A brief statement by the Ministry of National Defense in Beijing called China’s September 25 test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the South Pacific Ocean near Tahiti “routine.” That description is cynical in its dishonesty. China’s actual “routine” is to test its missiles within or near its territory, such as Xinjiang or the Bohai Sea. The last time China fired a missile into international waters was in 1980.
The Defense Ministry’s statement also said the test launch was “not directed against any country or target.” That’s possible. Beijing’s motivation for this test launch might not have been the desire to send a political signal, but rather a need for technical data.
Testing is a normal and necessary part of missile development. The United States, for example, test-launched two unarmed ICBMs from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California in June. Perhaps Chinese missile engineers wanted to see how the missile performed on a depressed trajectory over a long distance, and firing it into the South Pacific Ocean was the most convenient direction in terms of deploying data collection assets and avoiding some other country’s national territory. That would be a simple explanation for why the Chinese government denied that the test had political significance.
It is also possible, however, the test had both technical and political purposes – the scientists needed more data, but the top leadership chose the timing and parameters of the test with the intent of sending a message to a foreign audience.
If so, what message? Observers have offered several possible theories. The test launch might be a warning that the continental United States will be vulnerable to Chinese missile attack if Washington intervenes in a Taiwan Strait war. It might have been a patriotic appetizer for the Chinese public prior to the People’s Republic’s October 1 National Day. Or it might have been Beijing’s attempt to counter reports that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force is in disarray by showing that a Chinese ICBM can fly far and accurately.
We may not get an authoritative answer anytime soon. Beijing sometimes publicly clarifies what message it is trying to send through a particular instance of saber-rattling. The Chinese government usually says, for example, that military exercises near Taiwan are warnings against the island moving toward formal independence. But Beijing is also often content to leave other governments wondering what motivated a threatening Chinese action. In practice, this multiplies the effect. If Beijing specifies it did something as a warning to government X, all the other governments can breathe easier. But in the absence of an explanation, more governments will engage in nervous introspection about what they might have done to offend the Chinese.
If Beijing did indeed use the missile test for political signaling, an especially plausible explanation is the recent U.S. deployment of the Typhon mid-range missile system to the Philippines.
Increased Philippines-U.S. security cooperation is a major sore spot for China. U.S. support emboldens the Philippines to oppose Beijing’s attempts to claim ownership of waters and features within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and U.S. forces in the northern Philippines could help defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. Chinese officials and media have long stridently warned the Philippines against strengthening its alliance with the United States. A recent focal point of Chinese anxiety is the Typhon launcher, which could fire U.S. Tomahawk missiles into the southeast part of China opposite Taiwan.
U.S. forces brought Typhon to the Philippines for recent military exercises. How long it will stay is now under discussion. General Romeo Brawner, the head of the Philippine Armed Forces, said he hoped Typhon would stay in the Philippines “forever.” China, of course, wants Typhon out. About a month prior to China’s ICBM launch into the South Pacific, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Philippine government counterpart, “If the Philippines introduces the U.S. intermediate missile system, it will create regional tensions and confrontation, triggering an arms race.”
The Typhon issue could have triggered China’s ICBM test in the South Pacific. Since Typhon’s long-term presence in the Philippines appears undecided, Beijing has the chance to exert influence. It was perhaps no coincidence that the ICBM, fired from China’s Hainan Island, flew over the Philippines’ Babuyan Islands just north of the main island of Luzon. Also, there is a logic to responding to U.S. missiles in the Philippines by sending a Chinese missile into the U.S. sphere of influence in the Pacific.
This might have been another case of lack of coordination among different parts of the Chinese government, with an incoherent outcome subject to misinterpretation by foreigners. When asked about the missile launch during the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ regular press conference on September 25, spokesperson Lin Jian simply referred the questioner to the Defense Ministry statement, as if his own ministry was not prepared to speak about it.
Something similar happened in 2011, when China’s J-20 stealth fighter aircraft made its debut test flight while U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was visiting China. Some Americans believed the Chinese government intentionally arranged the overlap of the two events as a gesture of disrespect toward the United States. Gates and his entourage, however, concluded during their meeting with China’s then-paramount leader Hu Jintao that the civilian leaders did not know about the impending test flight.
In a more recent example, the 2022 spy balloon incident seemed to some commentators an intentional “humiliation” of the United States, when it is far more likely that top leader Xi Jinping was unaware of a Chinese balloon in U.S. airspace until the story made international headlines.
Once again, all the parts of the bureaucracy may not be on the same page regarding the ICBM test. Although some officials in Beijing would have seen the test launch as beneficial, either for technical or political reasons, the incident clearly undermines important Chinese foreign policy goals.
A jarring missile launch before a U.S. election is something we’ve come to expect from North Korea, which employs a radical business model of cultivating high tensions and then seeking payment to lower them. China, however, presumably wants to maintain as low a profile as possible in the upcoming U.S. presidential election, especially since both of the United States’ major political parties are happy to talk tough about China.
Xi has tried to convince the United States he has no immediate plans to attack Taiwan. He and Biden are expected to speak by phone sometime in the next few weeks. Both want to show their respective audiences that they have helped to stabilize bilateral relations; the Chinese ICBM launch won’t help.
The ICBM test also made waves – literally and figuratively – in the South Pacific. Chinese influence is already a sensitive issue in Oceania. China has made progress in winning over some of the Pacific Island states, but has run into resistance from others that fear turning the region into an arena of China-U.S. strategic competition. Firing a nuclear-capable missile into the midst of the islands not only stokes that fear, it positions China as an aggressor.
The governments of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Palau all criticized China’s missile test. New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters called the missile launch “concerning” and inconsistent with hopes for “a peaceful, stable, prosperous and secure region.” Palau’s President Surangel Whipps said China’s test “means it could strike any one of us in the Pacific.” He added that Beijing owes the region an explanation.
The president of French Polynesia said China did not notify him before the test launch, despite Tahiti’s proximity to the splash zone. The member of the French Senate representing French Polynesia said his constituents were “profoundly shocked” by China’s action.
The reaction from Guam, which hosts U.S. military infrastructure and which the missile overflew, was negative as well. Both the Republican Party and Democratic Party candidates competing to be Guam’s representative in the U.S. Congress reacted to the Chinese missile launch by calling for more U.S. funding for Guam’s defense. Incentivizing the hardening of Guam against a possible Chinese attack works against China’s freedom of strategic maneuver in the region.
The missile launch appeared successful and doubtless provided the Chinese with useful engineering data. Politically, however, it was counterproductive. Once the full truth is revealed, history might assess this incident as a blunder in which China lost more than it gained.