The South China Sea has seen its fair share of clashes and conflicts as China tries to assert its claim over nearly the entire body of water. Such efforts continue even after an arbitral tribunal set up under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled overwhelmingly against China’s claims in the South China Sea back in 2016. The stakes are high: The South China Sea sees the movement of up to 64 percent of global maritime trade and contains 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
However, China also realizes the potential of this conflict escalating into a full-blown war with the United States, especially with the Philippines, another claimant state, having a mutual defense treaty with the superpower. As a result, China has resorted to what some scholars have called a gray zone strategy to assert its claim in the South China Sea. Beijing hopes that it can push its Southeast Asian neighbors to back off by realizing that they can not win in a fight with China while at the same time keeping the risk of potential U.S. intervention at bay.
Indonesia claims that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, which is true in the sense that Jakarta does not claim any maritime features that China also asserts ownership over. However, the southernmost part of the ten-dash (formerly nine-dash) line that China uses to assert its claim overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) just north of the Natuna Islands, a body of water that the Indonesians called the North Natuna Sea. As a result, Indonesia’s fishermen often encounter a myriad of Chinese vessels, from China’s maritime militias and China Coast Guard (CCG) to Chinese survey vessels and warships in the North Natuna Sea.
While deploying Chinese naval vessels to the North Natuna Sea could be seen as an escalatory act on Beijing’s part, it was Jakarta that first deployed warships to the area to counter the frequent incursions of Chinese maritime militias and CCG vessels. Although the Indonesian public might see this deployment of gray-hulled warships to the region as an assertive step by the Indonesian government, it is the wrong move to be made.
Sending warships to patrol against white-hulled CCG vessels marked an escalatory act in gray zone conflicts. This allowed China to cry foul first, giving Beijing some justification for deploying People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships to the North Natuna Sea. Beijing could simply argue that Jakarta is responding to water pistols with an AK-47 assault rifle. This escalation would not end well for Indonesia, as it has nothing in its fleet that can match the capabilities of the PLAN vessels deployed in the North Natuna Sea.
To be fair to Indonesia, there is no other option for it to respond effectively to these Chinese incursions without involving the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut, or TNI-AL). Jakarta simply does not have a capable civilian maritime law enforcement agency that can go head-to-head with the CCG. While Indonesia does have a Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut, or Bakamla), with only ten patrol ships in its fleet, it simply does not have the resources to effectively counter Chinese incursions into the North Natuna Sea, especially considering the fact that Bakamla’s area of responsibility covers the entire Indonesian archipelago.
This situation is a result of some serious structural challenges that have hampered Jakarta’s ability to effectively counter China’s gray zone strategy in the North Natuna Sea. One of the main issues is the Indonesian government’s constant underinvestment in Bakamla. The ten ships under its disposal are a far cry from the 90 patrol ships needed to adequately patrol the vast Indonesian archipelago. However, the agency continued to be on the receiving end of endless budget cuts from 2017 until 2022. While Bakamla has seen an increase in funding since then, it still receives only 10 percent of what it needs to operate its already small fleet.
There is also the fact that there is a significant overlap in responsibilities between Bakamla and TNI-AL. This situation is a result of the blurring lines between “defense” and “security” due to the constant Chinese incursions. While the fact that Chinese fishing vessels are fishing illegally in the North Natuna Sea presents a maritime security challenge, there is also a political dimension to the presence of those fishing vessels and their CCG escorts, which is meant to assert Chinese claims over the North Natuna Sea – delivering a direct challenge to Indonesian sovereign rights in its own EEZ.
This reality, combined with the continued underinvestments in Bakamla, results in Jakarta’s continuous dependence on TNI-AL to deal with the Chinese incursions in the North Natuna Sea. However, relying on its navy will only continue to put Indonesia on the back foot when dealing with China’s gray zone strategy: After Indonesia escalates the situation by sending in its warships, it will only find itself facing even stronger Chinese warships later.
To rectify this issue, the Indonesian government needs to increase its investments in Bakamla and acquire further coast guard vessels to supplement the existing fleet. For too long, the Indonesian government has tried to modernize its maritime capabilities by investing almost exclusively in TNI-AL. This situation must change. While it is true that TNI-AL is in desperate need of modernization, the navy is not supposed to be in the vanguard of Indonesian responses to CCG and Chinese maritime militia incursions into the Indonesian EEZ – or any other matter regarding maritime security. This constabulary function firmly lies within Bakamla’s area of responsibility.
To that end, Jakarta must be able to start beefing up Bakamla and move toward increasing the number of ships under Bakamla’s disposal to conduct its policing tasks. A well-funded and well-equipped Bakamla is needed to confront Chinese incursions and any other maritime security challenges that might emerge in the future without the involvement of gray-hulled vessels whose presence could result in unwanted escalations.