The ousting of Bangladesh’s longest-reigning prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, is one of the most significant political developments in the country’s post-independence history. Bangladesh has already experienced major internal and external aftershocks as a result of her downfall. Dhaka’s foreign partners have yet to adequately appraise the situation, given the establishment of the new interim government just a month ago. In this new transition period, China is one of the key regional powers eyeing Bangladesh for strategic purposes, with an emphasis on the security and defense domains.
One of the core developments in decades of warm relations between Beijing and Dhaka has been the gradual deepening and widening of their defense ties. These include the sealing of an official military cooperation agreement, the supply and receipt of vast volumes of weapons, and bilateral cooperation in the construction of critical military infrastructure, exercises and drills, and more. The cost-effectiveness of Chinese weapons compared to Western weapons, Bangladeshi officers’ extensive experience with Chinese equipment, and the simplicity of arms purchasing mechanisms have been the main drivers behind the growth of these defense ties.
The sudden political shift in Bangladesh, together with evolving regional security dynamics, has transformed the country’s relations with neighboring governments and brought fresh challenges. Internal and external unrest could shatter the current geopolitical order in South Asia and its subregions.
Dhaka is most likely to reevaluate its foreign policy toward its immediate neighbors, India and Myanmar, considering the changes that have taken place in its political landscape and new geostrategic pressures. To safeguard security inside and sovereignty outside, it is essential that Dhaka modernize its armed forces. China is likely to be keenly aware of these opportunities and seize them to strengthen its defense diplomacy with Bangladesh.
The Chinese ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, has already launched a diplomatic campaign to meet with the interim government members and important political parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami. Combining the changing internal situation, geopolitical dynamics, and strategic needs, Beijing’s defense cooperation with Dhaka might increase sharply in the coming days.
Bangladesh-China Defense Cooperation Reaches New Heights
Dhaka’s defense nexus with Beijing technically persisted even before the latter recognized the former as an independent state in 1975. Before achieving independence in 1971, Bangladesh was part of Pakistan. China shares a historic friendship with Pakistan and has provided the country with much-needed defense equipment since the 1960s. Therefore, Pakistan’s Armed Forces were familiar with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s inventory and had become accustomed to using PLA standard weapons. After independence, Bangladeshi officers also acquired these weapons, and the defense cooperation between the two states began with the establishment of formal diplomatic ties.
This relationship reached new heights when Beijing and Dhaka signed a landmark Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2002 in order to strengthen their strategic partnership. This agreement was the first of its kind that Dhaka had ever signed. But cooperation rose to yet another level when Sheikh Hasina assumed power in 2009. She initiated an ambitious modernization plan for the Bangladesh Armed Forces (BAF), named Forces Goal 2030. This aims to provide the BAF with cutting-edge capabilities needed for its Army, Navy, and Air Forces to meet the 21st century standard and increase operational capability. Beijing took full advantage of this initiative.
Since 2009, China has become the largest supplier of arms to Dhaka. At one point, estimates indicated that Chinese weapons made up 82 percent of the BAF’s total inventory. These include Ming-class diesel electric attack submarines, Shadhinota-class C13B corvettes, MBT-2000 Type 90-II and VT-5 light tanks, HQ-7 short-range surface-to-air missiles, and dozens of F-7BGI fighter interceptors, among other arms and equipment. Dhaka’s tank inventory is entirely of Chinese manufacture, showing its reliance on Beijing for its armaments. Beijing has also given Dhaka permission to build a variety of Chinese small and light weapons.
Currently, Bangladesh is the world’s second-biggest purchaser of Chinese weapons, with two-thirds of its arms supplied by Beijing. Credit and soft loans facilitate these acquisitions.
Using Chinese technology, Bangladesh inaugurated a new naval base, BNS Sheikh Hasina, near Pekua. This was the Bangladesh Navy’s first dedicated submarine base. Beijing has since regularly facilitated officer training for the BAF to increase people-to-people ties in the defense sectors. This year, both countries conducted joint military drills, codenamed “Golden Friendship-2024.” This counterterrorism exercise was the first-ever BAF-PLA joint exercise. Along with anti-hijacking exercises, the collaborative effort practiced eliminating terrorist training camps.
As their cooperation grows to encompass joint exercises, notably in the naval domain, personnel training programs aimed at improving public awareness, and the construction of military infrastructure, the defense relationship between the two countries is transforming.
Keeping the Military Bond Strong
Several factors are behind Beijing’s successful defense cooperation and military diplomacy with Dhaka. Apart from the positive views of China that Bangladeshi officers derived from the Pakistan era, regime type, availability, cost, and geopolitical balance issues are substantial factors behind the emboldened defense ties.
China has been keen to sell arms irrespective of the recipient country’s internal political situation. This was one of the reasons why Hasina, whose regime stood accused of corruption, money laundering, undermining democratic systems, human rights abuses, and enforced disappearances, received arms from Beijing more readily than from any Western suppliers. Even the previous regime of Khaleda Zia, which faced severe corruption allegations and had connections with extremist outfits, embraced Beijing’s arms sales.
China also sells arms at a cheaper cost than other countries and agrees to sell sophisticated weapons like drones, long-range missiles, and fighter jets. High-end technology at relatively low costs is desirable for a country like Bangladesh. The military allocates a weighty portion of its military budget to personnel salaries, subsidies, pensions, and development initiatives. Therefore, for its new acquisitions, the BAF aims to purchase current equipment within a restricted budget.
The final reason for acquiring Chinese-made arms is geopolitical balance. Regardless of Bangladesh’s regime, India holds substantial geopolitical leverage over the country. Both share the world’s fifth-longest land border and close economic ties. Dhaka’s robust defense cooperation relations with Beijing functioned as a strategic counterbalance, upholding the official foreign policy stance of friendship towards all. These factors served as the foundation for the forging of strong bilateral defense relations between the two countries.
Bangladesh’s Contemporary Strategic Needs
In addition to its internal problems, Bangladesh faces daunting external ones. The Indian media is increasingly portraying Dhaka as a new threat to national security, causing growing concern. Recently, during high-level meetings of Indian Armed Forces commanders, Rajnath Singh, the defense minister of India, declared his military readiness for war, mentioning the situation in Bangladesh alongside the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine. New Delhi is also concerned about the possibility of Dhaka disbanding Hasina’s security cooperation with India. The Indian Border Security Force has a long history of border killings, making the situation considerably more tense.
Meanwhile, the situation in Myanmar, Bangladesh’s other neighbor, remains ambiguous. Dhaka has yet to account for the shift of power in Myanmar’s Chin and Rakhine states, which border Bangladesh. Two main concerns relate to Myanmar. The Kuki Chin National Front, a new insurgent group in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, is allegedly taking shelter in Myanmar and has received training from Burmese rebels.
The motivation of the Arakan Army (AA), which currently controls more than half of Rakhine State, is another cause for concern. Growing tensions between the AA and the long-persecuted Rohingya, epitomized by the recent attacks on Rohingya in Buthidaung, are troublesome for Dhaka. Armed Rohingya groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organization are allegedly cooperating with Myanmar’s military, which only adds heat to the prevailing ethnic tensions. Moreover, there has been a resurgence of Rohingya incursions into Bangladesh, compounding the already chaotic conditions in the existing Rohingya refugee camps.
Regional developments appear to have led Dhaka to recognize that the BAF requires further upgrading to mitigate risks and escalation from both state and non-state actors. The BAF will need to acquire multiple updated systems to improve strategic deterrence.
Combating insurgency and conventional forces necessitates the adoption of assault helicopters and drones by the Army. These systems can carry out joint surveillance operations and accurately reveal the enemy’s positions and movements when paired with cutting-edge reconnaissance vehicles. To deter and prevent neighboring states like Myanmar from regularly breaching Dhaka’s airspace, as it has done multiple times, the Air Force will need multi-role combat aircraft and medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles. A more capable Navy, armed with diesel-electric submarines and frigates, could better patrol the country’s seas and safeguard its rich maritime resources.
China’s thus has an ideal opportunity to showcase its arsenal to the new interim government, just as it did when Hasina assumed office. Dhaka may consider buying arms from Beijing to bypass geopolitical problems and security concerns. This scenario is probable in light of the present circumstances and the over 10 percent drop in Bangladesh’s military procurement budgets this year. Meanwhile, the wars in Gaza and Ukraine are extending delivery times and limiting the quantity of Western defense exports, further giving China’s defense industry an advantage.
Beijing is likely to offer Dhaka a plethora of weapons and systems, including J-10C multirole combat aircraft, Z-10 attack helicopters, Wing Loong 1 attack drones, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, Yuan-class submarines, Type 054 frigates, and likely more.
As India’s influence diminishes and Western countries, particularly the United States, lack incentives such as low cost, rapid delivery, less accountability, and a legacy of familiarity, Beijing appears to have a potential advantage. This is true even though China lacks high-quality, battle-tested weapons, given that its military has not seen combat since 1979. As a result, it is not surprising that the defense partnership between Beijing and Dhaka will strengthen in the coming days, with the former choosing to compromise quality over national security. That, in turn, presents an opportunity for China to enhance its influence in Bangladesh.