According to a news report on October 31, two key officials in China’s defense industry – Lei Fanpei, executive deputy director of the Office of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development (CCIMCD), and Zhang Kejian, vice minister of industry and information technology and director of the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) – were notably absent from the opening of the study session at the Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee for principal officials at the provincial and ministerial level on October 29. Additionally, online rumors suggest that Zhang Kejian may have been taken in for investigation by authorities around two weeks ago.
Some media analyses interpret these developments as a sign that Xi Jinping is intensifying his purge of the defense industry, with high-ranking officials with backgrounds in this sector likely to be implicated amidst the ongoing crackdown.
Current analysis points to two possible scenarios: one, that China’s defense industry is undergoing a purge; and two, that high-ranking officials within China’s military-industrial group may be implicated. However, publicly available information remains scarce, and there has been no official announcement confirming the investigation of any related officials. Therefore, it is necessary to further examine the known and unknown information and use appropriate indicators to assess the likelihood of these two potential scenarios.
Currently Known Information
It is known that Lei Fanpei and Zhang Kejian did not attend the important intra-party meeting on October 29, and their public profiles provide a basis for analysis.
First, it is possible that Lei Fanpei is under investigation due to his former role as chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corporation.
Lei currently serves as the executive deputy director of the Office of CCIMCD, a unit responsible for coordinating cross-departmental policies and activities related to military-civil fusion. It should be noted that there has been no official report confirming Lei’s appointment to this position, but it remains highly credible.
Jin Zhuanglong held this role starting in 2018 before being reassigned in 2022 to serve as minister of industry and information technology. No official announcement has been made regarding Jin’s successor after his transfer. However, there is speculation that Lei, a member of the 20th Central Committee who is frequently seen with ministerial-level officials, may have assumed the position. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that Lei appears to be the only Central Committee member whose official post has not been publicly disclosed, adding credibility to the theory, especially considering the ministerial rank of the role.
Lei’s last officially announced position was as chairman of China State Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, later China State Shipbuilding Corporation, from 2018 to 2022. Before this, he served extensively within the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
Based on the current reports regarding investigations into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the defense industry, it appears that Chinese authorities are focusing on issues that arose between 2018 and 2022. During this period, Lei held the position of chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corporation, suggesting that any investigation into him may be linked to problems within the corporation during his tenure.
Several officials from China State Shipbuilding Corporation have recently been investigated. On March 13, 2023, Chen Fusheng, former director of the Huazhong Photoelectric Technology Research Institute, was investigated for suspected serious disciplinary and legal violations. On December 12, 2023, Wang Xiaofei, former director of the Wuhan Digital Engineering Institute, faced a similar investigation. On June 4, 2024, Li Chaokun, former chairman of the corporation’s Finance Company, was also investigated. On August 29, 2024, Cui Xiaowen, former director of the 715 Defense S&T Institute, faced investigation for serious violations.
The most recent case, on October 27, 2024, involved the corporation’s listed subsidiary, Emergency Warning and Rescue Equipment Co., Ltd., which issued a report on “rectification and accountability measures following an economic responsibility audit” concerning former Chairman Yu Hao, suggesting possible accounting issues during his tenure.
In summary, it is indeed possible that Lei Fanpei is under investigation due to the recent probes into China State Shipbuilding Corporation. Notably, there was an incident in May this year that a Chinese submarine, built by China State Shipbuilding, allegedly sank at the dock of the Wuhan Shipyard. However, no specific information has been released regarding accountability for this incident, nor is it certain whether senior executives at China State Shipbuilding Corporation will be investigated in relation to it.
Another individual suspected of being under investigation is Zhang Kejian, though there is no public information available to support an analysis of the reasons behind his potential investigation. Zhang currently serves as vice minister of industry and information technology and director of SASTIND, overseeing administrative affairs related to the defense industry and military-industrial groups. However, his role essentially does not involve direct involvement in the operations of the defense industry.
Zhang assumed the role of deputy director of SASTIND in 2015 and was promoted to director in 2018, concurrently serving as vice minister of industry and information technology, administrator of the China National Space Administration, and director of the China Atomic Energy Authority. Notably, although Zhang did not become a member or alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP in 2022, he has remained in his position as director. Born in 1961, Zhang is now 63 years old, and as a deputy ministerial-level official, he would typically have been reassigned to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference by age 60. His continued tenure suggests he has been retained due to the special favor of Xi Jinping.
Therefore, Zhang is essentially a technical official who is not involved in the direct operations of military-industrial corporations and has been favored by the top leadership. There has been no public information about any officials within SASTIND being investigated, making it difficult to assess the likelihood or reasons for Zhang’s potential investigation.
In conclusion, the currently available information suggests that Lei Fanpei may indeed be under investigation due to issues arising during his tenure as chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corporation, while it is more challenging to assess the situation regarding Zhang Kejian.
Indicators for Future Observation
Regarding the potential purge of the defense industry and military-industrial officials, future observation indicators can be categorized into micro and macro indicators.
Micro indicators to watch include whether there will be a comprehensive investigation into the defense industry, specifically targeting officials who held office during the 19th Party Congress. Jin Zhuanglong serves as an important indicator, as he was the executive deputy director of the Office of CCIMCD from 2018 to 2022. During this period, Zhang Kejian was responsible for the day-to-day administrative management of the defense industry under the State Council, while Jin advanced military-civil fusion initiatives within the Party Central Committee’s office. If the Chinese authorities are indeed conducting a systematic investigation into the defense industry, Jin would likely also come under scrutiny, whether publicly or secretly.
Jin attended the party event on October 29, which Lei Fanpei and Zhang Kejian missed, suggesting that the scope of the investigation into the defense industry may still be limited. While Lei, who is reportedly under investigation, serves in his current capacity as deputy director of the Office of CCIMCD, it is vital to note that he served as chairman of China State Shipbuilding Corporation from 2018 to 2022.
Regarding macro indicators, two aspects can be observed to determine whether there will be a comprehensive purge of the military-industrial group. The first aspect to observe is whether Xi Jinping has long intended to purge the military-industrial faction. By 2022, Xi had essentially consolidated full control over the CCP, allowing him to easily sideline potential political rivals. For example, at the 20th Party Congress, Hu Chunhua was demoted from a Politburo member to a Central Committee member. If Xi intended to suppress the military-industrial group, he would not have assigned them significant positions within the 20th Central Committee.
In practice, it appears that Xi has not been inclined to suppress the military-industrial group over the long term. Four members from this group – Vice Premiers Zhang Guoqing and Liu Guozhong, Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, and Chongqing Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun – were all promoted to the Politburo in 2022.
A more significant observation involves Zhang Qingwei and Wang Yong. Both Zhang and Wang held multiple terms as ministerial-level and vice-national-level officials. Upon approaching retirement in 2022, they assumed semi-retirement roles as vice chairmen of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, respectively, in 2023. Typically, it is common for ministerial or vice-national-level officials to transition to vice-national-level semi-retirement positions without holding a senior CCP rank, such as Central Committee membership. However, both Zhang and Wang were re-elected as Central Committee members in 2022 and appointed to these semi-retirement roles – a rather unusual occurrence.
In comparison, Hu Chunhua, who served as a Politburo member and vice premier, was downgraded to a Central Committee member and appointed as vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at the 20th Party Congress. Zhang Qingwei and Wang Yong, on the other hand, appear to have been granted semi-retirement privileges beyond their rank level.
The second aspect to consider is whether Xi decided to purge the military-industrial faction only after the 20th Party Congress. If that were the case, military-industrial officials should have faced investigations, been excluded from key positions, or denied promotions since at least 2023.
In practice, however, this has not occurred. It has been two years since the 20th Party Congress, and no Central Committee or Politburo member from the military-industrial group has been investigated. In fact, two members from this group were appointed as vice premiers in 2023. Zhang Guoqing, a military-industrial official, was appointed as vice premier overseeing industrial regulation, while Jin Zhuanglong was appointed as minister overseeing the defense industry. Additionally, Huang Qiang, who served as governor of Sichuan Province for nearly four years, was promoted to party secretary of Jilin Province in June of this year.
Based on the two indicators above, it can be observed that, at least thus far, the defense industry has not undergone a comprehensive investigation, nor has the military-industrial group faced a full-scale purge. It is important to note that China, or the Chinese Communist Party, tends to conduct internal investigations with a high degree of secrecy, so it is possible that investigations are already underway but have not been disclosed. Therefore, the actual extent of any investigation or purge within China’s defense industry requires further observation and analysis over time.