Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election last month has led to a growing debate over the form his foreign policy will take. At the core of this debate is the question of which issues he will prioritize in his foreign policy when Trump takes his place behind the Resolute desk in January.
In the 2024 election campaign, foreign policy was a more prominent issue than has been the case in previous U.S. presidential elections. Given the international context of the war in Ukraine and the Israeli occupation of Gaza, these two crises dominated the foreign policy issues in the campaign. Beyond Trump’s comments on tariffs on trade with China, Mexico, and Canada, competition in the Asia-Pacific has not been a key topic of debate in the campaign. As such, we have to interpret Trump’s comments and the policies of his previous administration to understand where he may seek to act in the region in 2025.
Analyzing policies from his first term, and Trump’s comments during the 2024 election, four key points stand out: First, Trump will be unlikely to cooperate with allies in a coordinated or institutional way. However, he may work together on an ad hoc basis.
Second, Trump will seek to be unpredictable in his comments on China-U.S. competition.
Third, U.S. allies are likely to be more reluctant to commit to U.S. policy, because of the risk of Trump reneging in some way.
Finally, Trump will likely try to challenge North Korea and China, potentially in cooperation with U.S. partners in the Asia-Pacific region such as India and the Philippines.
In his first term, Trump demonstrated his dislike of international cooperation and particularly international institutions. His immediate withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, his disparaging comments on NATO, and his distrust of the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic all demonstrated this dislike of international cooperation. We can expect Trump to demonstrate a similar attitude during his upcoming term, and a reluctance to further tie the United States into international institutions.
However, Trump was more willing to cooperate with international partners when it was clearly demonstrated to be to the advantage of the U.S., in an overt (typically monetary) way. While he was not happy with NAFTA when he entered office, once he was able to renegotiate the deal with Mexico and Canada he became more willing to engage. This could provide insight into how to deal with a second Trump administration. While he is likely to be averse to international cooperation, partners in the Asia-Pacific could overcome this by demonstrating a direct economic benefit to the United States.
U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific are likely to be apprehensive about Trump’s return to office. His proclamations about tariffs on trade and his hawkish attitude toward China demonstrates that cooperation between the United States and allies will be very different to cooperation with the Biden administration. Adding to the concern, while in Trump’s first administration there were establishment figures willing to stand up for the status quo in U.S. foreign policy, this is less likely this time around. Then-Chief Economic Advisor Gary Cohn’s willingness to confiscate the letter withdrawing the United States from the KORUS deal with South Korea was a strong example of this. By contrast, members of this incoming administration have been chosen for their loyalty to Trump and his vision, rather than their experience in government.
Trump has repeatedly proclaimed that his approach to competition and confrontation with China differed from the Washington establishment because his approach was “unpredictable.” Trump is highly likely to continue with this, given he frequently points to this area of foreign policy as one of his successes. Trump’s well-publicized verbal attacks on Kim Jong Un, calling him “little rocket man” and referring to U.S. nuclear weapons, will still be strongly imprinted in the memory of leaders and diplomats from across the Asia-Pacific.
Trump left office on bizarrely good terms with the North Korean leader; however, Asia-Pacific allies should be concerned about the direction Trump’s unpredictability doctrine will take. If not directed at North Korea, Trump’s next target for his ire would presumably be China. However, this is arguably the predictable avenue for Trump to take, and the strongest lesson to be drawn from Trump’s time in the Oval Office is that he has the ability to subvert predictions.
U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific has been increasingly significant in recent years, and in Trump’s first term his influence on U.S. foreign policy was strongly felt in the region. From his angry exchanges with Kim Jong Un to his red-carpet treatment in Beijing and New Delhi, and his “trade war” with China, Trump was active and attention-grabbing in his policy in the Asia-Pacific. While the Biden administration has operated more conventionally, they have also continued Trump’s flagship “trade war” tariffs on China. Trump’s return to the Oval Office signifies another serious change of course in U.S. foreign policy, and this is likely to be felt most in the Asia-Pacific.