U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific

The responses of key U.S. allies – Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – to Washington’s maritime capability-commitment gap reflect the future of Indo-Pacific security.

The U.S. alliance network is its greatest advantage in the competition with China. But Washington can hardly count on its allies if it treats them worse than the way it treats its systemic rival.

During this sensitive time of Seoul’s political turmoil, Blinken’s much-awaited visit to South Korea is the last gift that the Biden administration wants to offer its ally. 

The strongest lesson to be drawn from Trump’s time in the Oval Office is that he has the ability to subvert predictions. 

Having checked China in Asia, the Biden administration will be a hard act to follow, particularly given regional governments' skepticism of Trump.

China is the biggest factor behind the continued development of the U.S. alliance network – a trend that works independently of, and supersedes, any political dynamics in Washington.

The two sides will find it increasingly difficult to avoid intense security competition over the coming decades, but there are still meaningful choices to make.

Different threat perceptions as well as Japan’s colonization of Korea and atrocities committed during World War II have made even basic trilateral cooperation difficult – until now. 

For Moscow, AUKUS is a threat to the delicate balance in the Asia-Pacific – a region that is crucial to Russia’s economic plans and foreign policy strategy.

Insights from Liselotte Odgaard.

Inter-regional solidarity in the face of aggression is welcome. But there are hard limits to hard commitments outside of a country’s home region.

A mutually assured deterrence could be an alternative diplomatic strategy toward Pyongyang.