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Japan’s New Prime Minister and the North Korean Abduction Issue

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Japan’s New Prime Minister and the North Korean Abduction Issue

Can Ishiba manage a new approach to a long-standing issue?

Japan’s New Prime Minister and the North Korean Abduction Issue
Credit: Deposit Photos

On October 1, Ishiba Shigeru became the new prime minister of Japan. Long known for being part of the anti-mainstream faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Ishiba has now finally reached the pinnacle of Japanese politics, winning the party leadership election on his fifth try.

Ishiba’s specialty is security. He not only advocates amending the Constitution of Japan, which stipulates that Japan should not maintain a military, but is also known for calling for a stronger deterrence by creating an “Asian NATO” with the United States and Southeast Asian countries.

At the same time, it is worth noting that Ishiba has also talked about the importance of opinions outside the mainstream. Take the issue of North Korean, for instance. Ishiba has consistently argued that Japan should seek a breakthrough using diplomacy rather than relying solely on pressure, and in fact has offered detailed policy proposals to this effect.

Japan does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea. It certainly has prickly relations with other countries too, like Russia for instance. But despite the antagonism over the war in Ukraine and the territorial dispute, no one in Japan is talking about severing relations, and in fact Japan maintains only limited economic sanctions against Russia. By contrast, few Japanese believe that diplomatic relations with North Korea are warranted. This underscores Japanese outrage over the abduction of Japanese nationals, the nuclear issue, and the missile issue.

Tokyo has imposed the world’s strictest economic sanctions against North Korea. In 2018, when the first-ever North Korea-United States summit was held and as many as three Inter-Korean summits were organized, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo refused to even engage in dialogue with Pyongyang. He failed to even acknowledge Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, when they were right behind him at the opening ceremony of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in South Korea.

Nevertheless, as long as North Korea is governed by one person, there will be no progress toward resolving outstanding issues without a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In the past, Ishiba has argued that Japan and North Korea should establish liaison offices in their respective capitals. His position was that it is precisely because the two countries are hostile toward each other that they need lines of communication in the event of a contingency.

During the administration of Koizumi Junichiro, which did manage to hold a Japan-North Korea summit meeting and get some of the abductees back, Ishiba served as chairman of the bipartisan Parliamentarian League for Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea. He appears to have a good understanding of the complexity of this problem.

Now, though, Ishiba is no longer a polemicist in the anti-mainstream faction within the ruling party. Instead, he is in a position to advance diplomacy toward North Korea as Japan’s head of government, and as such the effectiveness of his policies will now face constant scrutiny. The Representative of the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) has stated that the immediate and complete return of all abductees is non-negotiable. There are several hurdles to overcome in order to achieve this.

The first hurdle is a resumption of behind-the-scenes contact with Kim’s administration. In January 2024, Kim sent a telegram to former Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to express his condolences after the Noto Peninsula Earthquake, but he grew impatient with the lack of change in attitude on the Japanese side. In March, Kim Yo Jong announced that “North Korea will pay no attention to and reject any contact and negotiations with Japan.” Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui also issued an official statement asserting that “The DPRK will not allow any attempt of Japan to contact Pyongyang.”

This is the starting line for any diplomatic outreach Ishiba attempts with North Korea. It will first be necessary to show that a resumption of negotiations with Japan will be beneficial for North Korea, after finding an effective negotiation route through which this message can be effectively conveyed to Kim Jong Un.

Next, as a way to extract concessions from North Korea, the Japanese government could ease its own sanctions on North Korea or offer the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), a group for North Koreans living in Japan that supports North Korea, the same financial support for their North Korean school that regular schools in Japan receive. Of course, either measure would doubtless meet with strong resistance from the Japanese public. In particular, Ishiba will find it very hard to take the lead in changing Japanese policy before concessions are obtained from North Korea.

Moreover, even if a Japan-North Korea summit meeting is organized and liaison offices are established, there is no guarantee that all of the abductees will be returned safely. Even if a few survivors do make it back to Japan, public opinion could still be sour, with possible claims that the Japanese government is “abandoning” the other victims or a feeling that only the return of all of the abductees would have any meaning. In fact, after Koizumi Junichiro managed to get five abductees back, Japanese distrust of North Korea only increased, further straining bilateral relations.

As a final point, any effort to by Japan to improve North Korea relations will need to have the understanding of the next president of the United States.

These challenges notwithstanding, if Ishiba remains adamant that the only way to bring peace to Northeast Asia is through dialogue with North Korea, and if he can demonstrate leadership and diplomatic skills in his own right, he could yet manage to improve the bilateral relationship.