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Thinking About China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan

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Thinking About China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan

What does Beijing hope to achieve?

Thinking About China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan
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After Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as president of Taiwan on May 20, and then again after Taiwan’s National Day on October 10, China conducted military exercises near Taiwan. These exercises – respectively called Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B – were conducted on a scale that was somewhat smaller than the exercises China put on in the wake of then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Meanwhile, the exercises in October were not held near Kinmen Island (Taiwan), possibly due to a resumption of exchanges between China and the island. Given these factors, it is possible to view the exercises as somewhat restrained.

China’s Taiwan policy is based on the concept of “peaceful reunification,” but it does not rule out the use of force to achieve that reunification. Under the “One China” principle, China’s basic strategy is to seek acceptance of the 1992 Consensus and One Country, Two Systems policy within Taiwanese society and create “patriotic unification forces” among the people and private companies to work towards reunification. The goal is to achieve reunification through the methods of the United Front Work Department of the CCP rather than through the Kuomintang (KMT)’s efforts.

Specifically, China is putting pressure on Taiwanese society in a gray zone between peace and war by threatening society with a show of force through exercises, infiltrating society through economic pressure, cyber attacks, and disinformation, and cutting undersea cables that connect remote islands under the pretext of “accidents.” At the same time, China is also pursuing a policy of economic and social integration through Fujian Province, encouraging Taiwanese investment and interaction with China. In short, Beijing is attempting to push Taiwan toward reunification.

Seen in this light, it is clear that China’s military exercises are meant to intimidate Taiwanese society. China has not ruled out the possibility of attacking Taiwan, and it must demonstrate that it is ever more prepared to do so. This is because Beijing needs to show that it has the military capability and is ready to use force for reunification at any time.

Sugiura Yasuyuki, a senior fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, says that Joint Sword has three objectives. The first is the normalization of military action. The People’s Liberation Army began conducting Joint Sword exercises in 2023, and as we’ve seen they have already held two drills in 2024. This means that deploying more forces in the areas surrounding Taiwan should not elicit a major reaction and should rather create an environment more conducive to military invasion. The second objective is to steadily advance preparations for an actual invasion. These exercises seem to confirm this objective, whether it be a maritime blockade or coordination of the aircraft carrier fleet and the Rocket Force. For this reason alone, Sugiura believes that each exercise has a specific agenda. The third objective is to broadcast the exercises domestically and internationally to promote the narrative that Taiwan is part of China and that reunification is fast approaching. This also puts pressure on Taiwanese society.

China has shown no hesitation in demonstrating its military force, as it views the Taiwan problem as a domestic matter. However, the international community does not always share this perspective. China’s repeated military exercises likely give the impression, both domestically and on the global stage, of a nation with the potential to change the status quo by force. If this continues, the international community will continue to lean toward viewing China and Russia in the same light.

Will these exercises be effective in creating “patriotic unification forces” within Taiwan? How will China assess their effectiveness? And if China determines that the exercises are ineffective, will it choose to halt military exercises or will it rather intensify its efforts? While military exercises serve as a grand performance for China, it has little control over how the global audience will react.

A previous version of this article mistakenly said Lai Ching-te was elected as president on May 20.