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The UK Carves Its Own Path on China

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The UK Carves Its Own Path on China

The new government should be careful in determining whether the rewards of a friendlier approach to China truly outweigh the risks. 

The UK Carves Its Own Path on China

U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy meets with Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Wang Yi in Beijing, China, Oct. 20, 2024.

Credit: U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

The United Kingdom’s new government is working on a reset in China-U.K. relations, going against the grain of key partners in Europe and the United States. While a reset in this relationship could bring lucrative trade and investment opportunities, the myriad security, economic, and values risks associated with engagement with China have not gone away. At the same time, too dovish an approach risks signaling disunity among democracies who are attempting a firmer line on Beijing. The U.K. should be careful in determining whether the rewards of a friendlier approach to China truly outweigh the risks. 

July 2024 saw the end of 14 years of rule by the U.K. Conservative Party, with the Labor Party winning a landslide victory in the election. Labor’s election campaign relied heavily on the promise of economic growth to improve living standards after years of hardship in the country. 

The Labor Party’s foreign policy was built around two core pillars. The first was the promise of “Britain Reconnected” – the idea of Britain taking on, or returning to, international leadership in defense, development, and climate. A refreshed relationship with the EU was core to this. Alongside this was the doctrine of “progressive realism” – in essence, a foreign policy that attempts to do the right thing by international law and human rights, while recognizing the constraints of doing so within the international system.  

U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited China last month in an attempt to rejuvenate what has been a highly fraught relationship in recent years. Meanwhile, the U.K.’s business secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, has signaled an openness to reviving the China-U.K. Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO), a trade promotion instrument that was scrapped by the previous British government following China’s clampdown on Hong Kong. The U.K.’s finance minister, Rachel Reeves, has spoken of the need for a “hard-headed, economic realist” approach to relations with China. 

These efforts represent a significant departure from the policy of the previous government. The United Kingdom swung from a “golden era” of relations with China to a period of severe mistrust and enmity in the early 2020s. By 2022, then-Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak – under whose own party the “golden era” came about – described this period of closer ties as “naïve.” The deterioration was spurred by many factors, including the Hong Kong National Security Law, the 2021 mutual sanctions on Chinese and British officials, and multiple cases of China-backed interference in the U.K. through alleged spying and the hostile acquisition of national security critical companies. 

These issues have not gone away. Any “reset” must be managed extremely carefully, as doing so carries numerous risks. First, it risks defanging the U.K.’s principled stances on China’s brutal human rights violations against Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, and other groups. While Lammy did raise these issues during his visit to China, human rights groups have already expressed dismay at a perceived lack of prioritization of human rights dialogue. Reverting to a relationship that prioritizes economic engagement all but confirms that trade and investment with China outweigh a pragmatic, principled foreign policy approach. This would clearly risk undermining the U.K.’s claims of championing international law and human rights. 

The reset, of course, is not entirely placatory. The readout of Lammy’s visit to China said that the U.K.’s new approach would entail “a firm recognition that the U.K. and China will not, and do not, always agree.” This language is encouraging, and should be maintained – especially in relation to China’s ongoing human rights violations in its own territory, and its support for Russia’s continuing invasion of Ukraine. The issue of Hong Kong in particular should be kept at the forefront of engagement, given the United Kingdom’s history with the territory. The issue of Uyghur forced labor must also be prioritized, and the government has made encouraging promises on cross-government measures to keep forced labor out of energy supply chains.

Key areas of U.K. interest can and must be central to London’s engagement with China. Protection of critical national industries, concrete action on Beijing’s interference within the U.K., and criticism of China’s continuing extreme human rights violations cannot and should not be cast aside in the blind pursuit of trade. A robust, risk-proofed, and rights-minded approach to engagement with Beijing can mitigate some of the dangers associated with engaging with China. It is, by now, received wisdom that greater trade and diplomacy with China cannot and will not influence a shift in the behavior of its government. 

It is vital to be realistic about how much revitalized relations with China will truly benefit the United Kingdom’s overall interests. “The risk is that the Labor Government is too optimistic over how high the ceiling is for improving U.K.-PRC relations,” said Sam Goodman, senior policy director at the China Strategic Risks Institute, a U.K. think tank. “The reality is the U.K. is seen by Beijing as neither an equal nor a trusted partner, and there are few areas of the economy China wants to invest in which don’t touch upon national security.” 

As well as the risks to the U.K.’s interests and influence, a reset could earn the ire of partners and allies and cause further disunity among democratic nations. In taking too placatory an approach to Beijing, London would risk undermining the actions of key partner countries and actors who are attempting to take a harder line on Beijing – for instance, the just-agreed EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. The U.K. government has already confirmed that it will not follow suit with tariffs of its own.

Too soft of an approach will also risk alienating the next U.S. president, Donald Trump. The Labor Party has already earned Trump’s fury in response to plans for Labor activists to fly out and support the Harris campaign. While the full details of the incoming Trump administration’s China policy are yet to emerge, the U.K. taking too “soft” of an approach on China is unlikely to win much favor. This is another potential trade off that must be considered, given the importance of the U.S.-U.K. relationship, and the capriciousness of Trump’s approach to foreign relations with both friends and foes. 

Moving too far out of step with partner countries will further signal to Beijing that democratic partnerships are weak and divisible, increasing the Chinese Communist Party’s sense of impunity and strengthening its efforts to reshape the rules-based international order. The U.K. government must decide whether economic gain is worth the longer term risk of an emboldened Beijing and a weaker global democratic coalition.  

With economic difficulty at home and a foreign policy pledge to “reconnect Britain,” the United Kingdom faces a unique new bind in dealing with China. Lucrative though trade and investment opportunities may be, they must not come at the expense of the U.K.’s security and values. The need for a unified approach on China is a far longer term imperative than any domestic political cycle, and the dangers autocracies pose to the international order are grave. The U.K. has a key role to play in responding to those dangers. The new government should remember this.  

Authors
Guest Author

James Jennion

James Jennion is a U.K.-based foreign policy analyst. He is an associate fellow of the British Foreign Policy Group and China Working Group chair of the Labor Foreign Policy Group. He previously worked for the U.K. Foreign Affairs Committee, advising on U.K. policy on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. His writing has featured in publications including The Diplomat, Just Security, and The National Interest, and he has provided expert commentary on UK-China relations for outlets such as Nikkei Asia and Voice of America. He writes in an individual capacity.

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