At the beginning of October, 1,800 state employees were instructed by the Tajik government in Dushanbe to caution locals in the country’s southwestern Khatlon Province against joining religious extremist groups. Among those employees were government officials, local council members, teachers, and doctors who completed “special courses” prior to the campaign on how to communicate with the population. Dushanbe’s so-called “door-to-door” campaign is part of wider efforts aimed at combating the alarming upsurge of radicalization and religious extremism in the country in recent years.
What do these door-to-door visits entail, and are they an effective way to counter radicalization?
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, there has been mounting concern about the rise and spread of Islamic extremism across Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which both share a long border with Afghanistan. Dushanbe has put measures in place to tighten border security. This year, dozens of Tajiks were accused of being involved in planning or carrying out attacks associated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional affiliate of the Islamic State. The attacks on Kerman City in Iran and Crocus City Hall in Moscow carried out by Tajik nationals with ISKP affiliation at the start of the year put pressure on Dushanbe to take counter-radicalization efforts and border control more seriously.
In the first half of 2024, door-to-door groups visited over 620,000 homes in the Khatlon region. During these visits, people are asked about friends and relatives living abroad who might be more susceptible to extremist influence; younger individuals are urged to join the army. Officials also warn about online groups and social media as forms of recruitment: embracing the so-called “media jihad,” ISKP uses propaganda to disseminate its message and mission across Central Asia with translations in Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen.
Door-to-door officials also advocate traditional Tajik clothing for women during their visits. This is not new: since 2015, Dushanbe has cracked down on clothing and other outward displays, like beards, associated with Islam. Now, the push for traditional attire can be more widespread.
While visits feel like interrogations and lectures about conforming to Tajik identity, people whose homes were visited said that talks were mainly about how to prevent radicalization, especially in younger individuals.
Critics who view the policy with skepticism say it does little to address the root causes of radicalization. Systemic poverty, lack of education, and high unemployment rates are among the socioeconomic challenges that contribute to radicalization in Tajikistan. Experts suggest a multi-dimensional approach that reduces domestic inequalities and supports higher-quality education in the long-term.
Another issue with Dushanbe’s policy is that it might be counterproductive: door-to-door visits that target physical appearance and advertise a Tajik “way of being” risks fueling socio-political exclusion and perceptions of injustice within society. Severely restricting the practice of religion and imposing state-ordered dress codes can marginalize parts of a population, and breed resentment toward the government. Lastly, some claim that these visits are intrusive. Interactions are sometimes filmed by the visitors and posted on social media.
Dushanbe’s door-to-door policy is part of an almost decade-long campaign to counter radicalization. But only warning people about this issue will not make it go away. While the door-to-door policy may raise awareness about radicalization, and educate some citizens about violent extremist movements, it does not address the more fundamental domestic problems like systemic poverty and restricted religious freedom. Without tackling the root causes of radicalization these kinds of initiatives are unlikely to achieve meaningful or sustainable outcomes to prevent religious extremism.