The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Russell Hsiao – executive director of Global Taiwan Institute, adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum, and author of “Red Tide: CCP Propaganda and United Front in the 21st Century” (2025) – is the 450th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Compare and contrast the objectives, functions, and methods of the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CPD) and the United Front Work Department (UFWD).
The ultimate objective of the CPD and the UFWD is to amass “discourse power” and achieve narrative dominance by winning what CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping described as the “public opinion struggle.” Its supporting objectives are two-pronged: One prong is to propagandize Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy positions, and the other is to attenuate and undermine adversarial narratives.
There are significant overlaps in the objectives and functions of the CPD and the UFWD. While the function of the CPD is to control the narrative conveyed through media channels on issues that the Chinese leadership deems important for the party-state’s interests, the function of the UFWD is to cultivate and mobilize political coalitions within and across interest groups, internally within the country and externally, to support its policies and to oppose that of its political adversaries.
Both organizations employ overt and covert methods in their operations, which aim to influence individuals and organizations among the political elites, government, media, academic, cultural, and civil society space. Although these two organs and their target sets were originally more internally focused, they have taken on a more externally focused orientation as the PRC’s interests have expanded globally. In its effort to undermine adversarial narratives, CPD and UFWD methods seek to shape the information battlespace by sowing discord, confusion, and weakening cognitive and political cohesion to undermine the resiliency of a target society and its government against its propaganda.
Highlight CPD and UFWD objectives and influence in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Taiwan – as first among equals for CCP “red lines” that include issues of democracy, human rights, and rights to development – falls into a unique category for its priority in CPD and UFWD operations. There are similarities between CPD and UFWD objectives and influence activities in Hong Kong and Taiwan because the CCP views both primarily as lost territories that must be “reunified” and firmly under its control. The objectives directed at Hong Kong and Taiwan are similar in that the CCP seeks to deter so-called “secessionist” activities and compel unification.
CPD and UFWD influence activities in Hong Kong and Taiwan stand out for their deep penetration and wide scope when compared to the other case studies. One clear distinction is that the CCP enjoys a high degree of access in both places in terms of capital flows and human interactions that enable its influence operations.
Describe CPD and UFWD objectives and influence in Japan.
Given the historical issues between Japan and China, CCP propaganda and United Front activities against Japan tend to focus on matters of history, concerns with Japanese militarism, and also Taiwan. In addition to activities that would be characterized as traditional intelligence operations, the CCP often amplifies and seeks to build support and coalitions across Japanese domestic audiences, both at the elite level and among the general public, but also externally in other targets like Taiwan or South Korea to support its anti-Japanese and anti-American rhetoric.
CPD and UFWD activities in Japan are more targeted at the political and business elites, and they tend to have much more influence with the fringe segments of society since the mainstream of society and traditional media remain harder for Chinese propaganda and United Front operations to penetrate. This means that its influence activities may be more effective in rural areas – like Okinawa – with local governments, universities in less populated city centers, and fringe social and religious groups, although such impact has not been thoroughly studied and is difficult to assess.
Examine CPD and UFWD objectives and influence in Singapore and South Korea.
CPD and UFWD objectives and influence do not differ substantially from Singapore and South Korea. The two countries share similar features in that both are close security partners of the United States but also maintain extensive economic and cultural ties with China. Singapore is a majority ethnic-Chinese state and South Korea is a traditional Confucian society and treaty ally of the United States. Both polities also have traditional constituencies that are more pro-China, and the level of success in such activities can vary across political administrations and geopolitical conditions.
A common thread is that the objectives of CPD and UFWD influence activities in both countries are aimed at undermining the credibility of the United States as a security partner, while having them cleave closer to Chinese interests for economic reasons or cultural and political affinity. In the case of South Korea, there is a unique centralized structure between the CPD and UFWD, with significant overlaps in the persons within the networks. A review of the expansive political activities of CPD and UFWD organizations and their leaders underscores the depth and breadth of their political motives and the degree of their penetration into South Korean politics, from opposing Japan-ROK intelligence sharing to protesting against U.S. missile defense deployments.
As a small state where ethnic Chinese comprise around 74 percent of the population, national identity is an existential issue in Singapore. In Singapore, the CPD and the UFWD utilize clan, business, and cultural exchanges in their influence work to co-opt local political and community elites to support the CCP’s policies. While the effectiveness of these measures is debatable, the recent application of anti-external influence measures underscores the growing penetration of these efforts into Singaporean society. The PRC also leverages the local media’s dependency on the Chinese market to have it promote pro-CCP articles and exercise self-censorship.
Access Beijing’s agenda behind the CPD and the UFWD’s activities in these U.S. allies and partners and implications for U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Contrary to the perception that the CPD and the UFWD are singularly focused on Taiwan, CCP propaganda and United Front activities demonstrate an expansive agenda that underscores the party-state’s global ambitions.
In addition to the CCP’s aim to reshape the global order and make it safer for its development path, a common thread that reaches across all the case studies is its aim to make these countries and/or their populations more aligned with the PRC’s interests and to undermine the credibility of the United States. If these activities are left unanswered, it could have serious implications for U.S. interests in the region.