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The BRICS Summit in Kazan and the Limits of Western Influence

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The BRICS Summit in Kazan and the Limits of Western Influence

While it may not yet be a powerful alliance, BRICS has the potential to be an attractive alternative for the countries of the Global South to pursue their national interests.

The BRICS Summit in Kazan and the Limits of Western Influence

President of Russia Vladimir Putin during an expanded meeting of BRICS leaders during the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan.

Credit: Sergey Bobylev / Photohost agency brics-russia2024.ru

Despite Western sanctions and measures to isolate Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the BRICS summit in Kazan from October 22 to 24. Leaders and representatives from 36 countries, as well as the U.N. secretary-general, attended. BRICS, set up in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded in 2010 to include South Africa, and in 2024 added Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The summit highlighted a multipolar world, with the Kazan declaration emphasizing themes such  as “just global development and security.” For some, the attendance of numerous BRICS heads of state and leaders from CIS countries indicated that Putin was in the center of the Global South. Although an ICC arrest warrant has been issued for Putin over war crimes in Ukraine, the summit revealed that this did not deter major states of the Global South or the Global East, which are seeking to maximize their own interests through participation in the bloc to travel to Kazan. 

Has the Western world failed to isolate Putin? Why are countries of the Global South – and even some close Western allies – interested in joining what seems to be a Russia-led alliance?

There are several factors at play. First, nation-states, as well known by the tenets of the realist school of international relations, are driven by their self-interests. For the so-called Global South, these interests do not necessarily involve aligning only with Western ideas or norms. While these states differ from the West in their culture and values, they seek common ground for mutually beneficial projects.

One example of this is the case of India, which claims to be a close ally of the West and is a part of the Quad alongside the U.S., Australia, and Japan, yet it actively participates in BRICS, too. India frames itself as a “non-Western” but not necessarily “anti-Western” state. When questioned for buying Russian oil at the Munich Security Conference, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated it should not be a problem for others if his country was “smart enough to have multiple options.” 

Second, the idea of a multipolar world is attractive to the developing states of the Global South. Rather than putting all their trust and dependence into U.S.-led alliances and institutions, these states prefer the flexibility to have options. While Putin has claimed that the BRICS is not an anti-Western alliance, stating that “BRICS was never meant to be created in opposition to anyone,” for some of its members such as China and Russia, it could be indeed about balancing U.S. power. For other members and prospective members, such as Turkiye, it offers leverage in negotiations with Western partners, including the United States. 

What got less attention in the mainstream Western media was the attendance of the presidents of all five Central Asian states, as well as the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia at the BRICS Plus/Outreach meeting.  While they are not BRICS members, Putin’s speech framed these states as those with whom Russia “shared a common past, having lived within a single state.”  The Central Asian states, in particular, pursue multi-vector foreign policies, balancing Western pressures over Russia’s sanctions and the realities of their geographic and political proximity to Russia. Their wider participation in the summit helped to frame and solidify Russia’s weakened, isolated image on the international stage.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, BRICS promotes “peace and stability” among its key goals in the Global South. While it is controversial for Russia to champion such a goal given its war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and the responses of major Western powers have affected how Global South states perceive widely celebrated values like human rights and where and how the rule of law is upheld, or not. 

Many states, including those of the Central Asia states who attended the BRICS, have long expressed their disappointment over Western powers’ apparent “blind eye” to Israel’s breaches of international humanitarian law in Gaza. In the media, recently several former U.N. officials condemned the firing at U.N. peacekeepers, including UNIFIL, by Israel. Civil society groups from Israel itself stated that their government is violating international law and that the “friends of Israel” could have mitigated the Israeli government’s disproportionate response including the mass killing of civilians. Israel’s daily violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza, coupled with limited action from the international community to enforce a ceasefire, have fueled skepticism in the Global South over the West’s commitment to justice.

Given the lack of condemnation – let alone punishment – by the West for Israel’s breaches of international humanitarian law, states of the Global South perceive a double standard in the West’s approach to justice for non-European states. This disappointment is reflected in the discourse of BRICS Plus participants, with some Central Asian states stating, “No political goals can justify innocent civilian casualties, especially among children.” To them, BRICS presents itself as “a new architecture for a more just world order” while upholding the U.N.’s central role.

When challenged by a BBC correspondent on how Russia’s BRICS chairmanship could promote themes such as “justice and security” while Russia is waging war in Ukraine, Putin responded by citing past “unjust” NATO eastward expansions. Putin claimed Russia’s numerous efforts in calling the West to stop the NATO’s eastward expansion were “disregarded” and the West kept “building military bases” in Ukraine. The war was described as a necessary defense against an existential threat to Russia’s sovereignty.

BRICS is not a military institution; it is a political and economic bloc. While it may not yet be a powerful alliance, the fact that both democracies and authoritarian states participate – and others are interested in joining – suggests that the organization has the potential to be an attractive alternative for the Global South to pursue their national interests. From the statements of BRICS members and BRICS Plus attendees, it is clear that the Global South seeks a multipolar world where no single major power dictates the rules and where all states’ rights are respected.

While such ambition may be detached from reality, and it may be too soon to predict the bloc’s long-term influence, one realistic conclusion, for now, is that coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, have proven ineffective in isolating major powers like Russia. At the very least, the example of BRICS in Kazan illustrates this.