After February 2023, when a U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jet shot down a Chinese surveillance balloon off the U.S. east coast, relations between the United States and China plummeted. Despite the easing of the COVID-19 pandemic, military dialogue between the two nations was slow to improve. This is particularly evident in the multiple military exercises China has conducted near Taiwan, where both Chinese actions and U.S. responses were on display.
It was not until December 2023, when General Charles Q. Brown Jr., chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, held a video conference with Liu Zhenli, chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, that military communication between the two powers resumed.
Subsequently, the United States and China re-established their maritime military security consultation mechanism in Hawai’i, followed by a meeting between the defense ministers of both nations during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2024. These developments suggest a gradual restoration of military interaction, albeit far from the level seen during the Obama administration.
There are signs of a thaw, but the key question remains: Do these gestures indicate a genuine improvement in China-U.S. relations, or will the dynamic of competition and cooperation – and the possibility for future disruptions to military talks – persist? This remains an area for further observation.
Stable Interactions Following Leadership Changes in China
The breakdown in military communication channels between China and the United States in recent years has largely been attributed to escalating tensions between the two nations. However, it is important to recognize that this period coincided with significant changes in Beijing’s military and diplomatic leadership. Notable figures such as Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu were abruptly dismissed from their posts, while reports also emerged about the disappearance of former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and a number of senior officers in the Rocket Force.
This raised speculation that another wave of internal purges or anti-corruption campaigns may have taken place within the Chinese military hierarchy. Later, both Wei and Li were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, stripped of rank, and now face criminal prosecution over corruption charges.
These rapid personnel changes inevitably cast a shadow over China-U.S. interactions.
However, with the appointment of General Dong Jun as defense minister in early 2024, a degree of stability has begun to emerge at the top levels of China’s military leadership. This stability, coupled with a clearer foreign policy direction, has allowed Beijing to begin re-engaging diplomatically on the global stage.
At the June 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, much attention was focused on the interactions between the U.S. and Chinese defense ministers. Although Dong maintained a measured tone in informal exchanges with the press, he adopted a much firmer and more resolute stance during official speeches and in discussions involving senior Chinese military officers. This assertiveness was particularly pronounced when sovereignty issues were raised. Nonetheless, a notable aspect of China’s recent diplomatic approach is its increasing tendency to separate the Taiwan issue from its broader international engagements.
For Beijing, Taiwan and cross-strait relations are strictly domestic matters, not subjects open to foreign intervention. This is the atmosphere that China seeks to cultivate on the international stage: that issues concerning Taiwan are not of concern to other nations. Beijing’s message is clear: as long as foreign countries do not intervene in Taiwan-related matters, there remains room for negotiation on other international conflicts.
Following the Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made an unexpected visit to China, where he met with Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC). Although both sides largely maintained their respective positions during the talks, the significance of the meeting lies in the fact that Zhang’s authority, as CMC vice chairman, surpasses that of China’s defense minister, thereby underscoring the importance of the dialogue.
This exchange was followed by the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, to which the United States again sent a senior official marking another step in Sino-U.S. military-diplomatic engagement.
Developments Following the Beijing Xiangshan Forum and Regional Dialogue
At international conferences, the importance of the host nation’s arrangements is rivalled by the level of representation from participating countries. The U.S. delegation to the 2024 Xiangshan Forum was led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Michael S. Chase, a more senior figure than the official sent in 2023 (Xanthi Carras, director for China in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy). This marked a return to the level of representation in 2019, when Chad Sbragia, the then-deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, attended the Xiangshan Forum.
Chase’s participation holds particular significance due to his expertise in Chinese military affairs. His extensive background in academia, particularly his research on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and his numerous publications in key think tank journals on Chinese military strategy, suggest that his presence may have been intended to observe ongoing changes within China’s military leadership and its future trajectory.
In September 2024, General Wu Yanan, commander of the PLA’s Southern Theater Command, held a video call with Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Later that month, Wu also travelled to Hawai’i to attend the Indo-Pacific Defense Chiefs’ Conference.
These events indicate that China is actively seeking to restore military communication channels with the United States. But even as Sino-U.S. military exchanges are gradually being restored, China has continued its missile tests, such as the launch of a DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile on September 27. Furthermore, in mid-October, just after Taiwan’s National Day, China initiated the Joint Sword-2024B military exercise against Taiwan. This illustrates that, while China is open to ongoing military dialogue with the United States, it will continue to use military actions as a tool to assert its stance on Taiwan-related issues, regardless of the U.S. administration in power.
From the U.S. perspective, military engagement with China does not conflict with the need for preparedness against potential PLA actions. Rather, such interactions serve to enhance understanding and reduce the risk of miscalculation.
Conclusion
While it remains unlikely that Sino-U.S. military relations will return to the more cooperative framework seen during the Obama era, the current interactions show signs of a thawing process. Despite Beijing’s disregard for Washington’s prior warnings and its insistence on proceeding with the Joint Sword-2024B exercises, military engagement between the two nations is steadily increasing. Although these military exercises may affect future interactions, and past military dialogues have often resulted in both sides merely reiterating their own positions, engagement remains a key mechanism for reducing the risk of conflict.
It is important to note that while the PLA may not actively seek direct conflict with the U.S. military, Beijing will use military actions as its primary means of responding to external pressures. This is especially true when it comes to Taiwan. For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable red line, and military exercises are the most effective method of expressing discontent when it feels that foreign powers are interfering in what it considers to be domestic affairs. This uncompromising stance underscores the limits of military diplomacy and remains a crucial factor for Taiwan and the international community to monitor closely.
