The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Vita Golod – visiting adjunct instructor at Carolina Asia Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, junior fellow at A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and co-author of the article “Tracing the Path of Sino-Ukrainian Relations: From the Post-Soviet Era to the Russo-Ukrainian War” published in the Journal of Contemporary China – is the 444th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Explain Ukraine’s approach toward China since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.
In a few words, the Sino-Ukrainian relations during the conflict can be described as a diplomatic drama. Since the invasion began, President Zelenskyy and Ukrainian officials have frequently appealed to Chinese leader Xi Jinping through media channels, highlighting the ineffectiveness of official diplomatic channels the first year of invasion. Despite Ukraine’s efforts, there has been only one phone call between Zelenskyy and Xi in April 2023 and just two top-level visits by Ukrainian diplomats to China in 2024, a stark contrast to the frequent and extensive meetings between Chinese and Russian diplomats.
For China, it was a deliberate choice to maximize influence and security in the light of its rivalry with the U.S. The Ukrainian leadership understands this geopolitical puzzle very well and seeks alternative channels of engagement with China where it is possible. Ukraine’s economic relationship with China, as one of its largest trading partners, suggests that Kyiv’s strategy is focused on maintaining diplomatic and economic ties to avoid outright confrontation with Beijing.
Ukraine has actively sought China’s support as a global power to mediate the conflict and potentially act as a guarantor of Ukraine’s security. This effort includes nuclear security, given the existence of a legal basis for such negotiations between Ukraine and China, as well as food security guarantees, as Ukraine must preserve its export channels in the Black Sea. By the way, China was the greatest beneficiary of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. However, Ukraine has not achieved any significant breakthroughs with Beijing so far.
Ukraine recently received a new Chinese ambassador, Ma Shengkun, and a new Ukrainian ambassador, Olexander Nechytaylo, has been appointed to China, although he has yet to receive agreement. Perhaps this development could bring some new dynamics to the Sino-Ukrainian relations.
Evaluate how effectively Kyiv has managed relations with Beijing amid strong China-Russia cooperation in the war.
This direction is undoubtedly one of the most challenging for Ukrainian diplomats. It is evident that China’s increasing alignment with Russia has significantly impacted both current and future Sino-Ukrainian relations. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategic relationship with the U.S. heavily shapes its foreign policy approach toward China. Additionally, the Taiwanese factor has become an important consideration. Taiwan’s visible support for Ukraine has garnered significant sympathy among Ukrainians, contrasting sharply with the growing perception of China as a hostile country. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to adhere to the One China policy, prioritizing its economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing over closer engagement with Taiwan. Sino-Ukrainian relations have demonstrated a certain degree of resilience, albeit transitioning from a potential strategic-level partnership to a relationship now predominantly centered on trade.
How might the Trump 2.0 presidency impact Kyiv’s strategic calculus toward Moscow and Beijing?
In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war resolution, Trump could be seen as a black swan. His “America First” approach could result in unexpected interventions or initiatives that disrupt conventional diplomatic efforts made by Ukraine and its allies since February 2022. Trump has suggested the possibility of forcing Ukraine or other parties to negotiate with Russia, potentially aligning with the China-Brazilian proposal made in May 2024, which has been highly criticized by President Zelenskyy. In December, during one of his interviews, Trump mentioned that Xi Jinping could bring peace to Ukraine, while his special envoy for the conflict, General Keith Kellogg, claimed the war could be ended in 100 days.
In contrast to the Biden presidency, the Trump administration could significantly reduce or even halt military and financial aid to Ukraine, undermining Kyiv’s ability to counter Russia militarily and forcing it into negotiations with Russia under terms unfavorable to Ukraine. Trump’s repeated skepticism about NATO and the U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts could further weaken Western unity. This scenario would strengthen Russia’s position while leaving Ukraine more vulnerable and significantly weakened in its efforts to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
A Trump 2.0 presidency could potentially push Kyiv to explore deeper economic ties with China as a hedge against reduced U.S. support. Beijing’s economic and diplomatic activities could potentially intensify immediately after both sides reach a ceasefire resolution, especially if Beijing plays a mediating role in the negotiations, providing Ukraine with avenues for critical trade, financial partnerships and infrastructure development. This shift could potentially reshape Kyiv’s foreign policy strategy, emphasizing pragmatism and survival tactics to offset diminished American support. However, it is more likely that Ukraine’s future strategy toward China will align closely with the general EU strategy, especially given the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023.
Analyze what type of outcome in the Ukraine war would benefit China the most.
It would likely be a negotiated settlement achieved through China’s mediation. Such a scenario would enable Beijing to project itself as a neutral powerbroker, aligning with its fundamental principles of foreign policy, while simultaneously preserving its economic and strategic ties with Russia, Ukraine, and the West. This outcome would undermine U.S. dominance, which aligns with China’s long-term strategic interests.
When discussing a ceasefire in Ukraine, China’s primary aim appears to be stabilizing global energy and food markets, benefiting its trade-dependent economy and reducing supply chain disruptions. To date, China has already capitalized on discounted Russian oil and gas due to Western sanctions, bolstering its energy security at lower costs. Additionally, Beijing has extracted favorable terms in trade and other agreements, making Russia increasingly dependent on China economically and strategically.
Identify Kyiv’s top priorities vis-à-vis Beijing and Washington in negotiating the next phase of the war.
As Zelenskyy has publicly stated, Ukraine’s current top priority is to secure security guarantees from the U.S., akin to the “Israel scenario.” He has expressed a strong desire to meet with Trump as soon as possible to discuss these agreements. Whether or not Ukraine obtains these guarantees will be a pivotal moment, shaping the next steps in the war and the broader trajectory of Ukrainian foreign policy.
I believe all countries are closely watching these developments, including China. From my observations during my visit to Beijing last year and conversations with Ukrainian diplomats, Kyiv’s diplomatic priority vis-à-vis Beijing is to maintain at least a political dialogue and keep communication channels open. Xi Jinping is unlikely to travel to Kyiv anytime soon, and it seems doubtful he would invite Zelenskyy to Zhongnanhai.
Ukraine and its allies are closely monitoring China’s actions to ensure it does not support Russia militarily, including through the provision of dual-purpose goods or assistance in evading Western sanctions, an issue that has occurred frequently in recent years.
China’s leverage over North Korea also presents an opportunity. It would be highly effective if Beijing could use its influence to curb North Korea’s participation in the war. Additionally, nuclear and food security guarantees from China remain logical priorities for Ukraine, as previously mentioned. However, these issues are likely to be addressed in Washington, D.C., or Brussels, and would need to align with China’s strategic interests.