomatic. For example, Kazakh MP Marat Bashimov claimed that Fyodorov had the intellectual capacities of a 13-year-old boy and advised him to seek psychiatric treatment. Bashimov regarded statements by Fyodorov as inappropriate to “Russia’s position as a key and strategic partner.”
In addition, some Uzbek officials reacted to Fyodorov’s rhetoric, too. Odiljon Tozhiev, an MP in the Uzbek parliament, argued that if Fyodorov saw Central Asian independence and their separation from the Soviet Union as illegal, then for over 30 years “the Russian Federation [has] been illegally dealing with all these republics.” Tozhiev claimed that since Russian institutions of power have been operating in such illegal legal frameworks, they are also illegal in their essence.
Regional Solidarity as Response
Central Asian leaders have been increasingly aligning with each other as well as with international partners. In January 2024, the European Union issued a resolution on Central Asia to restate support for the region’s independence and integrity, stressing the role of regional cooperation in boosting resilience against external pressures. The document also notes Central Asia’s strategic role amid the declining influence of Russia and incentivizes connectivity within the region embodied in such projects as the Middle Corridor Initiative, which links Europe and Asia, bypassing Russia.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have assumed the roles of regional leaders, promoting Central Asian integration and cooperation. Thus, during the latest Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders in August 2024, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for further strengthening regional interaction to ensure stability and security amid “a dangerous erosion of the fundamental foundations of the international relations system.” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev underscored the importance of building a commonly shared regional identity as well as “promoting the common interests” of Central Asian countries, and hinted toward increased cooperation with the European Union and China, among others.
The proactive position of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in pushing for increased regional cooperation and integration might be one of the reasons why the two countries have often become the target of Russian experts questioning the very statehood of these two nations.
Despite the inappropriate rhetoric of politicians and commentators, Moscow’s official position has not formally changed toward Central Asia. Nevertheless, there is a visible revitalization of regional exchange and communication led by the Kazakh and Uzbek leaders. Such solidarity may signal the creation of multilateral frameworks and institutions not only for the sake of improved regional cooperation but also to resist Russia’s influence.
Conclusion
It is of no surprise to some people that Russian government representatives, media, and political figures frequently challenge Central Asian sovereignty, which unmasks a continuous view of the region as part of Russia’s domain. Such narratives range from calls to annexation to cultural portrayals of Central Asians as historically subject to Russia’s rule and are most commonly met with diplomatic and public backlashes from Central Asia.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such statements are no longer perceived as mere populist rhetoric but are regarded as something tangible, contributing to a sense of fear in the face of Russia among Central Asian decision-makers and citizens.
Therefore, attempts within the region to unite and act with solidarity, as well as forming alliances with such actors as the European Union, are ever more noticeable. At the same time, navigating relations with Russia remains the most challenging task for Central Asian leaders. After all, Russia is not only one of the most powerful geopolitical players in the region and a strategic political and economic partner to the Central Asian states but also the most familiar one.