Trump is no friend to China. From derogatory rhetoric about the “China virus” during the COVID-19 pandemic to recent trade tariff threats, the 45th and 47th president of the United States has long been targeting the People’s Republic of China on many fronts. The increasing rivalry between the – now again Trump-led – U.S. government and Xi Jinping’s China has also played out at the United Nations, often with bipartisan U.S. support.
During his first term, Trump repeatedly made use of U.N. fora to attack Beijing rhetorically. Representatives of both the first Trump and the Biden administration intervened in U.N. board meetings and behind the scenes to halt U.N. support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This time around, Trump has appointed Marco Rubio, a long-term “China hawk,” as secretary of state. And the Trump administration’s representative at the U.N., Elise Stefanik, vowed during her confirmation hearing to curb Chinese power at the world organization. At the United Nations as elsewhere, China has become the ultimate rival for Trump and his entourage.
Yet, Trump’s actions and approach vis-à-vis the U.N. system are set to ultimately play into Beijing’s hands. This includes the U.S. withdrawal from individual U.N. bodies, a more general U.S. disengagement from the U.N. system, and a partial alignment between Trump and Xi on what multilateralism is ultimately all about.
First, Trump’s (potential) retreat from individual U.N. bodies opens up concrete spaces for an expansion of China’s multilateral weight. His first actions in office included signing orders to pull out of the World Health Organization and the Paris Agreement on climate change. A number of other multilateral mechanisms could soon be affected as well, if not through outright withdrawal then via explicit disdain or de facto shunning. This will provide concrete opportunities for China to step in.
Beijing is unlikely to replace the United States by mimicking past U.S. engagement; instead, China will focus on what it believes matters strategically for strengthening its footprint over the long run. As a developing country superpower, China is able to combine its standing as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council – a position also held by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France – with its membership in the Group of 77, the developing country alliance at the U.N. The combination of capacity and legitimacy that this dual identify provides is a unique feature of China’s engagement, which Beijing has already translated into multilateral engagement mechanisms of its liking. They include South-South partnerships, where Chinese technologies and development experiences are promoted across the so-called developing world. The Global Development Initiative, in turn, has been set up as a rallying point for China-led support for the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.
Beijing’s funding modalities have been a key features of China’s hands-on engagement. With the start of 2025, China’s share of the U.N. regular budget has – for the first time – reached 20 percent (up from about 15 percent in the previous funding cycle), coming close to the 22 percent the U.S. government is expected to pay. While China has thus almost caught up with the United States in terms of obligatory membership payments, it has been reluctant to increase its share of voluntary contributions that many entities in the U.N. system financially depend on. Instead of imitating the United States and other Western donors in providing considerable parts of their funding as core contributions that U.N. entities can make use of without strings attached, China has opted for a more targeted use of its money. It has set up (overall modest) trust funds that channel money into the U.N. system in line with Beijing’s preferences when it comes to both partners and policies. A U.S. withdrawal from bodies such as the WHO will not only make China the most important contributor to regular budgets but also increase the space for China-led funding and cooperation mechanisms.
Second, and more generally, Trump’s approach to the U.N. is set to further undermine the role of the United States as the backbone of the current multilateral system. Beyond a withdrawal from individual U.N. bodies, a more far-reaching U.S. retreat would contribute to what official Chinese sources refer to as a shift from a “U.S.-centered” to a “U.N.-centered” world. Under Trump, the United States is unlikely to continue as a steadfast guarantor of the post-1945 multilateral system.
U.S. governments have always had a complex (and often complicated) relationship with the United Nations, as reflected in disputes over Palestine or U.S. Congressional debates about U.N. funding. However, most of Trump’s predecessors had an overall supportive stance toward the U.N. as an inherent part of a multilateral system that long served as a mechanism for U.S. hegemony. The track record of Trump 1.0 and arguments put forward by Trump’s entourage suggest that this has been changing, and that Trump 2.0 is likely to further undermine the position of the United States as the core player of U.N. multilateralism. Trump’s administration – including Stefanik as U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. – is unwilling to continue with the provision of broad and unweathering support for the U.N. together with its Western allies.
In many ways, this aligns with Beijing’s hopes. The “U.N.-centered” world that China has long been promoting is one where the United States no longer calls the multilateral shots. Instead, China foresees that the developing country majority at the U.N. – with Beijing as primus inter pares – will dominate decision-making and cooperation processes. While large parts of the U.N. system still disproportionally depend on U.S. funding, the dominance the United States has long projected across the U.N. system through political, financial, and other means is not as irrefutable as some might have thought. Indeed, many U.N. entities currently receive only a minor share of their budgets from U.S. coffers. Even though decisions by the U.S. government to halt funding would send shockwaves through the U.N. system and throw the U.N. Secretariat into chaos, it seems likely most entities would be able to weather the storm and turn to other member states – including China – to restructure their funding channels.
Third, the underlying logic of Trump’s approach to the U.N. ultimately serves to bolster China’s long-term vision of “true” multilateralism. Beyond questions about the potential absence of the United States, Trump’s America First outlook and his focus on bilateral or minilateral deals undermine the idea of a strong international bureaucracy. His transactional take on multilateral cooperation foresees rather weak international organizations that remain at the mercy of the most powerful member states.
While Xi explicitly embraces a “U.N.-centered” world, his underlying conception of multilateralism resonates with Trump’s. For both leaders, U.N. entities and U.N. staff are supposed to act as brokers for and facilitators of member state interactions. Similar to Trump, Xi is not a fan of a more autonomous U.N. bureaucracy but underlines the inter-governmental logic of multilateral cooperation. Trump’s opposition to more interventionist forms of multilateral action – often associated with liberal humanitarianism – resonate with China’s focus on sovereignty and non-interference (even if Beijing’s position on Russia’s war against Ukraine clashes with this principled stance).
China’s rejection of universal values and embrace of normative pluralism, as expressed in its Global Civilization Initiative, project a vision of international order where multilateral entities are unable to challenge member states’ authority. The U.N.’s human rights arm and its focus on China’s human rights challenges, for instance, have long been a thorn in Beijing’s flesh. The America First approach championed by Stefanik – where all U.S. funding commitments to the U.N. are set to be evaluated on whether they directly benefit the United States – resonates with this general embrace of weak multilateralism.
An abrupt U.S. retreat from the entire U.N. system is unlikely, not least because of China: Trump and his entourage are well aware that a complete withdrawal could seriously affect U.S. interests. Despite mounting rivalries and tensions between China and the United States that some have stylized as a Second Cold War, it seems as though the current leaders of the two superpowers share a disdain for strong and more autonomous multilateral institutions. This does not bode well for those committed to a more substantive idea of U.N. multilateralism centering on a stable international bureaucracy with a strong normative compass. Trump does not mind offending traditional U.S. allies supportive of – and at least partly dependent on – strong multilateral institutions, but he underestimates (or does not care about) long-term consequences. Ultimately, it might be China who – long after Trump will have left the White House – laughs last and longest. For Beijing, Trump 2.0 suggests that the shift from a “U.S.-centered” to a “U.N.-centered” world is well underway.