Thailand and China’s defense relations have achieved several notable milestones in Southeast Asia. Thailand was the first country in the region to engage in military exercises with China, starting in 2005. Since then, these joint exercises have grown in scale and complexity, particularly following the 2014 Thai coup, which prompted Thailand to seek closer ties with China in response to U.S. criticism of its governance. Today, Thailand is unique in Southeast Asia for conducting bilateral military exercises with all three branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including the naval Exercise Blue Strike and the air-combat Exercise Falcon Strike.
On October 16, China and Thailand conducted a joint counterterrorism exercise in Kunming, Yunnan province. Footage from China Central Television (CCTV) showcased troops from both countries engaging in urban warfare drills, professional arms exchanges, and Thai soldiers operating the Chinese QBZ-95-1 assault rifle. At first glance, these exercises may appear routine, following the established pattern since 2005.
What sets this year’s Strike-2024 exercises apart?
The significance of Strike-2024 lies in the introduction of unmanned drones into the military exercises. Thailand has been actively seeking to procure military drones to patrol its porous border with Myanmar. For China, the integration of military drones into these exercises serves its broader goal of expanding arms sales and enhancing its defense relations in Southeast Asia.
Conducted near the China-Myanmar border, the Strike-2024 exercises also provide a platform for Thai and Chinese troops to exchange information and tactics for addressing common nontraditional security threats, such as transborder crime, human trafficking, and arms smuggling, particularly in the challenging mountainous terrain of the region.
Thailand: Cooperating on Shared Security Threats With China
Although China and Thailand do not share contiguous borders, they have maintained close defense cooperation to address shared security threats in their region. A historical example of this cooperation is the response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia from the late 1970s to the 1980s. At the time, Thailand feared the spread of communism and clashed with Vietnamese forces along its border with Cambodia. Beijing, meanwhile, viewed Vietnam as a proxy for Soviet influence, threatening to encircle China. In response, Thailand and China cooperated by sending weapons to the Cambodian resistance against Vietnamese forces, aligning their strategic interests.
Today, the civil war in Myanmar, exacerbated by the 2021 coup, has brought China and Thailand closer again. Both countries face spillover effects, including illegal immigration and transnational crimes such as human and arms trafficking. These shared concerns have strengthened defense cooperation, particularly along their borders.
For Thailand, the use of drones by both Myanmar’s government and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the conflict has raised significant security concerns. Drones can evade traditional radar detection, and using missile systems to neutralize them would be prohibitively expensive for the Thai military. Additionally, patrolling the porous 2,000-kilometer border between Myanmar and Thailand is a significant challenge.
To address these issues, Thailand’s 2024 Defense White Paper highlighted plans to acquire military drones and develop counter-drone capabilities to secure its borders more effectively. However, U.S. drones like the Predator and Reaper remain too costly for Thailand. As a result, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) signed a 2023 contract to procure China’s Norinco Sky Saker FX80 drones, enhancing surveillance and monitoring capabilities.
During the Strike-2024 exercise, Thai troops gained valuable hands-on experience operating Chinese drones, which enhanced their real-time intelligence-gathering and Command and Control (C2) capabilities. These drones proved particularly effective in search and sweep operations in dense jungle terrain, where infrared sensing and night vision capabilities improved situational awareness and operational effectiveness, even under low-visibility conditions. By integrating such technology, the Thai military can better coordinate and make informed decisions during operations.
Beyond technological transfers, these joint exercises allow the PLA and RTA to refine their tactics for addressing nontraditional security threats emerging from Myanmar. The Strike-2024 drills included urban counterterrorism activities such as room clearance and hostage rescue, providing valuable practical experience. Additionally, both forces participated in search and sweep operations in jungle environments, where the PLA benefited from the RTA’s extensive combat experience, honed during counterinsurgency operations dating back to the communist insurgencies of the 1960s and continuing through Thailand’s recent efforts in the southern provinces.
China: Joint Military Exercises and Expanding Arms Sales to Thailand
China’s joint military exercises with Thailand serve as key platforms for expanding its arms sales and deepening defense ties in Southeast Asia. These exercises allow China to showcase the effectiveness of its military technology, aiming to secure new buyers like Thailand. By expanding its arms exports, China fosters closer defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, enhancing interoperability through shared maintenance, logistics, doctrinal development, and training programs.
In Thailand’s case, this holds particular significance. As a U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has traditionally relied on military equipment from the United States. However, China’s growing arms sales to Thailand are part of a broader strategy to counterbalance U.S. influence in the region, which Washington sees as crucial to containing China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China now accounts for 44 percent of Thailand’s military imports, including small arms, tanks, armored vehicles, and submarines.
By increasing Thailand’s reliance on Chinese technology, China pressures Thailand to maintain neutrality in the escalating Sino-U.S. rivalry. Close alignment with the United States could jeopardize Thailand’s access to affordable Chinese arms, complicating its efforts to balance relations with both superpowers.
Conclusion
The Strike-2024 exercises take place against the backdrop of the civil war in Myanmar, which has raised shared security concerns for both China and Thailand. Despite these challenges, the exercises offer both countries valuable opportunities to learn from each other’s tactics in addressing transborder threats.
Additionally, the drills allow China to showcase its latest military technologies to Thailand, which is actively seeking drones to bolster security along its border with Myanmar. This trend of incorporating advanced technology was also evident in the 2024 Cambodia-China Dragon Gold exercises, where drones were utilized for combat-related activities.
Moving forward, it is likely that China will continue to deploy advanced drones and military equipment in bilateral exercises throughout Southeast Asia to expand its arms sales. However, despite these military collaborations, China’s arms sales to Thailand may not see significant increases, as Thailand aims to maintain cordial relations with all major powers, including its treaty ally, the United States.