Myanmar’s strategic position as a bridge between two rising Asian powers, China and India, places it at the center of a critical geopolitical nexus. The historian Thant Myint-U underscored the country’s strategic importance in his 2011 book “Where China Meets India.” Examining Myanmar’s pivotal role during its early semi-democratic transition under President Thein Sein, he likened the nation to the Suez Canal, a key intersection for global economic activity.
Myanmar’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s Act East Policy (AEP) has shaped the responses of both nations to the military coup of February 2021, which has placed economic considerations at the forefront. Both China and India have viewed Myanmar’s military as the stabilizing force necessary to protect their investments and regional strategies. This pragmatic approach underscores their foreign policy priorities with regard to Myanmar.
Without the political support of neighboring powers, Myanmar’s democratic forces face significant obstacles. Recent developments in China’s foreign policy towards Myanmar highlight this dynamic. China has actively sought to de-escalate conflicts between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed groups, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. These groups have been urged to halt their offensives and disengage from the National Unity Government (NUG), which is nominally coordinating the nationwide resistance to military rule, signaling China’s vested interest in preserving its relationship with Myanmar’s military as a stabilizing force in the region.
Meanwhile, a United Nations report revealed that India has provided arms and materials to Myanmar’s junta, further complicating the position of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. These international dynamics illustrate the strategic bind in which Myanmar finds itself, caught between the competing interests of China and India.
To secure the political support of China and India, the NUG must demonstrate its ability to maintain stability and safeguard the economic interests of these influential neighbors. Achieving this balance is crucial for ensuring that Myanmar’s democratic aspirations align with the economic priorities of China and India, while avoiding subjugation to either side’s geopolitical objectives.
However, Myanmar’s identity and democratic future cannot be shaped solely by external pressures. Much like the culinary innovation of Burmese tofu, which was created by drawing on both Indian and Chinese culinary traditions to craft a distinctly Burmese delicacy, Myanmar’s diplomatic strategy must emphasize balance, adaptation, and self-determination.
The idea of “Burmese Tofu Diplomacy” would symbolize Myanmar’s capacity to harmonize the competing influences of China and India while maintaining its path as a sovereign democratic nation. Myanmar has long existed between these two culturally and politically dominant powers, yet throughout history, both China and India have been unable to impose their influence on the country entirely. This resilience stems from Myanmar’s ability to adapt to external influences, transforming it into something uniquely its own. Similarly, Myanmar’s foreign policy must be a fusion of regional influences and internal autonomy, charting a path that protects its democracy and sovereignty.
In the aftermath of Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, the NUG faced the critical task of striking a delicate balance between fostering democracy and accommodating the existing economic interests of powerful foreign countries, including China and India. The challenge lies in aligning Myanmar’s sovereign and democratic aspirations with the economic priorities of these neighboring nations, ensuring that Myanmar’s future path is not dictated solely by the strategic objectives of any outside nation but reflects the aspirations of the Myanmar people.
The people of Myanmar have made it clear that they seek democracy while also recognizing the importance of maintaining strong economic ties with China and India. They aim to embrace democratic principles, much in the way that Indians, who lay claim to being the world’s largest democracy, enjoy a variety of spices in their cuisine. They do not wish to replicate the taste of Indian curry but instead aim to create a unique fusion akin to the distinctive flavor of Burmese tofu.
Similarly, while China’s interests in Myanmar primarily focus on economic engagement, the Burmese people’s preference is for a version of “tofu” crafted with chickpeas and turmeric, not soybeans. This approach to Myanmar’s diplomacy reflects its desire to maintain its unique identity, ensuring a fusion that honors both democratic principles and economic pragmatism.
As China has expressed concerns about Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces being aligned with Western powers, the NUG faces the challenge of proving that its pursuit of democracy does not threaten China’s interests. The NUG must clarify to China that Myanmar’s transition to democracy is compatible with the stability that both countries require. At the same time, in the eventual downfall of Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime, the NUG will not pledge allegiance to China at the cost of its democratic principles. Instead, it will prioritize mutual respect, seeking to foster a relationship that honors the interests of the citizens of both nations. China should remember that Myanmar’s people will not forget who stood with them in their time of crisis, a sentiment that will shape the future of Myanmar-China relations once the military regime has been overthrown.
On the other hand, the NUG must reform its leadership and broaden its inclusivity to enhance its position in engaging with both China and India. Building on its existing partnerships with major ethnic groups, the NUG should form a coalition government that truly reflects Myanmar’s ethnic diversity and the hard power realities on the ground. This requires integrating leadership from influential ethnic organizations such as the Kachin Independence Organization, the Karen National Union, and representatives from the Rohingya ethnic group.
A pivotal step in this transformation would be the adoption of a transitional federal constitution that ensures federal democracy, granting greater autonomy to ethnic regions and fostering a more inclusive political framework. Furthermore, the NUG must prioritize the abolition of the 1982 Citizenship Law, a key factor in the persecution of the Rohingya and the broader ethnic conflict.
Addressing these issues is essential for promoting stability, which aligns with the strategic interests of China and India, as well as for achieving national reconciliation with ethnic minorities. These reforms would significantly bolster the NUG’s case for diplomatic recognition from Western democratic countries.
With these steps, the NUG can present itself as the only viable force capable of safeguarding China and India’s economic interests in Myanmar. Beijing and New Delhi must recognize this new coalition government and inclusive leadership as the legitimate representatives of Myanmar, capable of maintaining stability while respecting both Myanmar’s democratic principles and China and India’s economic and strategic priorities.