On October 15 and 16, Pakistan hosted the 23rd Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council of Heads of Government meeting. Security was tight due to ongoing protests by the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and recent attacks by Baloch insurgents in Karachi that resulted in the deaths of two Chinese nationals. Over 10,000 paramilitary personnel were deployed to protect the 900 delegates. Islamabad was taking no chances with the summit, which marked the first time Pakistan has hosted a leader’s-level SCO meeting.
Pakistan became a full member of the SCO in 2017, alongside India, as part of the group’s first expansion. The SCO was originally formed in 1996, known then as the Shanghai Five, before officially adopting its current name in 2001. It was initially formed by Russia and China to maintain their influence – and limit the United States’ – in Central Asia. Over the past two decades, the SCO’s mission has significantly expanded beyond its initial focus on border disputes and combating the “three evils” – terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Today, its agenda encompasses economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation.
However, the SCO’s broad and varied scope has raised questions about its effectiveness. Critics argue that the SCO increasingly resembles the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), functioning more as a platform for member states to advance their own foreign policy goals rather than fostering collective action.
Although widely regarded as a Russia- and China-led organization, the SCO has seen a shift in relative influence due to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, creating space for China to assert greater sway over the group. This changing dynamic was evident in the Islamabad summit, where Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif delivered an opening speech that leaned heavily toward China’s interests, also reflecting the Sino-Pakistani “all-weather” friendship.
In his address to the summit, Sharif spoke on the expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). While the BRI remains China’s flagship project, Beijing is increasingly showing interest in the INSTC, which involves SCO members Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, and India, among others. Though not directly involved, China recognizes the potential of the corridor to enhance its influence across Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Moreover, the INSTC provides China with an alternative trade route, allowing it to bypass Western-imposed sanctions, particularly in its dealings with Russia and Iran. By promoting trade through these non-Western-aligned routes, China aims to reduce the impact of Western financial dominance, a critical concern following the Ukraine conflict and ongoing tensions with the United States. Chinese Premier Li Qiang echoed this sentiment in his remarks, emphasizing the need to enhance trade, investment facilitation, and connectivity in the region while ensuring stable and efficient industrial and supply chains.
Another critical aspect of Sharif’s speech was his remarks on Afghanistan. He said, “A stable Afghanistan is not just desirable but essential to fully realize these opportunities,” urging the international community to provide humanitarian aid while encouraging the Taliban to embrace a more inclusive political approach. Sharif’s remarks closely aligned with China’s stance on Afghanistan, particularly with plans to extend the BRI into Afghanistan and Central Asia.
For China, the SCO is a key platform for advancing the Global Security Initiative (GSI). President Xi Jinping introduced the GSI during the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022, where he garnered backing from several Central Asian nations. This move represents a strategic expansion of China’s security influence in Central Asia, an area traditionally dominated by Russia.
While China is expanding its presence, Russia uses the SCO platform to signal to the West that attempts to diplomatically isolate Moscow have not succeeded. Although some narratives suggest Russia feels threatened by China’s growing clout in Central Asia, Russian leadership has not publicly expressed concern over Beijing’s initiatives. Instead, Russia maintains a balanced approach, supporting Chinese initiatives while introducing measures for oversight. The support was evident in Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s statement during the summit, where he proposed the creation of an independent payment system within the SCO to ensure stable business conditions. This proposal aligns with China’s efforts to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. However, checks and balances are evident in India’s opposition to such proposals.
India has long been viewed as the most ambivalent member of the SCO, an organization often described as anti-Western. Over the past decade, India has strengthened its strategic and economic ties with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Moreover, India views the SCO as a China-dominated organization. In his recent address to the SCO, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar struck a restrained tone. He largely positioned India as a voice for the Global South as he called for comprehensive reforms of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), advocating for increased representation of developing nations.
Jaishankar urged the SCO to reflect on its founding Charter, specifically Article 1, which emphasizes mutual trust, friendship, and regional cooperation. This subtle remark was implicitly aimed at Pakistan and China. Jaishankar enunciated India’s ongoing concerns about cross-border terrorism without directly mentioning Pakistan. Jaishankar said that regional cooperation cannot thrive without mutual respect, sovereign equality, and recognition of territorial integrity – a reference to India’s territorial dispute with China.
Jaishankar critiqued the selective global practices in trade and transit, alluding to China’s BRI, which India has consistently opposed due to sovereignty concerns. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a key element of the BRI, runs through the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which India claims as part of Jammu and Kashmir.
India’s participation in the SCO summit remained strictly focused on multilateral concerns, avoiding any bilateral discussions with Pakistan, despite the wishes of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and many Pakistani business leaders. Jaishankar did have an “informal interaction” with his Pakistani counterpart, Ishaq Dar. However, the visit would not change the dynamics between India and Pakistan.
India and Pakistan continue to hold mutually exclusive expectations of each other: India demands that Pakistan renounce the use of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, while Pakistan insists on addressing the Kashmir issue. These positions are fundamentally irreconcilable. With its clear military advantage, India would have little difficulty confronting Pakistan if terrorism were no longer part of Islamabad’s strategic approach.
In conclusion, the 23rd meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government highlighted the organization’s evolving dynamics, with China’s growing influence filling the void left by Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine. Pakistan’s alignment with China’s strategic goals, particularly regarding Afghanistan and trade routes, was evident throughout the summit. However, the SCO’s broad agenda raises questions about its ability to foster genuine multilateral cooperation, especially with India’s cautious participation.