Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first world leaders to congratulate Donald Trump on his victory in the U.S. presidential election. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Modi shared photos of their previous interactions while congratulating “my friend” Trump on his “historic” victory.
New Delhi always seemed somewhat more comfortable with a second Trump term than a Kamala Harris presidency, which would have entailed a more value-driven foreign policy with greater emphasis (and scrutiny) on India’s democratic credentials. Not even Harris’ Indian ancestry could match the bromance of the “Howdy, Modi!” and “Namaste Trump” gatherings during Trump’s first term.
This initial optimism has been complemented by the ongoing announcement of Trump’s picks for foreign policy posts. Several key positions in the second Trump administration are going to people with a pro-India tilt, including Representative Mike Waltz – Trump’s pick for national security adviser – who previously served as head of the India Caucus, and Senator Marco Rubio – a potential candidate for secretary of state – who has pushed for deepening India-U.S. defense cooperation: Earlier this year he introduced the U.S.-India Defense Cooperation Act in the Senate.
Common Ground
On the face of it, Trump and Modi maintain a common worldview. This is rooted in a shared preference for strongman leadership, perceptions of China and radical Islam as existential threats, animosity toward the liberal media and civil society, well-entrenched economic nationalism, and a value-neutral foreign policy dictated by self-interest. This sets the stage for a high degree of alignment between the foreign policy priorities of a second Trump term and a recently re-elected third-term Modi government.
For example, Trump’s preference to end the war in Ukraine and de-escalate tensions with Russia will remove a key thorn in the India-U.S. relationship given New Delhi’s close relations with Moscow. Trump is also likely to double down on the United States’ strategic rivalry with China, to the benefit of India, which is seen by Washington as a bulwark against the rise of China.
Trump’s reversion to a more transactional U.S. foreign policy will also entail less scrutiny of India on issues of human rights, as well as reduced support for regime change in neighboring countries (such as Bangladesh, where an India-friendly government was ousted in August in what is widely seen in New Delhi as a U.S.-backed coup). New Delhi also welcomed Trump’s post on X “strongly condemning the barbaric violence against Hindus, Christians, and other minorities” in Bangladesh, adding that “Kamala and Joe have ignored Hindus across the world.”
Renewed U.S. support for Israel in its proxy war with Iran will also be welcomed by New Delhi. Despite maintaining close relations with both Iran and Israel and supporting a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine issue, New Delhi has increasingly leaned toward Israel in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. This has been fueled by pragmatic considerations – arising from Israel’s importance as an increasingly important defense and technology partner for India – but also ideological considerations. Elements of Modi’s Hindu nationalist base see India and Israel as ethno-nationalist states facing a common threat from Islamic extremism.
Another country where Trump’s foreign policy is likely to align with that of India is Canada. Canada-India relations have been on a downward spiral over the last year amid allegations of Indian complicity in the assassination on Canadian soil of a Canadian national linked to the Sikh separatist Khalistan movement inside India. While Canada will remain a key partner for the United States as a neighboring country and fellow member of the NATO alliance and the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing group, Canada-U.S. relations are likely to become increasingly strained amid the tetchy relationship between Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The United States under Trump and India under Modi will both welcome a likely change of government in Ottawa in 2025 as Canada goes to the polls and Trudeau faces declining popularity ratings.
Fissures
Based on these developments, it is not surprising that India’s foreign policy pundits are lauding Trump’s return to the White House. However, this overlooks several fissures in the bilateral relationship that are likely to come to the fore in a second Trump term. Two perennial priorities for Trump – trade and immigration – are key flashpoints in the India-U.S. relationship.
With respect to trade, India maintained a trade surplus of over $35 billion with the United States in 2023-24 – more than India enjoyed with any other trade partner. While China will be the primary target of Washington’s wrath under a second-term Trump administration, India will also be caught in the crossfire, as Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on any country with which the United States maintains a trade deficit.
Trump has referred to India as a “very big abuser” in terms of its tariffs on U.S. products and called for trade to be conducted on the basis of reciprocity. This is easier said than done for India, which maintains a well-entrenched protectionist sentiment. Since Modi assumed power in 2014 average tariff levels have gone up, and India has discontinued most of its bilateral investment treaties while seeking to renegotiate several existing free trade agreements. In this context, both countries’ common economic nationalist worldviews may be a point of friction rather than convergence.
Migration will also be a point of contention, with Indians among the largest source of illegal migrants into the United States. In the 12 months to September 2024, the United States deported over 1,100 Indians on charter flights after they had entered the country illegally. New Delhi has tried to downplay this issue by focusing on India’s contribution to the U.S. economy through skilled migrants that have come via legal channels. However, even legal migrants are prone to coming under scrutiny if Trump renews efforts to tighten visa restrictions as he had done in his first term.
Even seeming areas of convergence in the India-U.S. relationship have underlying frictions. Take the Canada-India relationship. While Trump and Modi may share a dislike for Trudeau, the United States cannot overlook India’s allegedly unlawful actions as they pertain to its own citizens. The U.S. Justice Department’s investigation into India’s alleged complicity in an assassination plot inside the United States will proceed independently of the Modi-Trump bromance. Moreover, in a world where the United States increasingly disregards international norms and rules, Indian foreign policy elites will challenge any U.S. criticism of India’s actions on the grounds of hypocrisy, noting that Washington is increasingly abandoning the very global order it helped to establish.
On Russia, while Trump has pledged to bring a swift end to the war in Ukraine, the process of de-escalating tensions with Moscow will take time and in the interim period scrutiny of the India-Russia relationship will continue. Last month, 19 Indian companies were named as part of a U.S. Treasury Department probe into “third-country sanctions evaders.” This comes amid reports that India has emerged as the second-largest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (after China).
On China, while New Delhi and Washington share concerns about Beijing’s increasingly assertive behavior, there are limits on the degree to which this will translate into policy convergence. The conclusion of a border agreement between China and India in October challenges claims that the United States and India are on the same page regarding their relations with China. While India maintains a history of difficult relations with China, New Delhi remains reluctant to get dragged into any China-U.S. conflict (over Taiwan, for example).
On the economic front, there is also a fallacy in the narrative of India as a potential beneficiary of the push to de-risk or diversify supply-chains away from China. While India has emerged as the world’s back office, it has a long way to go in replacing China as the world’s workshop. This means that for the foreseeable future as India seeks to build up its manufacturing capacity and centrality to global supply chains, it will become more (not less) reliant on China in industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to electric vehicles.
A recent example of this can be seen in the solar sector. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency has detained over $40 million worth of Indian-made solar panels since October 2023 on the grounds of violating the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. While the Indian government has incentivized indigenous production of solar panels, Indian solar companies continue to rely on Chinese vendors for key manufacturing inputs, including PV cells.
More broadly, while India has benefited from the Biden administration’s push toward friend-shoring, under Trump’s “America First” agenda there is no such thing as working with “likeminded” countries or “trusted geographies.” Trump’s “first and only America” foreign policy will have little interest in supporting India’s efforts to become a trusted global manufacturing hub while he seeks to reindustrialize the U.S. economy. In this context, India and the United States are potential economic rivals rather than partners.
Fault Lines
The India-U.S. relationship has gone from strength to strength over the last three decades with deepening cooperation in strategically important areas. Modi’s congratulatory X post to Trump alluded to this with a pledge to “further strengthen India-U.S. relations across technology, defense, energy, space and several other sectors.” This has been facilitated by India becoming increasingly enmeshed in a growing web of bilateral initiatives with the United States (such as the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology) and multilateral ones with like-minded states (from the Minerals Security Partnership to the Artemis Accords).
However, developments in both countries challenge the long-term stability of the bilateral relationship. On the U.S. side, there has been a strong value-based component to the India-U.S. relationship. Unlike the United States’ relations with other countries such as Vietnam or Saudi Arabia, which are rooted in shared interests, there is a perception in the United States that its relationship with India is also rooted in shared values. However, Trump’s proclivity to see foreign policy in purely transactional terms will weaken the narrative of a shared ideological affinity between the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy.
On the Indian side, New Delhi maintains a longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. While this can be traced to an Indian policy of nonalignment during the Cold War, it has found newfound importance under the Modi government as it has sought to reframe India as a “Vishwamitra” (or friend of the world). This entails engaging all major poles of influence in the international system and a reluctance to take sides in great-power conflicts. This includes an aversion to being part of any U.S.-led initiative that resembles a military alliance (an arrangement Waltz, Trump’s pick for national security adviser, has explicitly called for).
This reluctance will impose limits of the degree of alignment between India and the United States. Relations will be complicated by a world of growing geopolitical polarization and bifurcation in which India will be forced to take sides. This will be a difficult ask for New Delhi given its strategic compulsions, including India’s economic dependence on China (as its key trade partner) and military dependence on Russia (as its key arms supplier).
Ultimately, a second Trump term will be a double-edged sword for India. A more insular United States that is less interested in global leadership will create more space for other countries, including India, to step up. This will help India fulfill its longstanding ambition to play a leadership role in an emerging multipolar global order. This process is already underway, with institutions like the United Nations and World Trade Organization seen as increasingly dysfunctional while the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are no longer seen as representative of the shifting balance of economic power. But Trump’s return to power will accelerate this process.
At the same time, Trump’s erratic policymaking will complicate India’s relations with the United States (as it will for other U.S. partners, allies, and adversaries). China may be a rival today, but could Trump seek to “do a deal” with Beijing at some point in the future? If so, that would undermine the position of countries that maintain a history of difficult relations with China, including India.
There are well-entrenched structural challenges facing the India-U.S. relationship rooted in a gap in how both countries perceive each other. Put simply, India does not understand alliances and the United States does not understand nonalignment. This predates Trump’s re-election, but it is likely to be exacerbated by his return to power.