On January 5, the Taiwanese government alleged that the Chinese-owned vessel Shunxin-39 cut an undersea fiber-optic cable near Taiwan’s Keelung Harbor by reportedly dragging its anchor across the seabed. Taiwan’s government-run telecommunications operator, Chunghwa Telecom, discovered the alleged sabotage after receiving a disruption warning around 7:51 a.m. While the ship is reportedly registered in Cameroon and Tanzania, the Taiwanese Coast Guard stated that all seven crew members were Chinese nationals and the ship’s owner was based in Hong Kong.
On January 10, a director of the company operating Shunxin-39 refuted the allegations, despite the ship’s movements reportedly sustaining the sabotage hypothesis.
This incident appears to be the latest example of Beijing-directed “gray-zone harassment.” In 2023, similar sabotage severed two submarine cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, which temporarily disrupted their internet services. This most recent incident highlights the complex dynamics of China’s gray-zone tactics against Taiwan. Most notably, its timing – just weeks before Donald Trump’s inauguration for a second term as the United States’ president – raises the stakes, with China potentially testing the resilience of the Taiwan-U.S. partnership and Washington’s broader commitment to Indo-Pacific security.
Chinese Hybrid Warfare and Gray Zone Operations
The investigation into the Shunxin-39 incident remains inconclusive thus far, though the incident is far from isolated. It appears to align with Beijing’s broader use of hybrid warfare tactics to assert its claims over Taiwan, which it deems a “renegade province.” China’s gray-zone tactics – an established playbook – refers to a multitude of actions designed to deter, coerce, or subdue adversaries without escalating to full-scale war. In this context, China’s actions seem aimed at preventing Taiwanese independence, advancing unification with the mainland, and undermining or outright preventing foreign support for Taiwan, all while stopping short of an outright invasion and/or blockade.
To that end, China has employed a diverse array of tactics across various domains over the years, including cognitive warfare and influence operations such as swaying public opinion online, orchestrating disinformation campaigns, and promoting people-to-people exchanges. Beijing has also leveraged other gray-zone operations – such as regular maritime and aerial incursions near Taiwan, cyberattacks, and military exercises – alongside lawfare targeting Taiwanese citizens through legal ambiguities, detentions under security pretext, and even threats of “execution.” Other measures include espionage, trade pressures, and efforts to diminish diplomatic support for Taiwan, reflecting China’s “Three Warfares” concept.
These operations involve a multitude of state, non-state and ambiguous Chinese actors, from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and United Front Work Department (UFWD) to the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the maritime militia. While Beijing often denies deliberate involvement, such actions continue to damage China’s international reputation, particularly among Western nations. As these tactics are likely to persist indefinitely, the risk of escalation – including large-scale military force by Beijing – remains a looming concern. Over time, the protracted nature of this “salami-slicing” tactic may yield incremental gains for China in its pursuit of dominance over Taiwan.
The United States remains a key linchpin in Taiwan’s security strategy to counter China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the incoming Trump administration is expected to revive its first-term policies under the manta of “America First.” Central to this approach is Trump’s embrace of rhetoric labelling key regional allies as security “free-riders” and threatening to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region unless partners boost defense spending and financial contributions to Washington.
The potential of a decreased U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific presents a great opportunity for Beijing and its geopolitical goals, particularly its aim to bring Taiwan back into its fold. An all-out invasion of Taiwan remains a low-likelihood scenario in the short term, as it would potentially prompt regional players – particularly the United States, Japan or Australia – to concertedly counter China’s actions. However, there is a high likelihood that Beijing will seize the opportunity of a declining U.S. presence in the region to further increase its gray-zone harassment, or hybrid warfare, to clandestinely achieve its geopolitical ambitions while maintaining an outward face of international cooperation.
How Have Taipei and Washington Responded to These Hybrid Warfare Tactics?
Taiwan, and its partners, have not sat idly by but have actively pursued a range of countermeasures to address these growing security challenges. Taipei has invested in its satellite communications (SATCOM) industry, exploring secure domestic and international SATCOM options critical for resilience in a blockade or invasion scenario. Concurrently, the Taiwan Coast Guard is undergoing fleet expansion, alongside the country’s new one-year military service program enacted in 2024.
Taiwan’s Presidential Office also conducted late-2024 “tabletop” war game exercises with the armed forces to prepare for potential China-induced crises, including internet blackouts caused by undersea cable disruptions – a scenario that could accompany a Chinese attack. Although the results were not disclosed, these exercises underscore Taipei’s focus on strategic readiness.
Similarly, the United States under the Biden administration continued to supply Taiwan with various defense systems, with more sales reportedly expected. Moreover, U.S. special operations forces, stationed in Taiwan for several years, are expected to increase in number, and Washington has stepped up its freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Taiwan Strait, supported by a growing coalition of allies. These actions underscore the high level of importance that the Biden administration placed on the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy, vis-a-vis global security and economic interests.
Relations between the United States and China modestly improved under Biden compared to his predecessor, exemplified by the November 2023 agreement to restore a bilateral military hotline to manage crisis escalation. Despite this, doubts persist about its effectiveness in curbing Beijing’s gray-zone tactics, vis-à-vis Taiwan.
Any goodwill gained during Biden’s term is highly likely to erode throughout the second Trump administration, given Trump’s historically hawkish rhetoric toward Beijing. Indeed, Trump’s looming threat of a 20 percent economic tariff on all incoming Chinese goods and his past rhetoric suggests a U.S. retreat from the Indo-Pacific indicates a volatile and disengaged approach that could exacerbate regional tensions.
This dynamic strongly reflects the necessity of decisive political responses to counter gray-zone activities. While Beijing and Taipei have maintained stable but contentious policies, Washington’s “strategic ambiguity” toward cross-strait tensions will likely rise throughout Trump’s second presidency. Nevertheless, U.S. defense deals with Taiwan can be expected to continue, albeit with higher costs for Taipei, highlighting the shifting balance in cross-strait and Indo-Pacific security policy.
Chinese Gray-zone Operations During the Trump Administration
The incoming Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan is expected to align with its broader Indo-Pacific policies, emphasizing transactional and financial dynamics. As such, Taiwan may face pressure to increase its defense spending – potentially exceeding the 2 percent GDP threshold expected of NATO allies – or to boost purchases from U.S. defense firms as a prerequisite for a continued Taiwan-U.S. security relationship. Additionally, Trump’s assertions that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is “stealing” American jobs could lead to expectations that Taipei shift some operations to the United States as compensation for its reliance on the U.S. security umbrella.
Such scenarios could prompt Beijing and its proxies to escalate hybrid warfare aimed at destabilizing the Taiwan-U.S. relationship. High-profile operations, including maritime blockades, disinformation campaigns, and submarine cable sabotage, are highly likely to remain prominent threats under Trump’s presidency. The prospect of Taiwan relocating parts of its semiconductor industry to the U.S., however, presents a particularly attractive target for Chinese cyber operations.
Taiwan’s role as a global leader in semiconductor production, accounting for an estimated 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips – primarily through Taiwanese firm TSMC – remains a key factor deterring Beijing from launching a full-scale invasion. Any invasion of Taiwan would likely result in the destruction of this critical supply chain, significantly hindering China’s economic growth. To mitigate the impact of such a scenario, Beijing has employed gray-zone tactics, notably corporate and cyber espionage, to steal critical technology to bolster its domestic capabilities. According to Taiwan’s Government Service Network (GSN), the island received a “daily average of 2.4 million [cyber]attacks” in 2024, with the majority attributed to China’s cyber forces.
While Taiwan’s investments in cybersecurity – bolstered by international partners such as the Netherlands – have largely prevented Beijing’s attempts to gain a decisive technological edge, the establishment of semiconductor facilities in the United States could increase the risk of intellectual property theft. Concerns are heightened by U.S. vulnerabilities in national cybersecurity infrastructure, compounded by the Trump administration’s deregulation approach to cybersecurity. The recent large-scale China-linked hack of the U.S. telecommunications sector underscores these risks, as U.S. national security experts caution that we are unlikely to ever know if Beijing’s hackers have been completely kicked out of U.S. networks.
Successful data theft by Chinese actors would reduce Beijing’s reliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor capabilities, potentially accelerating its timeline for a military invasion. Combined with a weakened U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, such developments could significantly heighten the risks of conflict, making semiconductor security a critical geopolitical flashpoint.
What Kind of Support Is Trump Likely to Offer Taiwan?
Politically, Taipei is likely to attempt to shore up support from incoming U.S. President Donald Trump without jeopardizing its economic well-being. The United States has long been a key informal ally, with nearly $50 billion worth of defense equipment and services sold to Taiwan since 1950. Under outgoing President Joe Biden, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to the relationship, approving a $2 billion arms deal in October 2024.
However, a second Trump presidency is highly likely to bring renewed pressure on Taipei to further increase its defense spending or purchase additional advanced military systems from the United States. This aligns with Trump’s broader agenda of addressing perceived imbalances in Washington’s strategic partnerships. Such uncertainties under a Trump administration may push Taipei to bolster its domestic defense manufacturing capabilities to reduce reliance on U.S. support.
While Trump’s transactional approach to the Taiwan-U.S. security relationship is unlikely to hinder broader Indo-Pacific efforts to counter China, it may fall short of providing Taipei the necessary edge to effectively counter Beijing’s hybrid activities. Instead, both Taipei and the Trump administration will likely need to adopt their own gray-zone tactics to stay below the threshold of open conflict while also stymieing China’s activity.
One potential avenue is leveraging the Taiwan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), a legal mechanism likely to gain bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. The ACSA would “allow the U.S. Department of Defense to exchange supplies, services, and logistical support” with Taiwan, enabling U.S. aircraft and naval vessels to refuel and operate in the region. In concert, Washington could conduct additional patrols around Taiwan, serving as a deterrent against China’s aggressive incursions into Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
Such measures would not only bolster Taiwan’s security infrastructure but also align with Trump’s domestic efforts to highlight his hawkish approach toward China. This dual approach could provide a framework for Taipei and Washington to counter Beijing’s aggressive actions without escalating to outright conflict.
The Coming Turbulent Trump Years
The next four years are poised to be critical not only for Taiwan’s security but also for the broader dynamics of China-U.S. competition. Escalation appears likely, driven by Trump’s threats of additional tariffs and restrictions targeting Chinese products and manufacturers. In turn, Beijing is expected to refine and expand its gray-zone tactics across Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Trump’s potentially transactional approach to Taiwan and other regional security allies, such as Japan, risks creating a more volatile Indo-Pacific with increased opportunities for escalation. This uncertainty underscores the need for Taipei to further bolster its domestic capabilities to counter China’s hybrid warfare strategies and its overarching geopolitical objective of achieving unification with Taiwan.
As the region braces for heightened tensions, Taiwan’s ability to navigate these challenges will be instrumental in maintaining stability and deterring aggression in an increasingly precarious Indo-Pacific landscape.
