The year 2004 continues to be invoked by insurgent groups in Thailand’s Deep South as a distinctly grim time, when hostilities between militants and Thai authorities peaked. The grievous incidents of violence that transpired that year have become a significant part of the Deep South’s collective memory, particularly in terms of entrenching mutual contempt and distrust.
In January 2004, four Thai soldiers were killed by insurgents when they launched a raid on a military base in Narathiwat. Subsequently, in April of that year, 32 militants attacked a police outpost and were killed by authorities after a seven-hour gunfight at Krue Se mosque. These instances of violence and escalation of tensions culminated in the Tak Bai Massacre on October 25, 2004. Cited as one of the most brutal violations of human rights in the Deep South, seven Muslim protestors outside a police station in Tak Bai district were fatally shot by Thai security forces and 78 others died from asphyxiation while being transported to a military detention center in Pattani.
Twenty years on, the region has seen its share of optimistic moments in terms of progress toward peace. Talks between the Thai government and the region’s foremost Malay-Muslim separatist group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), began in 2013. In the latest iteration of formal mediation held in February 2024, both delegations reached an in-principle agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace.
Despite these positive signals, regional insurgent violence remains a perennial security and humanitarian concern. Mainstream media reported that on June 30 of this year, a car bomb was detonated outside a police residential complex in Yala, resulting in one death and 21 injuries. Deep South Watch reported 11 fatalities in July across the four southern provinces, and grassroots media outlet, Wartani, recorded seven deaths in Pattani province in August.
Online monitoring reveals that despite ongoing peace talks, political deadlock at both the insurgent and national levels serves as a barrier to sustained cooperation. Concerted policy efforts must be directed towards building consensus on both fronts in order to chart a reconciliatory path forward.
Disarray Within the Deep South
Disunity between BRN’s political and military wings is an obstacle to the peace process at the insurgency level. Some insurgents insist on a sovereign and “liberated Patani,” a term that references the historic Patani Sultanate and seeks to unite the four Muslim-majority Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla. Conversely, other members advocate for alternative configurations of autonomy, such as the demarcation of a special administrative zone. The group’s diverging visions of the region’s future have resulted in a deadlock between competing factions.
Following the BRN political delegation’s agreement to “seek political solutions in accordance with the Thai constitution” during talks in March 2022, some BRN militant operatives have ramped up violence in retaliation, viewing the peace process as collusion with the Thai “imperialist invaders.”
Thus far, the ethno-nationalist movement that BRN champions distinguishes itself from the global salafi–jihadist movement as propagated by al-Qaida and Islamic State. However, some members of BRN’s military wing have leveraged the language of religious extremism for greater credence and relied on social media to galvanize the community to fight for Patani’s future independence without surrender. The insurgency calls for armed “jihad” against the “kafir” (infidel) Thai officials, who are perceived to have “oppressed and abused” Malay-Muslims since the fall of the Patani Sultanate. This is a particularly potent invocation, considering historical incidents of excessive use of force by Thai authorities in the region.
Insurgents who died for the cause are declared “shahid” (martyrs). They are glorified online through tribute videos and livestreams of their funeral processions. This evokes a sense of reverence towards fighters who dedicated their lives to a liberated Patani, while inspiring members of the community to contribute to the cause. Online monitoring reveals that at least 10 militants had their deaths memorialized online in August alone.
Militants have also produced propaganda content calling for the community to take up arms against the enemy, declaring that war is “obligatory” for the people of the Deep South and a “test of faith.” These videos seek to elicit an emotional response from audiences by combining imagery of weapons with songs recounting the suffering of the community under “occupation.” Additionally, local resistance music has amassed over millions of views on YouTube, with lyrics calling for “fighters” to “step forward” and subdue the “Siamese enemies.”
Chronic Power Struggle Within the Thai Establishment
Political deadlock within the Thai establishment has also significantly stymied prospects for sustainable peace in the Deep South. Power struggles concerning the premiership and the overbearing function of the military in the region are the foremost concerns.
Since 2004, Thailand has witnessed eight regime transitions, with Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the daughter of former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, most recently declared prime minister after a politically tumultuous period in August. This development has raised questions about the potential revival of grievances towards the latest administration, considering Thaksin’s heavy-handed approach towards the South during his time in office from 2001 to 2006. A survey conducted earlier this year by Projek Sama-Sama in Pattani reflected a mere 2.4 percent approval rating for Paetongtarn, while most respondents affirmed security and peace as their primary policy concern.
Due to the abrupt leadership succession, peace talks have halted and endorsement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace has been delayed until a chief negotiator is appointed or reinstated. Nine civil society organizations (CSOs) have already issued a joint statement calling for the new administration to address its policy strategy for conflict resolution in the Deep South.
The military also maintains vested interests in the region as its extensive jurisdiction in the Deep South amounts to significant political influence. While Thailand’s civilian government is engaged in carefully navigating power dynamics with the army, CSOs in the south remain deadlocked with Thai security forces due to overwhelming mutual distrust.
These CSOs seek to uphold the protection of human rights and condemn the excessive use of military force under present circumstances where martial law and the Emergency Decree prevail.
Malay-Muslim activists have been investigated under the Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation law for public assemblies centered on cultural identity, ultimately curtailing freedom of expression and instilling a culture of fear. Consequently, the community harbors deep-seated resentment towards the Thai establishment, a chronic suspicion that undermines the peace process.
Opening a Path Forward
Considering the insurgency’s loose and decentralized structure, intra-group reconciliation at the insurgent level is particularly challenging. BRN’s political arm must consider how to broker greater internal consensus. Unity will reduce incidents of violence and advance peace through dialogue. It may be incumbent on BRN to convene with leaders of smaller insurgent groups to minimize inter-group competition and factionalism at the local level.
Thailand’s current administration should holistically consider the recommendations proposed by the designated parliamentary working sub-committee and demonstrate its commitment to surpass confidence-building measures. It should prioritize fostering greater consensus between stakeholders in the Deep South, such as through public consultations conducted in collaboration with CSOs, and address community grievances that have built up over time as a result of military oversight in the region. Additionally, it should chart a timeline for future plans that succeeding administrations can inherit to ensure continuity of peace efforts.
Notably, acceptance of the Tak Bai massacre lawsuit in August offered Paetongtarn’s administration a chance to mitigate anti-establishment hostilities in the region. After the Narathiwat Court approved a criminal lawsuit, it found sufficient grounds for murder and illegal detention charges against seven former high-ranking officials. However, defendants neglected to cooperate prior to the expiry of the statute of limitations on October 25. This failure to uphold the rightful judicial process, and bring a measure of accountability for the killing at Tak Bai, could significantly hinder future peace efforts.
Ultimately, the road to peace and reconciliation in Southern Thailand will depend on commitment from both sides to break repeated cycles of political deadlock. Barriers to cooperation at both the insurgency and national levels can be ameliorated when conflict resolution policies are strategically designed to build consensus and uphold justice.