Many parts of the world have been closely following this year’s U.S. presidential election, predicted to be a close race between former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris. Multiple countries are preparing contingent responses for different election outcomes, given the resulting impact on U.S. foreign policy.
It may seem reasonable to assume that U.S. allies, in particular, would unequivocally prefer a Harris presidency over Trump. After all, Harris is part of the Biden administration, which has championed U.S. global leadership in defending the “rules-based liberal international system” and supporting allies in security conflicts. In contrast, Trump has advocated an “America First” foreign policy, threatening to abandon security commitments to allies, implement protectionist trade policies, and withdraw from international institutions and agreements.
Some U.S. allies, however, have more ambivalent perspectives regarding the outcome of the U.S. election. Though these countries may still, overall, prefer one candidate’s win, their domestic political debate reveals careful weighing of the potential opportunities and risks from future Trump or Harris’s presidency.
Although South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol government has stated that its alliance with the United States will remain unaffected by the election outcome, domestic political discussions in South Korea reveal divergent views on how Harris’s or Trump’s foreign policies might present different opportunities and risks for South Korea. Depending on their foreign policy preferences, South Korea’s political groups have varied perceptions of the opportunities and risks they are more willing to encounter from the next U.S. administration.
If Harris succeeds Biden as the next U.S. president, the anticipated opportunity for South Korea is the likelihood of continued foreign policy alignment. Since Yoon’s election in 2022, the South Korean government has aligned its foreign policy more closely to that of the Biden administration. The Yoon government has affirmed its support for maintaining the liberal international order against the destabilizing actions of revisionist states such as China and Russia. The Yoon government has strengthened strategic partnerships with other U.S. allies such as Japan and NATO. Together with the United States, the Yoon government has maintained pressure on North Korea for the latter’s denuclearization and protection of human rights. Under a President Harris, the South Korea-U.S. alliance may experience (at least, during the remainder of Yoon’s term) more predictability and consensus, which the Yoon government may leverage to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence to ensure South Korea’s security.
However, South Koreans who are critical of their government’s foreign policy are more likely to perceive a Harris presidency as posing risks by continuing the current geopolitical challenges South Korea faces. South Korean progressives have criticized both the Yoon government and the Biden administration for not actively pursuing a diplomatic settlement with North Korea regarding its nuclear development. They fear that Harris, like Biden, is likely to continue endorsing the Yoon government’s hardline stance toward North Korea, thereby prolonging the diplomatic standoff. Progressives are also concerned that a Harris administration might (as Biden did) push for greater South Korean involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, further straining South Korea’s diplomatic relations with Russia.
While South Korean conservatives are more likely to support Yoon and Biden’s policies toward North Korea, some have expressed disappointment that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have continued to expand despite pressure from South Korea and the United States. Growing skeptical of the reliability of U.S. nuclear deterrence, some conservatives have become vocal advocates for independent nuclear armament.
The return of a President Trump would pose a different set of challenges and risks for South Korea, particularly in three key policy areas: defense cost-sharing, trade protections, and North Korea policy.
First, during his first term, Trump demanded that South Korea significantly increase its financial contributions to cover the cost of U.S. troops stationed in the country. Although the South Korean government recently signed a five-year cost-sharing agreement with the Biden administration, there is concern that Trump could demand a renegotiation of the agreement if re-elected.
Second, Trump has proposed a 10 percent tariff on all foreign imports (and 60 percent on imports from China) and an accelerated economic “decoupling” from China in his second term. Given that South Korea’s economy relies heavily on trade with both U.S. and Chinese markets, it could suffer significant losses as a result of these economic policies.
Third, South Korean conservatives in particular worry that Trump may accept a diplomatic deal with North Korea that is averse to South Korean security. Trump may tacitly recognize North Korea’s nuclear armament in return for limits on the latter’s intercontinental ballistic missile capability, accommodate North Korean demands to restrict South Korea-U.S. military exercises, even reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. As a result, South Korea’s security vulnerabilities could escalate under a second Trump presidency.
Despite these risks, some South Koreans predict there may also be opportunities from a Trump presidency. Some South Korean progressives, frustrated by Yoon and Biden’s failure to overcome diplomatic gridlock with North Korea, hope that Trump might revive his summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. Some progressives argue that Trump’s openness to accommodate North Korea on nuclear settlement is more pragmatic than the rigid pursuit of denuclearization and may lessen the security tensions in the Korean Peninsula. For those progressives who are wary of South Korea’s entanglement in the West-Russia conflict, Trump’s apparent support for ending the Russia-Ukraine War may also be perceived with tacit relief.
South Korean conservatives are more likely to express concerns about the risk of the weakening of the bilateral alliance under another Trump administration. A few, however, have cautiously speculated that a Trump nuclear deal with North Korea may bolster South Korea’s security justification to pursue an independent nuclear armament. Despite the risk of economic losses from Trump’s trade policies, some analysts have suggested South Korea’s economy could benefit in some areas, if the decline of China-U.S. trade creates a market vacuum that may be filled by South Korean businesses.
For South Korea, which U.S. presidential candidate would bring more opportunities than risks? Several South Korean opinion polls suggest a higher preference for the Biden/Harris administration, though with ideological variations. South Koreans who prioritize geopolitical predictability and smoother alliance management are more likely to prefer a Harris victory. Her presidency may be perceived as a “lower risk, lower return” outcome in which South Korea continues to face similar geopolitical challenges and risks but collaborates with its superpower ally for risk management.
In contrast, South Koreans who are desperate for major changes in the geopolitical status quo are more torn when weighing the opportunities and risks of Trump’s return to the presidency. For some progressives advocating diplomatic rapprochement with North Korea and Russia, and for some conservatives who pursue independent nuclear armament, Trump’s presidency may be perceived as a “higher risk, high return” outcome that may lead to the achievement of their goals, albeit through skillful and perhaps fortuitous interactions with a volatile U.S. presidency.