Mahfuj Alam, a 27-year-old graduate of Dhaka University, completed his studies in the Department of Law. He is one of the key visionaries behind the revolutionary movement against the Hasina regime in Bangladesh. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, currently the chief adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh, introduced him as the “brain of the whole revolution” while speaking before the Clinton Global Initiative on the sidelines of the 79th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
Alam has been a political-intellectual associate of the student leaders driving the movement since 2021. He runs an intellectual study circle, known as “Gurobar Adda,” to attract young intellectuals and has edited a cinema magazine titled Purbopokko.
Currently, Alam serves as the special assistant (political) to Yunus. He is also one of the coordinators on the Liaison Committee, formed to facilitate communication between students and the interim government. Additionally, he is a member of the Constitutional Reform Committee, led by Professor Ali Riaz.
In an exclusive interview with The Diplomat, Alam highlighted key issues related to Bangladesh’s future goals and ongoing discussions for a new political framework: “We seek a political settlement grounded in dignity, responsibility, and compassion. We revere figures like Abul Hashem, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Sarat Bose, and Chittaranjan Das also. The type of new constitution we envision will be inclusive, not divisive. We prioritize public diplomacy alongside military, economic, and cultural diplomacy.”
Shahadat Hossain a research scholar in the department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi conducted the interview for the Diplomat.
The interview has been edited lightly for length and clarity.
Previously in Bangladesh, there was a movement on “quota reform,” using that same term as its banner. You have introduced a new banner, the “anti-discrimination student movement.” Why was the quota reform movement initially under that name? Was there a larger plan from the beginning?
With our banner, we aimed to address the country’s crises on a larger scale. The anti-quota movement already existed, and we felt there was potential to connect with broader issues. We wanted to stand for all oppressed people across various classes and occupations under the banner of the “Anti-Discrimination Student Movement.” This name serves as an umbrella term. At that time, we also spoke out against corruption, choosing this name to emphasize our connection to civic issues.
You have mentioned that Bangladeshi intellectuals couldn’t predict 1971, and they failed again in 2024. What path are Bangladesh’s intellectuals on, then? Why are they unable to join these larger movements?
In Bangladesh, no institution has been established in this regard. Intellectuals like Michel Foucault, Derrida, Iqbal Ahmed, or Indian public intellectuals are institutionally affiliated, while in Bangladesh, intellectuals are often limited to journalists or Bengali literature or English literature scholars.
There are numerous crises in Bangladesh, yet public intellectualism and research have not been meaningfully developed. What little has been achieved is due to private initiatives, as no institutional support exists for such efforts. Intellectuals in Bangladesh tend to remain within an upper-middle-class, urban bubble, disconnected from the language, thoughts, and lived experiences of the general population. They have not genuinely sought the public’s opinions, instead imposing their ideas and ideologies from a top-down perspective. This approach alienates people, leading intellectuals to miss the ideological and cultural transformations within society.
By becoming stuck in nationalist thought from earlier eras, most of these intellectuals have become increasingly distanced from the public. When the state oppresses the people, most of them often offer silent support or even encouragement, sometimes labeling people without truly seeking to understand them. These cultural and linguistic divides have prevented mutual understanding between intellectuals and the public. Due to this detachment, most of them were unable to connect with the mass uprisings of 2024.
You are advocating for a politics of responsibility and compassion. What does it mean? Could you please explain?
Bangladesh’s politics have been oppressive for the past 15 years, leading to the deprivation of rights. During this period, opposition political parties have consistently demanded their rights. However, I believe rights come with responsibilities. We need to shift from solely rights-based politics to responsibility-based politics.
We aspire to move away from fascist politics, which fosters conflict and division among people, toward a politics of understanding. We seek a political framework grounded in dignity, responsibility, and compassion – values essential to our fight against fascism.
Additionally, we will uphold the ideals of equality, human dignity and social justice. We must move beyond conflict-driven politics, like Mujibbad, and embrace inclusive politics. Without compassion, it’s impossible to connect with people or achieve genuine inclusivity. This is why we advocate for politics rooted in compassion and responsibility.
You posted on Facebook, “Dhaka will be the center of civilizational confluence and a cultural hub of the Bay of Bengal region.” Could you elaborate? What is the basis for this argument?
Bengal is a hub of multiple religions and cultures. Historically, Islam arrived here with the translation of a yoga text into Arabic. This land has been home to Buddhists, Christians, Jews, and a center of maritime trade. We see Bengal as a convergence of cultures and civilizations, with Dhaka at its heart. Various civilizations, cultures, and histories have intermingled here, fostering diversity of opinions, beliefs, and ideas among people. No single ideology can dominate here; this land thrives on a blend of perspectives. This soil is rich – a place where Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, and Vaishnavas have coexisted in mutual understanding, forming the foundation of the state.
The Bay of Bengal identity is also crucial. Around the Bay of Bengal – in places like Chittagong, Arakan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Australia – a cultural confluence has been happening for 200-300 years. We want Bangladesh to embrace this legacy and become a hub for diverse religions, cultures, and ideas.
You are advocating that the spirit of ’47 (the Partition of India), ’71 (Bangladesh’s Independence War), and ’24 (the Monsoon Revolution) should be combined into one, but each event had a distinct type of consciousness. How can these three events be tied together?”
I believe there is a common spirit within 1947 and 1971, when Bengali Muslims acted collectively. Both in 1947 and 1971 they allied with Hindus and others, pursuing aspirations rooted in shared goals. Although the movement in 1947 originated with Muslim nationalism, it included widespread participation, even among lower-caste Hindus in the East Pakistan movement.
In 1971, too, Bengali Muslims fought alongside their Hindu friends, driven by similar aspirations. The goal in 1947 was to seek a homeland where they could achieve economic freedom, escape the zamindari system, and have the religious freedom to practice cultural expressions tied to religion. This movement for religious freedom was not intended to establish Shariah; later, some Islamic scholars exaggerated this aspect, distorting the purpose of Pakistan. Instead, I believe the aspiration for Pakistan was simply for the freedom to practice religious rituals and preserve religious culture. Before 1947, such freedom was limited in this region.
Why didn’t all of Bengal align with Pakistan? There was a cultural and class divide between East and West Bengal, which Syama Prasad Mukherjee fueled. Bengali Muslims supported a united Bengal – a stance we still uphold. We revere figures like Abul Hashem, who, alongside Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, and Sarat Bose, sought a united Bengal. Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das also advocated for united Bengal through the Bengal Pact, striving for a cohesive Bengali identity. We hold Chittaranjan Das in high regard for his contributions to this cause.
In 1971, the fight was against political Islam, not Islam itself, nor against Bengali Muslims or their cultural identity. 1947 marked the beginning of a Bangladeshi identity. Without 1947, there would not have been 1971, as Abul Mansur Ahmad pointed out. The aspirations of the Lahore Resolution were ultimately fulfilled in 1971. I view the Pakistan Movement differently, calling it the East Pakistan Movement, as it was driven primarily by Bengalis. When they realized that achieving statehood did not translate to effective self-governance due to Punjabi dominance, they overthrew this control in 1971.
The spirit of the mass uprising of 2024 was a call for equality, with people from all backgrounds rallying together, opposing discrimination and seeking equal opportunity. Islamic scholars, including madrassa students, participated, with around 100 madrassa students martyred. For 15 years, they had been denied religious and cultural freedom; those practicing religion were labeled as militants. Workers and women also fought; each group motivated by unique aspirations. Despite these differences, the shared starting point was opposition to discrimination and the pursuit of equality. As a result, we will continue to build on these common issues.
Then what is the ultimate foundation of Bangladesh? When the people of this region fight repeatedly, what is the ultimate identity of the people or the state?
The foundation of Bangladesh lies in the unity of Bengali Muslims and Hindus, alongside other communities. Bengali Muslims, being the majority, do not need identity politics; they embody the state. The state has two aspects: the growth of the political community and the formation of the state. The political community emerged from Bengali Muslim aspirations, but the state itself must remain secular. All Bengali Muslims and Hindus must be treated equally by the state.
Bengali Muslims have repeatedly fought for their rights. In 1947, they did not achieve them due to Punjabi dominance, and in 1971, they were held back by Mujibbad. They rose again in 2024, seeking a state that is non-discriminatory, more democratic, and more equal. This struggle is not about religion, though religious inspiration is present – it is about equality and justice, not religious rule.
You talk about reconciliation in the country; how much it is possible after the revolution of 2024 or the mass uprising? Already, the Shahbagh-Hefazat debate is affecting the landscape of the post-revolution government.
A reconciliation was needed after 1971, and the issue with Jamaat should not have lingered until 2014 – it needed resolution much earlier. Now, by raising the question of the Awami League, efforts are underway to further weaken national unity. I think the Shahbagh-Hefazat conflict in Bangladesh has been diminished through the 2024 uprising, yet a cultural war remains. The Shahbagh-Hefazat conflict is not merely political; it is a political-cultural conflict. The Mujibists perpetuate this cultural conflict. They continue to maintain the division of the nation, aligning with a portion of Bangladesh’s population while labeling the other side as reactive without truly trying to understand them. This cycle of conflict is orchestrated by Mujibists for political gain.
The type of constitution we envision will not be divisive; it will be more inclusive. Our goal is to address the Shahbagh-Hefazat conflict, but, given its roots in deep-seated cultural politics, it cannot be fully resolved through a new constitution alone. Nonetheless, we will strive to bridge this divide.
How will Bangladesh view the rest of the world in the context of its new political and constitutional reforms? What will be the foreign policy direction of Bangladesh 2.0?
I am realistic and pragmatic. We advocate for civilizational confluence and cultural hubs that connect us from Central Asia to Turkiye and from China to Korea and Japan through civilizational dialogue. When I consider maritime relations, we see our influence extending as far as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. We support a foreign policy based on Bangladesh’s national interests. However, the divisive politics in Bangladesh have prevented the development of a cohesive national outlook. Our leaders are not aligned on questions of national identity or unity, which has impacted our foreign policy.
There is a lack of transparency and discussion in our foreign policy due to the absence of a unified national character within Bangladesh. Our foreign policy is too submissive and driven by party politics. To change this, we must pursue national reconciliation. In the new landscape we advocate for public diplomacy, and I have outlined a public diplomacy approach for Bangladesh. We need public diplomacy, as well as military, economic, and cultural diplomacy.